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51. Introduction
Ever since the time of Adam Smith, the founding father of Economics, competition has been
viewed as a natural market force that coordinates the individual behaviour of market
participants. Like an “invisible hand”, competitive interaction alters individual planned
behaviour (Budzinski 2004) towards more efficient economic performance. As a facilitator
of general economic wealth and efficiency, competition ultimately results in significant
improvements of social wealth.
Illegal collusion practices in the market place (cartels) will seriously undermine competition.
This will harm consumers by the increase of prices and restriction of supply; it will tilt the
balance of market power, increase waste and lead to inefficiencies in countries whose
markets would otherwise be competitive (OECD Policy Briefs 2002).
Over the past decade a series of cartels have been disclosed in the supply market to the
energy industries in both Norway and the EU. The effects of such collusions are increased
costs to owners and operators of power plants and electrical grids which, in turn, will lead to
increased electricity prices for their customers.
Norway is a major energy nation in Europe based on a completely unique set of resources:
abundant hydropower, petroleum and natural gas, as well as new renewable energy sources
such as wind power and biomass. Whereas Norway has only one per cent of Europe’s
population, it represents 20 per cent of total hydropower resources, 40 per cent of the gas
resources and 60 per cent of the oil resources.1 According to Statistics Norway the value of
supplies and services to electric utilities in Norway amounted to ca 27 billion NOK (approx
3,5 bill EUR) in 2007.2 A sector of this scale constitutes considerable earnings potential for
suppliers willing to illegally coordinate their market activities, to the detriment of society.
This thesis addresses the problem of supplier cartels discusses the structural and behavioural
specifics that make the industry especially exposed to the threats of collusions. Furthermore,
it carries recommendations on how to counter them by means of greater awareness in the
procurement process.
1 www.energinorge.no
2 Data for 2007 are to be found at http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/10/08/10/elektrisitetaar_en ”Table 26 Internal
accounts, by type of activity for all units in electricity supply” and “Table 34 Acquisition and sale of fixed assets”.
61.1 Background
1.1.1 Norwegian Electric Utility Industry - buyers vs suppliers
An electric utility generally refers to any plant, works, system, facilities or properties,
together with all parts and appurtenances thereto, including contract and franchise rights,
used and useful primarily for the production, transmission or distribution of electric energy.3
The electric utility industry in Norway is mainly represented by companies engaged in
hydropower generation, district heating, and power transmission/distribution grids. Solid
fuels such as onshore oil and gas constitute a relatively small part of the energy business, this
in contrast with counterparts in the EU which rely on crude oil and nuclear fuel for energy
production.
The market consists of a handful of big multi-utility companies (those providing more than
one essential service4). The major players are Statkraft, Statnett, Hafslund, BKK, Lyse,
Agder, Skagerak, Eidsiva, and Trønderenergi. There are also a number of smaller companies
geographically spread around the country. Whereas, large companies naturally represent a
major share of the market the smaller parties tend to group into regional cooperation units in
order to derive synergies in smaller procurement projects. These are Kjøpekraft Vest in
western Norway, Trønderkraft, Buskerud, and Elinor in the north. When working on large-
scale projects companies enter contracts on their own.
The prevalence of expensive deliveries makes the industry preoccupied by general
reliability, quality, compatibility and complementarity of the sought solutions. A wrong
choice of either supplier or product can result in a range of problems, such as reduced
lifespan or a sudden electricity black-out in a given geographical area. As such, the
consequence cost can be much higher than initial investment cost.
North America, Europe and Japan make up reasonably segregated markets with a few
dominant vendors of engineering solutions and components to similarly dominant
infrastructure customers. Other countries (Norway on the same level as China) are being
served by manufacturers from these markets.
3 http://definitions.uslegal.com/e/electric-utility/
4 Collins English Dictionary
7In Europe major suppliers to the energy industry are represented by following dominant
firms:
transformers: ABB, Siemens – a duopoly of large scale electrical equipment
iron piping products: Saint Gobain (PSH) have a European monopoly
turbines and generators: Alstom, Siemens
cables and cabling systems: Nexans (Alcatel) - a globally leading company
Three dominant companies – ABB, Siemens and Alstom – deliver turnkey construction
projects to the industry. Same three firms, with the addition of Schneider Electric, cover the
electrical components supply segment. Such interlacement in adjacent market segments
often leads to further mergers and acquisitions of one by another, which limits the supplier
market to an even bigger extent.
These big manufacturing conglomerates can choose whether to sell their products and
services directly or through intermediaries. In the latter case, they may either already own
those agents or exploit their market power in order to fix the price level and/or the available
assortment of goods. Also, the great investments and proprietary technology necessary for
business establishment as well as compatibility issues with current equipment create
extensive barriers for newcomers. Thus, the market is relatively closed and to a greater or
lesser degree controlled by the already existing players.
In sum, high shifting costs related to existing solutions, unavailability of substitutes in the
market, the importance of system reliability for the customer combined with well established
selling networks with sometimes exclusive access to sub-suppliers, all this creates an
imbalance in favour of the supplier. Moreover, should they try to cooperate on pricing this
would have a negative impact on the utilities industry and will lead to increased costs for the
end consumers. In order to counterbalance this imbalance government regulates the settings
in which competition takes place. On one hand, suppliers are regulated through the
Competition Law supervised by the Norwegian competition authorities. Buyers, on the other
hand, have to follow clearly defined tendering procedures established under EU-regulations
on public procurement. Both sets of laws are relatively new and came into force within the
last two decades. The Competition Law was established in 1993 with last revisions in 2009.5
5 http://www.lovdata.no/all/nl-20040305-012.html
8Administrative regulation in the supply sectors (water and energy supply, transport and post
services) under and in pursuance of laws about public procurement was introduced in 1994
and was revised quite recently (2010).6
What effect have these laws had so far on the markets?
1.1.2 History of Cartels
The effect the laws have had on the markets can be traced through cases brought against
cartels in the industry. Media overview indicates that the industry didn’t publicly address
such practices until the laws were introduced. A quick search in available publications offers
an insight into the more well-known cartel disclosures in the industry.
In 2007 the EU-commission found ten international companies participating in illegal price-
fixing activities in the market for an important component to electrical transformer stations.
The commission imposed fines of NOK 6,2 billion (EUR 397 million) as a remedy
(Konkurransetilsynet NHO ledersamling 14.09.2007) out of which German company
Siemens alone was fined NOK 1,8 billion (EUR 215 million) which became the highest fine
in EU history for this kind of crime levied against a single company (Dagens Næringsliv
24.01.2007). The total of EUR 397 million became the second highest fine ever imposed in
the EU (Konkurransetilsynet, NHO ledersamling 14.09.2007). The other companies involved
were Alstom and Areva from France, Japaneese electric giants Fuji, Hitachi, Mitsubishi and
Toshiba, the firms German Schneider and VA Tech which were acquired by Siemens in
Austria (Dagens Næringsliv 24.01.2007). At the time most of the companies had already
been suppliers to or were current bidders to the Norwegian electric utility market.
In 1997 Siemens and ABB were cited for price-fixing and market sharing. The companies
were dominating the market for suppliers of equipment to production, transmission and
distribution of electrical power in Norway. That case concerned the supply of machinery and
control installation systems. Many Norwegian energy industry companies presented
compensation claims in the civil action. The case was settled out in 1999, and the size of
settlement ABB and Siemens paid to the biggest of the victimized energy companies
constituted NOK 55 million. ABB alone got a fine of 13,5 million NOK, which at that time
6http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-wift/wiftldles?doc=/usr/www/lovdata/for/sf/fa/fa-20060407-
0403.html&emne=forskrift*%20om*%20innkj%d8psregl*&
9was the highest fine imposed to a single company in Norway (Konkurransetilsynet, Etikk og
Innkjøp 25.10.2006). At the time of disclosure the cartel had been active for a long time and
had caused extensive harm to the customers (IT Avisen 02.06.98).
The same year 1997 three companies - Alcatel, Siemens and ABB - were found guilty of
illegal price-fixing in Germany (IT Avisen, 25.11.97).
Other examples of cartels and total fines/seizures amounts in cases that concerned el-
industry in Norway: electric suppliers (1999) - 20 mil NOK, piping wholesalers (1995) - 17
mil NOK, steel wholesalers (1991) - 13 mil NOK (Konkurransetilsynet, Etikk og Innkjøp
25.10.2006). These cases have been in top-5 of the biggest cartel cases in history of the
Norwegian Competition Authority in the period 1986-2003 (Konkurransenytt 2/2003).
It is not the author’s intension to review all available data, but rather to present a backdrop
from which to draw certain conclusions. First, same companies have engaged in illegal
collusive practices several times. Second, collusions have not been limited by geography or
to one country. Third, the amount of fines paid by cartel participants has significantly
increased in the last cases of disclosure. Finally, as cartels are now being disclosed whereas
previously they were not, we can presume that the laws are working.
1.2 Problem Definition
The supplier market to the electric utility industry (will sometimes be shortened as el-
industry) is a clearly defined relatively protected market with few dominating participant,
operating in a transparent business environment. Media review on the background of the
market characteristics suggests that cartels still may exist in the market.
Is there something that can be done in order to avoid this unfortunate practice?
Energy companies have to act within the given settings, provided by market characteristics
and applicable law. While laws are the controlling mechanisms in the business there are still
decisions to be made by customers which ill influence how suppliers are selected and
contracts awarded. All those choices can work either as preventive measures or stimulators
to supplier illegal collusion.
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Are customers aware of the powerful tools they can employ? Do they attempt to utilise the
“invisible hand” of the market? What do they do in order to maintain real competition
between the bidders? What can they do, and what are they actually doing?
The focus of this research will be on following question:
Does buyers’ behaviour facilitate collusion on the marketplace?
In order to facilitate competition, buyers must try to find new suppliers from other markets to
compete for deliveries in Norway. Granted, there may be some hampering factors to that
goal. For example, when same buyers interact with same suppliers in a relatively closed
environment, the market players become familiar with each other over time. This is
strengthened by the fact that in the past there was just one educational institution in Norway
which graduated engineers (Sivilingeniør) - Norges Tekniske Høyskole (NTH). Today this
institution, The Norwegian University of Science and Technology, (NTNU), has lost its
monopoly on engineering profession but continues to be the alma mater of the captains of
industry. The graduates of that institution are to be found on both sides of the market.
Networking continues with employee exchange which happens as a result of search for
career advance. Such intertwined nature of professional relationships goes to show that both
sellers and buyers develop longstanding bonds with each other.
Historically, the post-war Norwegian government set restrictions against buying from abroad
in form of additional costs on such purchases. This resulted in the development of a national
manufacturing industry for major components – hydropower turbines, generators,
transformers, cable production. These were successfully established by the 1970’s, when the
regulation was removed. By that time it was natural to buy from domestic vendors and the
favouring of Norwegian suppliers continued for a while. Similar policies had created
national vendor markets all over Europe. It became a matter of national pride to favour
domestic vendors over more competitive foreign companies. The establishment of the
common market was a clean break from historical precedent. It led to consolidation where
large European firms acquired local industry and the goodwill that went with it.
The peculiarity of the business environment, the existence of tight bonds between the market
players and the development of preference towards national based manufacturers may make
customers reluctant to breaking up the status quo. Consciously or unconsciously.
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Our primary hypothesis will therefore be as following:
Buyers’ behaviour facilitates collusion on the marketplace.
1.3 Methodological Approach
The analytical process and outputs of this study will be rooted in the following sources:
- Academic literature
Literature will provide a toolkit of methods and models that will further be applied to create
more specific predictions.
First, a sound theoretical framework for understanding of the phenomenon of cartels will be
presented. Relevant terms and concepts will be defined.
Second, an explicit focus will be taken on industrial buying behaviour with description of
specific processes between different market players (sellers, buyers and Government). An
accurate description of these processes in the el-industry will be introduced after presentation
of the theoretical parts.
Finally, on the basis of a multiple construct used to predict and explain behaviour, the
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), a conceptual model will be developed. The approach of
Robert B. Cialdini, a Professor of Psychology at Arizona State University, who explains
choices people make by the effect of social influence, will be employed in order to describe
the attitude construct in the model. Thus, both theories will be integrated into the conceptual
behavioural model and adapted to the context of electric utility industry.
- Other open sources (laws and regulations)
This study will take account of the existing procedural and substantive requirements in the
Norwegian supply sector. Hence, the relevant laws and regulations available on official
Governmental Internet sites will be reviewed.
- In-depth interview
In order to gain insight into the problem nexus, it was decided to carry out an in-depth
interview with a representative of a major Norwegian electric utility company, Mr Øystein
Helle, Head of the Purchasing Department at BKK. The qualitative data collected during this
12
interview will not be presented as a separate chapter, but rather be used for insight into the
industry and current procurement procedures in the energy supply sector.
Notion clarifying objectives need to be fulfilled in following areas:
 characteristics of the industry
 laws and regulations in the energy supply sector
 shared systems and procedures used in the el-industry
 internal procedures and methods
Initial completed theoretical overview and openly available information will provide the
basis for developing a guide for this interview (not enclosed).
Furthermore, it was intended to carry out in-depth interviews with other informational
sources, such as:
- Representative of the Norwegian Competition Authority (Konkurransetilsynet) - in
order to help interpret laws that regulate suppliers’ behaviour and gather information on
Governmental mechanisms protecting competition on the buyers’ side.
- Representative of the Norwegian Complaints Board’s (KOFA) - in order to help
interpret laws which regulate buyers’ behaviour and gather information on
Governmental mechanisms protecting competition on the suppliers’ side.
These interviews would assist in the gathering of accurate data regarding earlier vs current
market situations, thus tracking behavioural trends of both suppliers and buyers. Regrettably,
the authorities declined to collaborate in the research for this report.
- Survey
Towards the registration of common beliefs, opinions, prevailing views, shared conceptions
and misconceptions among the buyers, a survey method was employed. This study is also
concerned with determining frequencies with which hypothesised behavioural patterns
occur, as well as describing relationships between certain variables.
The advantages of using a survey method include the standardisation of data, the ease with
which surveys can be administered as well as the ease in tabulating and analysing the data.
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Further, surveys can reveal otherwise unnoticed patterns and information, and are sensitive
to small group differences (Burns and Bush 2000; Churchill 2001).
The survey will be carried out among Norwegian electric utility companies, with people
responsible for awarding contracts as respondents. Information accessed from the literature
and other open sources, as well as the clarifying interview with the industry’s expert will be
employed in development of the questionnaire. The methodology will be further elaborated
in Section 3.
1.4 Limitations
The aim of this research is to conclude on whether or not the energy industry buyers support
conditions facilitating collusions among suppliers. The focus will be limited to the prevailing
perceptions among buyers that result in a competition-limiting supplier approach. Since the
concern is taken on behavioural constituents, behavioural theories will be employed. Only
data from buyers themselves will be used as a source for primary data.
Thus, the research has the following objectives:
1) Measure the level of awareness of the problem of supplier cartels among industry players.
2) Examine the working methodology in the industry in order to see whether the players use
their power in order to undermine supplier collusions.
3) Map buyers’ perceptions and attitudes regarding the supplier market and the conditions in
which they operate.
This research focuses on procurements of products and services above the EEA threshold
value in the public supply sector, which after the change of 01.03.20107 constitutes 3,2 mln
NOK. This is emphasized because the Regulations relating to Public Procurement in the
supply sector distinguish procurements below and above the EEA threshold value (also a
different threshold value is valid for procurements in building and construction, but since
this category is not industry-specific, it is not taken into account in the study).
7 Del II, § 2-3. Terskelverdier: http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-wift/ldles?xdoc=/for/ff-20100125-0066.html#map0
14
1.5 Outline
This thesis is organized as follows. The theoretical part of this paper deals with various
theories on cartels, market organization and industrial buyer behaviour, providing the
theoretical basis for further empirical research. The first theoretical subsection provides
definitions, introduces typology of interfirm cooperation, and an overview of the cartel
effects as an academic support to the actuality of the topic.
The second theoretical subsection accounts for macroeconomic theories dealing with market
structures distinctive for cartelized markets. Theories on monopoly and oligopoly as typical
market failure situations are overviewed. Two interrelated theories on hallmarks of industries
exposed to cartels are then presented.
The third theoretical subsection stands for introducing the Paradigm for Industrial
Organization, which contains the constructs of market structure, market behaviour and
market performance which different forces may affect. The theories flow to the role of
governmental policies in market regulation. The Norwegian Competition Authority secures a
fair play of competition on the side of suppliers, providing that the Competition Act (§10 in
this paper) is not violated by competitors.
The forth theoretical subsection focuses on the buyer side of the market. The theories of
industrial buying behaviour are followed by a specific focus on the el-industry and
conditions in which the industry operates. The purchasing process approach employed in the
industry is described, and Public Procurement Act regulating competition on the side of the
buyers is introduced. Systems used in the industry as a result of the law requirements are
also presented. The subsection provides the Checklist for Public Procurements as a toolkit
helping to uncover cartels.
As a round up of the theoretical part of the thesis, I present my own conceptual model for
empirical research in the fifth theoretical subsection. The model is rooted in the Theory of
Planned Behaviour (Azjen 1985), and is adapted to the el-industry conditions. In order to
provide more to understanding of attitudes and perceptions I further employ Cialdini’s
psychological postulates which assumingly impact decision taking in this industry on the
same line as other spheres of life. The graphical representation of the theoretical approach is
summed up in Figure 1.
15
Figure 1. Theoretical approach
Methodological part, Section 3 of the paper, deals with design and data collection.
Subsequently, results of the research are presented in Analysis and discussion, Section 4.
Finally, discoveries and implementations as well as critical overview of the study and
perspectives for future research are presented in Section 5.
CARTELS
MARKET DETERMINANTS
CONCEPTUAL BEHAVIOURAL MODEL
INDUSTRY AND BUYER BEHAVIOUR
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2. Theoretical background
2.1 What is a Cartel?
This first subsection deals with theories behind the phenomenon in interest, cartels, and the
effect they have on the market. Different definitions based on an array of cartel types are
offered; a definition of cartel for this research is introduced. Effects the cartels have will be
overviewed and examples from the el-industry will be presented.
2.1.1 A typology of Interfirm Cooperation
The literature offers a variety of definitions of cartel. Levenstein and Suslow (2006) explain
this by the fact that a wide variety of organizations might reasonably be described as cartels.
An early expert on cartels, Joe S. Bain (1959), wrote: "Collusion in general implies ... that
the rival sellers in some manner arrive at an understanding as to what price to charge or what
outputs to produce, or both" (pp. 271-72).
Another economist, the Danish-American H. Brems (1951), defined cartel more specifically
as “a voluntary, written or oral agreement among financially and personally independent,
private, entrepreneurial sellers or buyers fixing or influencing the values of their parameters
of action, or allocating territories, products or quotas, for a future period of time”.
The diverse forms of cartels are predetermined by their objectives.
Collusion that limits competition
Usually economists define cartel as “a combination of independent enterprises designed to
limit competition” (for example, Danielsen 1976). Levenstein and Suslow (2006) further
clarify that “producers form cartels with the goal of limiting competition to increase profits.
By restricting output and increasing price, ideally to the price a monopolist would set, profits
are jointly maximized”. This argumentation is in accordance with Roberts’ (1985) view on
the rational behaviour of a group of firms, which is “to form together into a cartel and
maximize joint profits or, more generally, act in a manner efficient to the group” (p. 401).
Despite the difference in definitions, most economists agree in their view of cartels as
associations of independent firms with monopolistic aims.
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Jeffrey Fear (2006) offers a chart in which cartels are classified along their objectives (see
Figure 2). He views cartels as “a subset of inter-firm cooperation, which ranges from highly,
fluid spot markets with no individual market power to fully integrated enterprise hierarchies.
The range describes the degree to which a formal organization wields authority over market
transactions, but one cannot judge actual market power from the graphic” (p. 7). Altogether,
cartels are “voluntary, private contractual arrangements among independent enterprises to
regulate the market” (ibid).
Among the types of cartels in the Fear’s (2006) classification, the middle four types of
“hard-core” cartels are those that harm competition directly. This is the reason why such
agreements draw a special attention from competition authorities in both, the European
Union and the Unites States, and where under the current laws they are considered illegal.
Europe’s Press releases8 has chosen the following definition of a cartel: “It is an illegal
secret agreement concluded between competitors to fix prices, restrict supply and/or divide
up markets. The agreement may take a wide variety of forms but often relates to sales prices
or increases in such prices, restrictions on sales or production capacities, sharing out of
product or geographic markets or customers, and collusion on the other commercial
conditions for the sale of products or services”.
In the context of this paper, the "hard core" cartels definition is as following:
“Hard core” cartels are anticompetitive agreements by competitors to fix prices, restrict
output, submit collusive tenders, or divide or share markets (OECD 2000).
8 EUROPA – Press Releases:
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/30&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN
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Figure 2. A Spectrum of Interfirm Cooperation
(Jeffrey Fear (2006, p.6) adapted from Wolfgang Korndörfer (1988)
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Collusive tendering or bid rigging
The specifics in which the electric utility industry operates in its turn determines specifics of
cartel agreements. Further in the thesis more definitions will be provided and details
overviewed, but in the context of cartels definition some practices require more attention.
The Norwegian Competition Authority, Konkurransetilsynet, in its Guidance on Tendering
and Project Agreement state that: collusive tendering “occurs where undertakings
collaborate on responses to invitations to tender.” 9 This cooperation of bids puts the buyer in
an unfavourable position since he does not receive as high profits as he would receive in case
the tendering process was between independent bidders. In contrast, the buyer will be under
impression that he achieved a profitable contract. According to the earlier overviewed theory
on cartels, collusive tendering ultimately results in reduced competition in the market.
Konkurransetilsynet provides examples of illegal cartels (Etikk og Innkjøp 25.10.2006):
- Bid rigging: two or more competitors coordinate prices and contract terms before a
bid is sent
- Price-fixing: two or more competing players agree upon or try to influence prices,
discounts or profits
- Market sharing: competitors agree upon geographical division, customer division,
product specialisation or they set quotes
All these examples can be the case with collusive tendering, depending on what was agreed
upon before submitting the bid. Konkurransetilsynet notes that various forms of illegal
tendering agreements can result in both price-fixing and market-sharing. There can be
cooperation agreements where the tenderers share among themselves the tender or agree on
the lower offer to be submitted (Guidance on Tendering) overviewed further.
Types of cartel strategies in bidding
Comanor and Schankerman (1976) distinguish two types of cartel strategies in bidding:
9 http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/legislation/Fact-Sheet-Guidance-on-Tendering-and-Project-Agreements/
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The first one is when bidders agree to set identical bids to insure that no measure of price-
shading occurs. The agreed upon price generally represents a high profit margin so that all
cartel members benefit. The bid-disclosure procedure at the end of the tender provides the
primary vehicle of enforcement so that all firms know if the agreement has been violated.
One of the possible ‘disadvantages’ of such strategy for cartel members is that due to little
basis by which to choose among rival sellers in case if all other criteria are alike, buyers have
to flip a coin in order to choose whom to award the contract.
An alternative strategy is used when cartel members rotate low bid positions among the
various bidders. Specific firms are assigned individual contracts and competing sellers are
required in these instances to “bid high”. It is essential to the scheme that competing sellers
bid sufficiently high so that the specified winner can still receive a generous return (p. 282).
This is the case of market sharing set by cartel agreements. This way the cartel makes sure
that the degree of uncertainty regarding the prospective output is reduced. The strategy
provides cartels with a mechanism (agreement) by which output levels can be divided among
firms, and cartel profits - divided.
The economists conclude that under an identical bid regime, the larger firms in the market
will suffer a reduction in their market shares as all firms are placed in comparable positions
and the expected share will approach the mean shares of participating firms. Smaller firms,
in contrast, will gain larger market shares. On this account, larger firms should prefer a
rotating bid arrangement to an identical bid scheme, while smaller firms should prefer
identical bid arrangements (Comanor and Schankerman 1976). McAfee and McMillan
(1992) later called these two cartel strategies as “Weak cartels” (because bidders who submit
exactly the same bid are unable to make transfer payments among themselves) and “Strong
cartels” (both transfer payments and exclusion of new entrants are done).
2.1.2 Effects of Cartels
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD, states in 2002 report, that
cartels are universally recognised as the most harmful of all types of anticompetitive
conduct, which offer no economic or social benefits that would justify the losses that they
generate. But though the harm from cartels is large is undisputed, quantifying it precisely is
difficult. Some insights from the literature can be structured, for example, in the following
manner.
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On prices
One of the aims with cartels for their participants is increased surplus through increased
prices. The international empirical research done by Oxera in 2009 (see Figure 3) shows that
the typical overcharge by a cartel is 10-20%. However, in some cases the price increase can
be as high as whole 50-60% and even 70%.
Figure 3. Cartel overcharges in empirical studies of past cartels (Source: Oxera (2009) analysis based on
underlying Connor and Lande data and selection criteria applied by Oxera)
The economist Joseph Harrington (2004) argues that upon a cartel formation, price does not
immediately jump from the endowed non-collusive price to some new higher steady-state
level; rather, there is a transitional path. First, they obviously want to raise price, because
higher profits is the primary reason for creating a cartel. Second, they want to raise price in
such a manner as to maintain the internal stability of the cartel; that is, all firms prefer to go
along with the proposed collusive price path rather than cheat on the cartel and grab a bigger
share of the market (p. 651). This approach not only helps the cartel maintain internal
stability, but also lets it remain unnoticed by the customer.
Earlier mentioned Comanor and Schankerman (1976) continue that while little is known
regarding cartel coordination costs, it seems likely that those costs will increase with the
number of firms which are party to the agreement. There is a greater number of required
communication flows, and also there may be a greater disparity of interests among the firms
searching for an agreement. The scientists argue that not only should those costs rise with the
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Price
Sale
Demand
Price and
cost
Redistribution: More to the seller and
less to the customers
Loss for society: A smaller “cake” caused
by lower sales (“dead weight loss”)
Bid
number of firms, but also we should expect them to rise more rapidly under a rotating bid
regime than under one of identical bids.
On society
As said, the main harm arising from hardcore cartels is that parties further down the supply
chain pay more for the product than they would have paid in a non-cartelised market. The
higher price normally results in existing customers purchasing lower volumes, and/or in
customers who would have purchased the product at the non-cartelised price not purchasing
at all. The ultimate harm caused to particular direct and indirect customers by the overcharge
(and also the effect on the volume purchased) will depend on the extent to which the price
increase caused by the cartel is passed along the supply chain (Oxera report 2009).
Konkurransetilsynet sums up the effect of a cartel in Figure 4:
Figure 4. Effect of market power: lower sale and higher price (Konkurransetilsynet, NHO ledersamling
25.10.2006)
The figure illustrates how cartels that successfully reduce output and raise price above the
competitive level cause consumers to purchase less of the cartelised product and to pay more
for the quantity that they do purchase. By paying the cartel price they consumers
unknowingly transfer wealth to the cartel operators (OECD 2002).
Consumers choose either not to pay the higher price for the cartelised product that they
desire, or forgo some or all of the products. Thus, high prices force consumers to substitute a
product that they can no longer afford to buy with a less desirable product or service of a
23
lower quality. Such misallocation of resources in the long term leads to a lower growth of
the entire economy.
On market
Levenstein and Suslow (2001) in their study of private international cartels underline the
duality between cooperation and competition. They state that cartels use a variety of
techniques to block entry into their particular industry. Even in cases where entry into an
industry is fairly easy and a large number of firms are in fact active, various relationships
among producers, either as suppliers or customers, provide many opportunities for
cooperation and may substantially lessen competition despite a large number of participants.
The lack of competition and the poor quality in supporting sectors limit the capability of
domestic firms to adapt and meet the challenges of international competition. With increased
competition forcing firms to adapt to just-in-time production and management systems,
flexibility, speed and reliability regarding the delivery of goods have assumed significant
strategic importance and are a key source of dynamic competitiveness (UNCTAD 2009).
On innovation
Since a cartel shelters its members from full exposure to market forces. The result could be a
reduced pressure to control costs (OECD 2002). Thus, the limited competitive pressure
hinders efficiency which reflects in lower levels of productivity growth and innovation.
Bouwens and Dankers (2005) note that if a product is subject to change due to frequent
technological improvements or changes in consumer behaviour, a cartel agreement will be
more difficult to sustain. This way product differentiation can destabilize or undercut
existing agreements easily.
Other effects
A pattern of increased cartel disclosures can be followed with introduction of more strict
antitrust prohibitions (like it happened in the United States in the late nineteenth century,
OECD, 2002). Harrington (2004) argues that though making price-fixing illegal may induce
a cartel to initially price lower, in some cases it allows the cartel to eventually price higher.
Risk of detection and penalties in this case can serve to stabilize a cartel so that participants
do not to deter from the set price in fear of detection.
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Last but not least, competition crime goes hand in hand with other types of crime. The most
common one which is hard to detect is corruption (Konkurransetilsynet, NHO ledersamling,
14.09.2007).
In sum, reduction in competition as consequence of cartel agreements leads to higher prices,
a reduction in choice, and a reduction in quality. All of these effects adversely affect
efficiency in a market economy.
Some practical support
Despite relatively closed market difficulty in obtaining data, open media sources offer a
practical insight into cases on this issue. Konkurransetilsynet sheds some light around the
ABB-Siemens case. The two firms became penalized for collusive tender when delivering to
the Norwegian energy industry. From this case conclusions can be drawn around:
- market sharing
In Figure 5. Konkurransetilsynet’s Director, Knut Eggum Johansen, presented the ABB-
Siemens case at NHO’s leader gathering at Losby (14.09.2007)10.
Figure 5. ABB-Siemens case: cartel in action (NHO ledersamling, 14.09.2007).
In this figure the red graphs illustrate the market share of Siemens, and the blue graphs – one
of ABB. The triangles show average share for Siemens last periods, while the horizontal line
points out the linear trend in average market share for Siemens. As we can see, the two
10 http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/iKnowBase/Content/427588/070914_NHO.PDF
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companies agreed upon a certain pattern in market sharing over a period of time (23 years
and 4 years), which let them keep the same average market shares in total. The case
advocates for the theory about collusive bidders that carry out market sharing by alternating
years of deliveries to pre-agreed upon buyers.
The illustrated strategy also supports Harrington’s (2004) approach about cartel pricing in
which he recognizes that in order to avoid detection firms set prices in such a manner that
suspicions about coordinating behaviour are not awaken. This way rapidly increasing prices
or anomalous price movements are avoided.
- prices
Same case further provides an insight on effect on prices (see Figure 6).
Figure 6. Estimated extra costs due to bid-rigging in ABB-Siemens case (NHO ledersamling, 14.09.2007).
The last graph in this figure indicates the average winning of the cartel according to the
power companies, and constitutes 15% overcharge.
Generally, the case supports Comanor and Schankerman’s (1976) theory about rotating
cartel strategy, in which they state that except extreme circumstances where the preferences
of smaller firms are dominant, identical bidding arrangements are unlikely to be maintained
among colluding firms where their number in industry is small (p. 286).
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Despite the disastrous effect of collusive behaviour, many theorists agree that the cartel
victims still may take actions to destabilize it (McAfee and McMillan 1992). To understand
which actions, it is vitally important to recognize market determinants of cartels in order to
see dangers for exposure.
2.2 Market Determinants of Cartel Duration
Levenstein and Suslow (2006) argue that there are two answers on the question of How do
cartels survive? Both are necessary but neither is sufficient. First, the cartels that survive are
located in industries whose exogenous features make collusion easier. Second, cartels that
survive organize themselves to address and overcome the problems of coordination,
cheating, and entry. In this subsection only market characteristics in which cartels operate
will be emphasized.
Thoron (1998) argues that the way in which competition is modelled determines the
incentive to cooperate. She cites d'Aspremont et al. (1983) that “a cartel is stable if firms
inside the cartel do not find it desirable to exit and firms outside the cartel do not find it
desirable to enter” (p. 64). The idea that cartel stability depends crucially upon market power
has been voiced by Pindyck in 1979.
2.2.1 Market Power
Market power denotes the degree of discretion of a firm (or a group of firms acting jointly)
in affecting price and competitive conditions in a market. This influence is not temporary.
Further, it can be either direct or indirect. In the former case, exercise of power is achieved
in the marketplace where the firms have control over price and quantities sold. In the latter
case, it is achieved through influence over public policy affecting issues of interest for firms,
such as price, barriers to entry or trade policy in the larger sense of the phrase (Bourdet
1992).
Bourdet (1992) further continues that each market consists of a certain number of sellers.
This number is usually regarded as the main indicator of the intensity of competition. The
presence of many sellers characterizes perfect competition. On the contrary, the presence of
only one seller (monopoly) or a few sellers (oligopoly) characterizes imperfect competition.
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In most textbooks the formation of cartel proces is disposed of with the remark that cartels
can be regarded as a special form of monopoly (collective or collusive monopoly) and that
ordinary monopoly theory may be applied (Fog p.16). If we are to view cartels as
associations of independent firms with monopolistic aims, as, for example, did Robert
Liefmann (1927) (refered in Bouwens and Dankers 2005), we need to take a look at the
preferred by a cartel conditions.
Monopoly and Oligopoly
Monopoly power is a general term for any case in which an individual economic entity has a
large influence on market prices (Støkken and Nylehn 1991).
By definition, the monopolist totally controls the supply of a product that does not have any
near substitute. Unlike firms acting under perfect competition, the monopolist is a price
maker. He can raise price by restricting output. The absence of substitute products means he
does not fear competition from other firms. He will select the output where marginal cost
equals marginal revenue. This is the output that maximizes his profits. Any other output,
smaller or greater, results in lower profits (Bourdet 1992).
A monopoly “naturally” emerges due to the attributes of the technology for producing
certain services, innovation or unique skills (Joskow 2005): “a firm producing a single
homogeneous product is a natural monopoly when it is less costly to produce any level of
output of this product within a single firm than with two or more firms.” (p. 8) Joskow
references Thomas Farrer (1902) who associated natural monopoly with supply and demand
characteristics that included (a) the product or service supplied must be essential, (b) the
products must be non-storable, (c) the supplier must have a favourable production location.
Van Weele (2002) sums up that natural monopolies exist when the entire supply of raw
materials or a particular manufacturing process is owned by just one producer or
manufacturer, excluding others by means of contracts and patents (e.g. oil concessions).
Government monopolies exist when based on special licences which are required from the
government or when based on state law (p. 78). The examples of industries based on natural
monopoly arguments are electric power, railroads, telephone, gas pipelines, water networks,
cable television networks, etc.
Oligopoly is the predominant market form in the real world. It is in particular true for most
industrial markets where production can only be carried on economically if conducted in a
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fairly large scale. This stems from the nature of technology and cost in industry. Actually,
the decline in average cost as output rises implies that only a few firms can produce the total
output sold on the market at the lowest average cost. Another factor behind the oligopolistic
structure of many industries is the desire of already technically efficient firms to acquire
market power though mergers and takeovers (Bourdet 1992).
The simple and in many ways still the most fruitful model of oligopoly starts by following
Adam Smith’s notion that every industry wishes to organize as if it were a single-firm
monopoly (Støkken and Nylehn 1991). The nature of interdependence between oligopolists
that wish to collude is the central point when it comes to output and price determination.
Joint-profit maximization is reached when oligopolists act together as a monopolist. In such
a case, the price/output and social cost outcome is the same as in the monopoly case
(Bourdet 1992).
Market Failures vs Competition
In contrast to the reviewed imperfect market situations, in market with perfect competition
prices never rise above the marginal cost of production (Sampson 1995).
One of the objections to monopoly is that as the monopolist is not constrained by
competitive forces to reduce cost to its lowest possible level, the firm becomes X-inefficient
(Leibenstien 1970). This term means that while resources are used to make the product, they
are used less productively.
Competition, on the other hand, provides an incentive for firms to perform at their best,
producing high-quality goods and services at the cheapest price. Competition encourages
entrepreneurial activity and market entry by new firms by rewarding efficient firms and
sanctioning inefficient firms. In ideal market conditions firms react flexibly and quickly to
changing market demands and the relentless entry of new firms. The entry of new firms
provides the necessary stimulus for adjustment, while the ability of firms to adjust, and the
speed at which they do so, are a measure of their efficiency and, by extension, their
competitiveness (UNCTAD 2002, p.4).
Baumol’s et al. (1982), in their concept of contestable markets argue that the market need
not be a model of perfect competition if entry and exit are free to the industry (p.4).
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When competitive conditions prevail in a market, individual firms cannot depart from
competitive behaviour and competitive prices for fear of losing their customers and of being
driven out of business. Market power does not exist in such cases or, at least, does not last.
Competition is thus the main restriction on market power (Bourdet 1992).
The fact that cartels have less control than monopolies, where only one company
manipulates supply, means that they can be undermined if competition is employed even
more. We further examine the characteristics of industries where formal collusion is
acknowledged to have occurred.
2.2.2 Hallmarks of Industries exposed to Cartels
Different economists use different approaches to describe industries exposed to cartels.
Major characteristics can, for example, be presented under Levenstein og Suslow’s (2006)
sources of cartel duration:
1 Number of Firms and Industry Concentration
The economists argue that cartel duration is negatively related to the number of firms in the
cartel and in the industry. This is easily explained with the fact that costs related to
coordination of behaviour, monitoring participants who want to deter and blocking new
entries are higher with larger amount of competitors.
Concentration provides information on the number and the size distribution of firms. For
example, a high level of concentration means that a few firms account for the bulk of market
supply (Bourdet 1992). Concentration is considered the most important factor in determining
market power, as it measures the level of actual competition in a market. Attempts to
exercise market power are likely to be more successful in industries that are more
concentrated; in such industries it is also easier to participants to increase gains from
collusion.
2 Large Customers
Levenstein og Suslow’s (2006) refer to Stigler (1964) who argued that large customers can
undermine cartel stability. Large corporate customers have both knowledge and bargaining
power on their side when ordering inputs. But there are other cases in which customers were
intimately involved in stabilizing a cartel, providing information and punishment
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mechanisms not otherwise available, and sharing, indirectly, in cartel rents (Granitz and
Klein 1996, Levenstein 1993a).
Large firms may be consciously willing to tolerate higher input prices. As some of these
downstream industries may be sufficiently oligopolistic themselves, it may be possible for
them to pass along higher input prices to consumers, decreasing any incentive they might
otherwise have to disrupt the upstream cartel (Levenstein og Suslow 2006). Customer
concentration may also have the cartel strengthening effect, because higher selling prices can
be used by large firms in order to gain advantage over smaller competitors
3 Nature of Demand
Collusion is more prevalent in industries with relatively inelastic demand, as the potential
profits arising from fixing prices are greater (Pindyck 1979). When demand is relatively
inelastic at the pre-cartel price increased revenues at lower levels of output are possible
(Bouwens and Dankers 2005). Eckbo (1976) found that cartels are able to raise price
substantially only if demand is sufficiently inelastic and there are few short-term substitutes
(p. 42).
Cyclical fluctuations of demand, to the extent that they are predicted or predictable, either do
not appear to undermine well-working cartels, but rapid industry growth and unexpected
fluctuations in demand do (Levenstein og Suslow 2006).
4 Cartel Organization and Cartel Learning
Levenstein og Suslow (2006) finalize that in order to function well (meaning to identify a
collusive equilibrium, coordinate on it, and then continuously update as demand and costs
fluctuate), the industry has to provide conditions for learning over time.
Sørgard (1997), on the other hand, looks at conditions that help suppliers succeed in price-
fixing:
1) Patient companies
Cartel participants must be patient in the meaning of valuing future profits. If short-sighted,
participants will have an incentive to deviate from the agreed behaviour.
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2) Short time length
In order to successfully coordinate pricing time period must be short. Under this condition
the participants will 1) quickly discover the deviating part, and 2) have the opportunity to
react quickly.
3) Hard competition
Sørgard argues that there is a potential for coordinated price-setting if it is expected a hard
competition after an eventual deviation. The large loss as a result of deviation will in such
case discourage the companies from infringing on the agreed price. In the markets where
potential for hard competition is biggest, there are biggest grounds to believe that companies
succeed by avoiding this hard competition.
4) Limited amount of companies in an industry
This criterion is already commented at Levenstein og Suslow’s (2006) overview. Sørgard
looks specifically on ability of sustaining of a monopolistic price. He argues that the reason
it is easier to do it in a market with few companies than in a market with many companies is
because in a market with many players, each of them will have an incentive to break out
from the agreement and profit individually. This can give small firms a considerable increase
in market share in the short time.
5) High barriers to entry
Markets with many players usually have low barriers for entry. As soon as the existing
companies set prices to a certain level via coordinated price setting practices, it will attract
newcomers. The existence of barriers to entry is therefore an important condition for that the
established cartel members to succeed.
The last two points are in accordance with Fear’s (2006) argument (based on observation of
Mirow and Maurer 1982: 11-35) that cartels appear most strongly in those industries defined
by scale and scope economies in industries saddled with high fixed costs.
El-industry in Norway
The supplier market to the el-industry as any industrial market is represented by the two
types of suppliers (Brynhildsvoll and Abrahamsen 2002), those who deliver products within
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general area of usage (for example, office furniture and requisites) and those who supply
industry-specific products and services. The latter type of supply due its specifics is a focus
of this thesis.
In the industry-specific supplier market all the listed cartel determining market factors are
present.
First and foremost, limited amount of producers accounts for the high level of concentration
in the selling industry. As the production is characterized by high fixed costs, this high
concentration level is heavily supported by high barriers to entry.
Second, the industry-specific products have no substitutes for buyers. Coupled with the fact
that all existing solutions have been delivered by the same suppliers, it makes the demand
both predictable and very inelastic, because despite of either positive or negative decisions
regarding investments into new procurement projects, service, maintenance and replacement
on the existing plants have to be carried out no matter what.
Third, the industry provides conditions for learning over time, because tendering procedures
open opportunities for cartel participants to learn about prices of each other, detect
defections and coordinate behaviour over time.
Finally, presence of large customers who might (consciously or unconsciously) tolerate
higher input prices in the industry is at place. Whether they do that and if so, why would they
behave like that is what this thesis is trying to find out. If such behaviour is at place, it means
that the buyers themselves strengthen entry barriers by creating market limitations that make
it difficult for new players to come in and provide more competition. This way the current
suppliers would be given an opportunity to have a technology-based artificial monopoly on
their products with related services, a monopoly that differs from the conditions in which the
buyers themselves as a legal monopoly have to operate. The main distinction of monopolies
in private markets (in Norway as well as in Europe) is that it is not regulated by government,
which means that ‘competitors’ can demand whatever prices they want. More about the role
of governmental policy in an industrial organization with specific focus on Norway is in the
next subsection.
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2.3 Industrial organization
This chapter will provide a look at the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (SPPP) that
introduces the role of the competition policy in regulating the processes within an industry.
The bigger focus will be taken on the Competition Law in Norway (limited to Chapter § 10
about price-fixing) and role of the Norwegian Competition Authority that guard interests of
competition.
2.3.1 The Paradigm of Industrial Organization
As the action in real economies lies between two extremes of the microeconomic theory,
monopoly and perfect competition, Viscusi et al (2005) present a general approach to the
economic analysis of industrial markets developed by economists at Harvard University. It is
based on three key concepts: (1) structure, (2) conduct (or behaviour), and (3) performance.
The causal relationship between these three concepts is as follows: Structure (number of
sellers, ease of entry, etc.) determines firm conduct (pricing, advertising, etc.), which then
determines market performance (efficiency, technical progress). The approach is known as
the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (SPPP), and is depicted in figure 7.
Figure 7. The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm of Industrial Organization (Source: Viscusi et al 2005)
In the figure, the dashed arrow between the conduct and structure blocks indicates that
conduct “feeds back” to change structure. There are number of ways in which the behaviour
of existing firms in a market can affect future market structure. For example, through
investing in research and development, a firm can lower its costs to a point where it can
force its competitors out of the market. Alternatively, firms can influence market structure
by affecting the decisions of potential entrants to enter through the strategic manipulation of
price or capital. The simplest way in which conduct affects structure is through mergers
(Viscusi et al 2005).
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34
Although the SCPP is of limited use, all the categories remain useful in organizing
knowledge about an industry. An important element in this model is the governmental
impact in industrial organization processes. In the figure, the government policy block
contains the two major categories of policy: competition policy (or in American manner,
antitrust) and regulation. The arrows show that by receiving signals of market behaviour and
taking actions that affect both the market structure and the conduct of its players in order to
improve the industry’s economic performance. For example, an antitrust decision might lead
to the dissolution of a monopoly into a number of independent sellers, which would directly
affect concentration. Alternatively, antitrust laws against price fixing influence the collusive
behaviour in the industry.
Though, the role of government in correction of “market failures” is huge, it is a real
challenge to detect anticompetitive behaviour. Due to the importance of the competition
policy in market functioning, we take a closer look at its goals (general intentions) and
objectives (specific measures).
2.3.2 Competition Policy
A large number of governments have introduced national competition laws. Generally these
refer to legislation, judicial decisions and regulations that relate either to agreements
between firms that restrict competition or to the abuse of a dominant position by a firm or
firms merging together. The rules established by these laws are intended to ensure that the
competitive process is not hindered through the creation of dominance that results from
forms of regulation or agreements between competitors that restrict competition (Maskus
and Lahouel 2000). The term competition policy has a broader meaning, and refers to a set of
measures and instruments used by governments that determine the overall conditions of
competition that are likely to be met in specific markets. As such, competition law is a subset
of competition policy. The broader set of instruments influencing competition policy
includes privatisation, deregulation, foreign investment policy and subsidies. Viewed in this
way domestic competition policy is also affected by regional and international agreements
(Cook 2001, p. 11).
What is the goal of competition policy?
As competition law is based on two distinct but related concepts, market power and
dominance, Sampson (1995) points out several objectives of the competition policy. The
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first one is the allocative and productive efficiencies through reducing costs as far as
possible. As the monopolist is not constrained by competitive forces to reduce cost to its
lowest possible level, the firm becomes X-inefficient (Clarke 1940). It means that while
resources are used to make the right product, they are used less productively. With
competition policy firms should be forced to ensure optimal allocation of resources provided
that the markets in which they operate are contestable. The important feature here is that
entry and exit are free to the industry and the market need not be a model of perfect
competition. The combined effect of both allocative and productive efficiencies is overall
maximization of the society’s wealth. A second objective of competition policy is
safeguarding individuals against the power of monopolist or anti-competitive agreements. In
so doing, competition law can prevent the transfer of wealth to the monopolist at the expense
of the consumer.
According to the SPCC model, competition legislation impacts on business and commercial
life in all the three areas. Conduct regulation relates to prohibition of conduct that restrains
trade, lessens competition or lessens the abuse of market power. Competition law as it relates
to economic structure, impacts on corporate transactions - mergers, takeovers, joint ventures
and asset transfers - when such transactions seek to weaken the independence of competing
firms and raise concentration in economic markets to undesirable levels. Intervention in
economic performance comes about when the Government seeks to correct monopoly
situations or restraint of trade by controlling prices or outputs (Sampson 1995, p.5).
All in all, competition policy is aimed to protect producers and consumers from anti-
competitive practices which raise costs and prices and reduce production, while at the same
time promoting transparency and enhancing the attractiveness of an economy to foreign
investment (UNTAD 2002, p.11). Though, as the national competition laws are unlike in
different countries, the legislation objectives also differ (for example, there are big
differences in legislation of the USA and the EU).
2.3.3 Competition law in Norway (Konkurranseloven § 10)
Competition law has emerged as an issue for the World Trade Organisation (WTO) largely
because exporting firms in high-income countries argued that anti-competitive practices of
competitors in foreign markets hindered their ability to penetrate those markets (Cook 2001
p. 21).
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Since Norway is a part of the European Economic Area (EEA) through its membership in
EFTA, the rules and regulations in the EEA have been implemented into Norwegian
legislation through special Acts and regulations. The Competition Act was introduced in
Norway 1993 and has been through the years harmonized with EU competition rules
regarding prohibitions against cartels and abuse of dominance. The general purpose of the
Act is to encourage competition in order to contribute to the efficient use of resources, with
special consideration to consumer interests.11
The Competition Act of 2004, Chapter 3, Section (§) 10 (corresponds to EEA 53/EU 81)
forbids all forms of collusion that has its purpose to hinder, reduce or twist competition
limits competition (25.10.2006). Following forms of competition-limiting activities are
forbidden: “all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition, and in particular those which:
a. directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any trading conditions;
b. limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
c. share markets or sources of supply;
d. apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
e. make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.”12
The prohibition is directed towards collaboration between independent firms. The form
undertaking is defined in Section 2 of the Act as “any private or public entity that exercises
commercial activities”. Collaboration that happens within the same economical entity is not
under the law’s scope.
11 http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/legislation/More-about-competition-act/
12 http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/legislation/The-Competition-Act-of-2004/
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Collaboration
The prohibition in § 10 regards, first, competition-limiting agreements between one or more
firms. The form of such agreement does not matter, and it is neither a requirement for it to
have a juridical power. Further, both, written and oral agreements are regarded.
Second, the prohibition regards competition-limiting decisions from unions of firms,
typically an industry representing organization. It can, for example, be about setting standard
contract terms that limits competition.
Third, the prohibition regards any competition limiting coordinated behaviour. With such
behaviour is meant that without any agreement, the firm behaves in a certain manner. For
example, when a firm is participating in meetings with a certain cartel participants without
having an active agreement themselves, such behaviour is also laws violation.
In order to talk about a coordinated behaviour, there has to be some form of contact between
the involved firms. One-sided market adjustment is therefore not forbidden by the regulation.
Limitation of competition
Only collaboration within same trade segment (horizontal cooperation) and between
enterprises which operates on different levels of the trade chain (vertical cooperation) is
considered illegal.13 Horizontal collaboration is considered more competition harming than
vertical one, if it is cooperation between the factual or potential competitors.
Collaboration with competition-limiting purposes is forbidden without the requirement to
prove that it has achieved the intended effect. For example, it regards following types of
horizontal agreements:
 collaboration on prices determining
 market sharing, either geographically or by customers, different types of products etc.
 limitation of production or sale
Example of vertical collaboration with competition-limiting purposes:
13 here and further in this subsection the information is taken from the sheets of paper on the topic in Norwegian:
http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/no/Konkurranseregler/Konkurranseloven/
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 determining of binding minimal prices for negotiators
If collaboration does not have competition-limiting purpose, possible competition-limiting
effects of it should be analysed. It has to be evaluated whether it is possible that such an
effects shall occur. The firm’s position in the market, the type and length of the limitation
and the market structure will have importance in this analysis.
Examples of collaboration cases that have to be analysed in detail can be competition ban,
agreements about exclusive delivery and purchase obligations, collaboration on purchasing,
research and development agreements. It is supposed that the effect of such cooperation is
limiting the competition on the market of interest (more detailed guidelines for the analysis
of competition-limiting effects are to be found in EFTA’s supervision authorities).
Requirement of significance
In order for a collaboration to be prohibited according to the Act § 10, it has to limit
competition noticeably. This requirement does not appear directly from the text of the law,
but follows by practice about the according regulations in the EU Treaty Section 81 and the
EEA Agreement Section 53.
Invalidity and compensation
Agreements that go against the prohibition in § 10 are not lawful. The business and people
that suffered from the illegal behaviour can require compensation provided that the listed
requirements are at place (exclusions are not to be reviewed here).
Norwegian Competition Authority (Konkurransetilsynet)
Konkurransetilsynet is the Norwegian Competition Authority’s (NCA). Its main task is to
enforce competition law. The Authority employs in excess of 100 employees and has its
head office in Bergen. In its daily work, the NCA puts great emphasis on providing
information and the correct incentives to the market players, benefiting ultimately, the
consumers, businesses in general, industry and the governmental administrative sector.14 The
Competition Authority is given powers to issue administrative fines for violations of the
prohibitions of the Act.
14 http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/about/
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Sanctions
With violation of the Competition Act § 10 the NCA has various types of reaction measures
to choose from. It can fine a breach penalty/ fine up to 10 percent of the firm’s turnover
according to the Act’s § 29 (the penalties are harmonized against the level in the EU (NHO
ledersamling, 14.09.2007). Further it can report the violation to the Norwegian National
Authority for Investigation and/ or Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime
(Økokrim) for criminal prosecution according to the Act’s § 30. Infringements of § 10 are
penalized with fines or serve 3 years in prison. With especially aggravating circumstances
the period may be extended to 6 years. With less serious infringements Konkurransetilsynet
can order discontinuance of the illegal behaviour according to the Act’s § 12. The order can
be imposed in combination with a breach penalty/ fine. Any possible winnings that were the
outcome of the laws violation are confiscated (25.10.2006).
It can also be relevant with blacklisting of the cartel participants (NHO ledersamling,
14.09.2007). The NCA is planning to adjust the criteria in such a way that the firms taken for
competition crime will be automatically locked out for a certain number of years. Further,
those companies that will be included will have to show to documented routines and internal
guidelines that secure that the company’s leadership and employees act in accordance with
competition legislation. Such routines can, for example, make it clear what both the
leadership and the employees can and what they cannot talk about when they in unlike
contexts meet competitors, among others in industry associations (Sunnevåg,
Konkurransenytt 4/2007).
Fines and leniency
Companies or individuals that cooperate with investigators may have their fines or
punishment reduced according to a new leniency program.15 This program, identically with
the EU practice, let those companies that open their cards and cooperate in investigations,
spare themselves from fines completely (Konkurransenytt 4/2007). The threat of large fines
against companies for cartel conduct provides incentives for firms to defect from the cartel
and benefit from leniency (OECD 2002).
15 ibid
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As the cartels are globalized, the NCA works in a close cooperation with other countries
(25.10.2006).
2.4 Industrial Buying Behaviour
The aim of this theoretical subsection is to present processes and procedures that on the other
hand determine the (industrial) buyer behaviour and how these processes are implemented in
the el-industry. Main considerations in Administrative regulation in the supply sectors (water
and energy supply, transport and post services (Forskrift om innkjøpsregler i
forsyningssektorene (vann- og energiforsyning, transport og posttjenester) and the
Procurement Act (Lov om offentlige anskaffelser) that regulate the industry will be
presented. The Complaints Board for Public Procurements (KOFA) is the governmental
organ that protects suppliers from competition-limiting practices on the buyers’ side. The
subsection will round up introducing systems used in the industry (Sellihca, Doffin/TED)
and their role in the procurement process in this business sector.
2.4.1 Purchasing Process Approach
An expert in buying processes in organizations, Arjan J. van Weele’s (2002), argues that a
major difference between the consumer sector and the industrial sector is related to the
interaction and (mutual) interdependency between buyer and seller. Unlike the consumer
sector, business-to-business markets are often characterized by long-lasting relationships
between the buying and the selling parties. As a consequence, business-to-business
marketers must regard their markets as a network of relationships. Their marketing strategies
are aimed at extending, investing in and continuously maintaining these networks (p. 30).
The term procurement relates to function of purchasing inputs used in the firm’s value chain.
It includes all activities required in order to get the product from the supplier to its final
destination. It encompasses the purchasing function, stores, traffic and transportation,
incoming inspection, and quality control and assurance (p. 16). Within an organization, the
purchasing decision-making process is complex and obscure due to that often various
disciplines and stakeholders are involved, with varying interests and different views and
opinions about what should be done. When ill structured, these processes can easily end up
in considerable loss of time and budget overruns (Van Weele 2002).
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The purchasing process
The purchasing process model depicted in Figure X shows how the different purchasing
activities are interrelated within an organization. Bryndhildsvoll and Abrahamsen (2002)
differentiate 14 steps of the purchasing process, which all are in accordance with the model:
1. Defining needs.
Internal customers within an organization initiate the purchasing process by identifying what
type of solution is needed and minimum requirements. Automatic proposals from a storage
system and prognoses are usually the basis for purchasing plans. The purchaser together with
the internal customer has to decide how they should proceed with the purchase, as it will
have consequences both back and forth the value chain in the company. Such things as
volume of the purchase, storage costs etc. and their total effect within the company must be
evaluated.
2. Purchasing/ developing-analysis.
Clarify whether the need can be covered internally or whether there is a need to proceed with
the purchase in the external market (for example, producing spare parts). Such decisions as
moving parts of internally added value to external suppliers can over time change the
organization and its strategy.
3. Purchasing criteria.
Decide which quality and quantity criteria that are valid. The purchaser has to decide on after
which criteria the incoming offers will later be evaluated. For example, competence,
experience and total costs of delivery. These criteria will be stated in the documents that will
be made available for relevant suppliers for submission of correctly developed offers.
4. Procurement procedure.
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Decide on which way the procurement should be done. The procedure will steer the process.
For example, the European Commission16 differs between the following most common
procedures (or competition forms) in public procurement:
 Direct procurements – there the principal has flexibility when it comes to how the
competition should be carried out, but must comply with the requirements pursuant
to Chapter I of the Regulations relating to Public Procurement. Is an therefore an
exception procedure that has to be well documented.
 Open competitive tendering – this procedure allows all interested suppliers to submit
tenders. There is no pre-qualification.
 Limited competitive tendering – this procedure allows only the suppliers invited by
the principal to submit tenders. First pre-qualification is carried out, where all
interested suppliers may request to participate in the competition with documentation
showing that they are qualified.
 Competitive dialogue – in cases involving particularly complex procurements where
it is impossible for the principal to describe what is to be procured, the competitive
dialogue can be used.
 Competition with negotiation – the procurement procedure allows the principal to
negotiate with suppliers about all aspect of the tenders
5. Specifications.
It is a description of the delivery that entails that supplier delivers an offer that covers
customer’s need (Håndbok). Specifications have a very big importance because they not
only determine terms for the purchase, but they also determine how the organization
manages to use the supplier market (Bryndhildsvoll and Abrahamsen 2002, p. 109).
Following types of specifications are differentiated:
 a detailed specification – describes the product down to the minimum component,
and leaves little space to the supplier to use own competence and experience. If a
16 http://ec.europa.eu/youreurope/business/profiting-from-eu-market/benefiting-from-public-contracts/norway/index_en.htm
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purchaser negotiates on the basis of such a specification, the only dimension is
usually left to talk about it price.
The specialists’ opinion is that other specifications should be used instead:
 a standard specification – where standards are ready developed in an industry.
 a functional or performance-based specification – where supplier can get hold of cost
effective solutions that purchaser possibly didn’t know of.
Use of these specifications leads to that purchasers don’t become locked on one certain
supplier but have many alternatives and dimensions to negotiate about with different
suppliers. It is a fact that on sales courses suppliers are being taught to take contact with
purchasers early in the purchase process in order to affect choice of specifications, and, as
result, choice of suppliers. Therefore, the cross-functional purchasing group in the
organization should evaluate different alternatives of specifications (Bryndhildsvoll and
Abrahamsen 2002).
6. Supplier market.
This step implies searching the market for relevant suppliers. The suppliers can be
producers, agents, wholesalers or even retailers, which should be evaluated for relevance to a
certain purchase. Updating list of suppliers in different markets is one of the most central
tasks for the organization’s purchasing function (Bryndhildsvoll and Abrahamsen 2002).
7. Sending out a request for quotation (or RFQ, a more precise definition will be given
in the next subsection).
This step is about sending out documents with description of needs, specifications and
requirements to relevant suppliers. Economists agree that a company should send RFQs to so
many suppliers as possible in order to receive submitted a competitive offer. The
recommended minimum requirement of bidders in a competition is three, of which one
should preferably be a new unknown supplier.
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8. Evaluation.
On this stage, analysis of the incoming offers, comparison and evaluation according to the
earlier stated criteria is taken. The result is often choice of suppliers for possible negotiations
are taken.
9. Negotiations with the chosen suppliers.
This step is not always necessary, and it also depends on the type of the procurement
procedure chosen early in the purchasing process. Negotiation competition is one of the
major competences a purchaser must have, as the other contractor party (seller) is usually
well trained in this field, and have an incentives to achieve own purposes in form of a bonus-
based wage. Though negotiations are time and cost-demanding, this stage is necessary used
when risks and insecurity are involved.
10. Contract.
On this stage a formal confirmation of the relationship with the supplier is produced (in
which specification of delivery, time limits, amounts, and responsible parties for the contract
from both, the supplier and the employer, etc. are registered).
11. Follow up.
On this stage purchasers secure correct delivery within given delivery deadlines, while
technical function controls technical performance of products.
12. Reception.
Control, installation and accept of the received delivery according to placed orders.
13. Payment.
Approvement and control of invoices are carried out.
14. Guarantee follow up.
This is the last activity in the procurement process with purpose of control and regulation of
compensation in case of deviations.
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According to van Weel, the added value of the professional purchaser lies in his ability to
act as a facilitator for the entire cycle, which among other things includes (pp. 32-33):
a) Being involved in the purchasing (especially investments) projects at an early stage.
b) Preparing a list of approved suppliers in cooperation with the internal customer, and
after that drawing up requests for quotation (RFQs) and preparing their evaluation
together with the user, as well as selecting a supplier by mutual agreement.
c) Preparing and carrying out the contract negotiations as well as drawing up and
reviewing the terms and conditions of the contract.
d) Setting up requisitioning and ordering routines in such a way that the users can place
orders themselves, within the terms and conditions established with the suppliers.
e) In case orders cannot be placed by users themselves, take care of orderhandling.
f) Expedition or follow-up of outstanding orders and monitoring outstanding financial
obligations.
g) Follow up and evaluation in terms of settling claims, evaluating supplier performance
and maintaining and keeping up to date the relevant supplier documentation.
In the real world, organizational purchasing process deviates from the ideal model.
Observation of numerous companies and institutions over many years has demonstrated that
the purchasing process can be obstructed by the following situations (pp. 35-36):
- Supplier or brand specifications. Often defined ‘towards’ a particular supplier. This
practice seriously limits the buyer’s commercial latitude (in terms of negotiations)
with the supplier – who is in many cases aware of the selection of his product.
- Inadequate supplier selection. Selecting a supplier is one of the most important
decisions in the purchasing process, particularly if the products require many years of
maintenance and service (which is often the very case in power business). Failure to
check the supplier’s references can produce very unpleasant surprises.
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- Insufficient contracting expertise. Misunderstandings about the handling of problems
can be prevented by means of a solid contract, editing of which is better left to the
buyer.
- Too much emphasis on price. Buying decisions need to be based upon total-cost-of-
ownership (TCO) models where the initial purchase of the equipment is balanced
against the life-of-type costs (including warranties and maintenance services from the
original manufacturer).
- Administrative organization. Sometimes there are no clear procedures with regard to
procurement or authorization of orders, which can lead to random ordering by
everybody in organization. This results in lots of extra work in the inspection of both
deliveries and invoices, with ultimate possible loss in form of payment without any
kind of check.
The role of the purchasing department in the purchasing process
The tasks, responsibilities and competence of the purchasing department vary between
organizations. Purchasing departments in large companies usually operate more
professionally than in smaller ones, and very small companies usually dispense with having
a specialist explicitly in charge of the purchasing task. The internal structure of the
organization generally governs the way in which the purchasing decisions are made (p.40).
In many companies, various goods and services are bought without intervention of the
purchasing department, in opposite many other disciplines within the company are actively
engaged in buying products and services. This is the reason why large savings usually can be
realized.
Purchasing function has four dimensions:
 a technical dimension, which concerns the functionality, specifications and quality
of the purchased products;
 a commercial dimension, related to managing the relationship with the suppliers and
the contractual conditions which must be negotiated and arranged;
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 a logistics dimension, which concerns all activities related to optimizing the
incoming materials flow from the supplier up to the point where the materials are
needed and actually consumed;
 an administrative dimension, relating to the efficient orderhandling, expediting and
follow up and handling of invoices (pp. 38-39).
A conducted a survey Van Weele (2002) has shown that in practice the involvement of the
purchasing department in the initial stage of the purchasing process is low. Its role becomes
more important when quotations must be solicited; however, when these quotations are
evaluated, involvement decreases. Purchasing appears to be most involved in the operational
activities of the purchasing process. The risks involved with the administrative orientation of
purchasing departments are as follows:
- it may prevent buyers from spending sufficient time on their tactical and more
strategic purchasing tasks;
- it may prevent development of a more strategic vision on purchasing and supply
management in the company.
Although organizational purchasing processes may vary, clear stages (see Figure 8) are still
recognized. Effective purchasing decision making requires a cross-functional approach. The
key issue is to direct and guide the efforts of the various organizational parties involved in
such a way, that an optimal result is achieved for the organization. The professional buyer
can make a major contribution here (p.49).
Figure 8. Purchasing process approach (Van Weele 2002)
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2.4.2 The Buying Process in the El-industry in Norway
Power utility business is a part of Norwegian public sector. Through the European Economic
Area and WTO agreements Norway is obliged to follow definite procedures with public
procurements above certain threshold values.17 Before the procedures are introduced, some
often used definitions are explained in more detail:
Tendering is the offer made by a tenderer when he receives an invitation to tender for the
supply of goods and services. An invitation to tender is an acquisition process which allows
all (open invitation to tender) or invited (restricted invitation to tender) contractors
(tenderers/ bidders) to submit a tender for a particular purchase. The process should increase
market competition between the tenderers and it is assumed that each tenderer is acting
independently. It should be noted that a tendering in this connection relates to every
acquisition process. Tendering is not limited to formal tendering processes but encompasses
also informal forms of invitation to tender.18
A request for information (RFI) is a document which is issued to potential suppliers to
allow them to take part in an "invitation to tender" process.19 The purpose of this business
pprocess is to collect written information about the capabilities of various suppliers
(Wikipedia).
A request for quotation (RFQ) is a document issued when an organization wants to buy
something and chooses to make the specifications available to many other companies so they
can submit competitive bids.20 Therefore, the purpose of this business process is to invite
suppliers into a bidding process to bid on specific products or services (Wikipedia).
The term public procurement is used about purchases made for the state, county and
municipal authorities and agencies. Such agencies may be municipal enterprises, state
enterprises or other institutions or enterprises generally funded by public authorities or
serving the needs of the general public. Public procurements can be divided into building
and construction, goods, services and information and communication technology (ICT). In
17 Ministry of government administration and reform
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fad/Documents/Handbooks-and-brochures/2006/veileder-til-reglene-om-offentlige-
anska/veileder-til-reglene-om-offentlige-anska.html?id=476384
18 Guidance on Tendering and Project Agreement provided by Norwegian Competition Authority (August, 2008):
http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/legislation/Fact-Sheet-Guidance-on-Tendering-and-Project-Agreements/
19 http://www.method123.com/request-for-information.php
20 By Reh, F. John, Management Guide: http://management.about.com/cs/marketingsales/g/req4quot.htm
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ICT and building and construction, procurements may comprise goods and services.
Procurement of goods is the field where the principal's purchasing managers are involved
most and have the greatest influence on the procurement process.21
The purchasing process in the el-industry goes according to the model depicted in Figure X
and all the 14 steps described by Bryndhildsvoll and Abrahamsen (2002). As the industry is
regulated by Public Procurement Act and Regulations pertained to public procurement in
supply sector, the degree of freedom on different stages of large procurements may
somewhat vary from what is described in the theory.
The purchasing function in the supply sector is organized with the principle of cross-
functionality and dualism, in which both commercial and technical dimensions in
procurement are present. While the commercial executives are supposed to manage the
relationship with the suppliers and the contractual conditions, the technical side is
represented by various specialists that come from internal customers.
According to § 5-1 of Regulations, the allowed procurement procedures are open competitive
tendering or limited competitive tendering or competition with negotiations.
For products and services, the EEA threshold value (from 01.03.2010) constitutes 3,2 mil
NOK (Regulations § 2 - 3 (1) a). For these type of procurements part III of Regulations is
valid. Legislation differs for procurements below and above EEA threshold value in order to
help sustain competition in more strategic markets.
Public Procurement Act (Lov om offentlige anskaffelser)
The fundamental requirements (§5) in the Public Procurement Act are as follows22:
• An employer shall act in accordance with good business practice, secure high business
ethical standard in the internal treatment of cases, and secure an equal treatment of
suppliers.
• A procurement shall as long as possible be base don competition.
21 http://ec.europa.eu/youreurope/business/profiting-from-eu-market/benefiting-from-public-contracts/norway/index_en.htm
22 http://www.lovdata.no/all/tl-19990716-069-0.html#5
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• An employer shall secure that predictability, transparency and checkability are attended
through the procurement process
• Choice of qualified tenderers and entering into contracts shall happen on basis of
objective and non-discriminating criteria
• An employer shall not:
a. discriminate between suppliers on the basis of nationality,
b. use standards and technical specifications as a measure to hinder competition, or
c. part up a planned purchase with purpose to avoid application of this law.
Violation of these rules as well as other requirements (not overviewed here) of the Act and
the pertaining Regulations can have serious consequences for buyers. According to the EU-
directive contracts can be declared null and void if entered against the laws. The intention is
to strengthen the opportunity for tenderers to complain about the process of procurement and
thus secure that the assignment goes to the supplier who delivered the best offer (bid).
Contracts can also be declared null and void if they are a result of a direct procurement. In
such cases the competition must be carried out afresh, unless some other strong
considerations speak against it. If that is the case, other sanctions may be used, like fines or
shortening the length of the contract (Konkurransenytt, 4/2007). Compensation for negative
contract interest must also be paid out.
Norwegian Complaints Board for Public Procurements (KOFA)
Duty of the Norwegian Complaints Board for Public Procurement (KOFA) is to handle
complaints of violations of the law on public procurement and relating regulations.
The Board consists of 10 members chosen by the government. Its secretariat, consisting of 9
lawyers, is administratively subordinated the Norwegian Competitive Authority.
KOFA’s statements are advisory, but they make grounds in the very most cases. The
Board’s authority may be described as follows (KOFA’s presentation in BKK, 23.04.2010):
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- provide advisory statements about whether the laws were violated
- state whether there are bases to require compensations or not
- impose fines up to 15% of the contractual value if the terms are fulfilled
From the 1st of January 2007 KOFA has the authority to impose fines with illegal direct
procurements.23 According to KOFA, the amount of complaints regarding illegal direct
procurements doubled since 2007. The largest fine ever imposed was 42 mil NOK (KOFA’s
presentation in BKK, 23.04.2010).
A new directive (in hearing in Norway 20.08.2010) among other propositions (like, change
in quarantine period before entering into a contract, lawsuit deadlines etc.) suggests to move
KOFA’s authority to impose fines directly to the Norwegian courts (KOFA’s presentation
in BKK, 23.04.2010). Such drastic changes, if approved, will not only result in even more
strengthened requirements to employers in the supply sector, but will also increase the
exposure and risks for the suppliers participating in tenders.24
Sellihca - Prequalification Order
The second step in the buying process – supplier selection – in the el-industry is coordinated
by prequalification order, Sellihca.
Sellihca - Nordic Utility Pre-qualification System – is a joint qualification system for
suppliers to utility companies in Nordic region (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and
Sweden). The participating organisations use the system as a joint vendor database in which
they select suppliers when buying goods and services based on the provided information.
In the limited tender procedure, the employer undertakes a choice of suppliers on the basis of
predetermined qualification requirements among those who after invitation to tender stated
their interest in participating in the competition. Such a qualification for participating in
tender is indicated as prequalification. The prequalification is based on objective and not
discriminating selection requirements (qualification requirements), for example
23 http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/no/om/kofa/
24 DLA Piper, an international legal practice at www.dlapiper.com
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requirements to economic solidity, sufficient experience, reference projects, staff. The
employer can set the upper limit of participants in order to avoid handling of too many
offers. Out of consideration for a sufficient and real the Regulations § 17-6 (3) states that it
shouldn’t be invited less than five suppliers to competitions above the EEA threshold
value, while according to Regulations’ § 8-6 (3) it is sufficient with three suppliers in
competitions under the EEA threshold value.25
Sellihca was designed to meet with the strict EU legislation. Its purpose is to reduce costs
and administrative workload to both purchasers and vendors, and to ensure that all vendors'
applications are dealt with fairly and consistently by the subscribing utilities.26
Doffin/TED
When talking about administrative procedures, following databases are valid:
Doffin - the database for public procurement - is a service under the auspices of the Ministry
of Government Administration, Reform and Church Affairs. Doffin comprises the databases
for announcing public procurements. Procurements exceeding the EEA threshold values
must be announced in the EU's announcement database for public procurements in EU:
European public procurement journal Tenders Electronic Daily (TED).27 This happens
automatically when submitting such announcements in Doffin (therefore the Doffin/TED
shortening in this thesis).
The supply sector is not obliged to announce competitions in Doffin because of use of the
prequalification order Sellihca (§ 8-2 (1) of the Regulations). Still, according to § 8-6 (1), the
industry has to announce awarded contracts with value above the EEA threshold. One of the
reasons behind this is that the supplier market must be kept informed about the ongoing
processes in the industry. This way all interested and qualified suppliers that are yet not
registered in Sellihca can get motivation do so. Thus, announcing entered contracts in Doffin
for the public eye is one of the ways to expand the available supplier database in this sector
and provide to a better competition in the industry.
25http://www.kf-
infoserie.no/lovtjeck.aspx?PVNids8U4ZLo9gZqYO9rffQY76UnsFdsnwSSWBh0NTYGDAU37EHTbT%2BngMuwNh4S
P4NWleodQRIR8aV7KHmycrX8qa23TxJsTdBK41SUuX6L3CsWjTZRjjmOMeTWNk64
26 http://www.doffin.no/Search/Show/Search_View.aspx?id=MAR120332
27 http://ec.europa.eu/youreurope/business/profiting-from-eu-market/benefiting-from-public-contracts/norway/index_en.htm
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2.4.3 Warning Signals in Tendering
Konkurransetilsynet in their Fact Sheet: Guidance on Tendering and Project Agreements28
states that “undertakings often collaborate on responses to invitation to tender for the supply
of goods and services. Such collaborations can result for instance in a collusive tendering or
bid rigging where there is an explicit collusion between the tenderers aiming at market-
sharing or price-fixing”.
The Check list for Public Procurements by NCA provides guidelines on how to determine
collusive tendering.
Collaboration on public procurements can happen in many ways. The collaboration forms
can be sophisticated and difficult to uncover. Collusive tendering happens basically in
following ways:
 Fictional bids. Fictional bids (complementary, symbolic bids etc.) are submitted
when the bidders are agreed on a strategy in which one company shall submit the
cheapest bid, or a bid which is obviously priced too high or which contains
conditions that cannot be accepted by the employer.
 Neglecting to submit a bid. A company that would otherwise submitted a bid,
avoids submitting it or drugs it out.
 Bid rotation. The relevant bidders employ a rotating strategy when it comes to
submitting the cheapest bid.
 Market sharing. The relevant bidders in advance share the market between each
other (georgaphically, by product, by quotes or similar).
Warning signals of collusive tendering
Konkurransetilsynet asks to be attentive to following warning signals:
28 http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/en/legislation/Fact-Sheet-Guidance-on-Tendering-and-Project-Agreements/
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o Some suppliers never or very rarely submit bids, although they have all opportunities for
that and are ”naturally” expected to do that.
o It is almost impossible to get bids from suppliers outside of the local region, although
there is no commercial explanation for it.
o Submitted prices are generally increased by all suppliers, although there is no natural
explanation for it (for example, in form of increased prices on raw materials).
o A bid submitted by a totally new supplier than those who usually participate in the
tenders leads to a considerable fall in the “normal” price level.
o Same suppliers almost always submit lowest prices, although there are no particular
circumstances that would provide a basis for that.
o Documents from competing suppliers contain same specifications. It can be
formulations, spelling mistakes, calculation mistakes, specification of subitems, various
specifications etc. The bids are obviously formed alike.
o A supplier reveals knowledge of a competing bid before the bid-submitting deadline.
o Only one supplier participates in inspections, but several suppliers submit bids.
o There is a very big difference between the winning bid and rest of the submitted bids.
o Two or more suppliers rotate the lowest priced bid according to the same pattern.
o The winning supplier uses competitors as sub-suppliers.
o Competing suppliers undertake simultaneous and uniform price changes without natural
and logical explanations.
While one should be awake and considerate over all the symptoms and signals, it is possible
to undermine conditions for cartels to form. Different preventive measures will be reviewed
in the next subsection.
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2.4.4 Preventive Measures
In practice, two ways of counteracting local cartels can be pointed out (Helle, presentation in
BKK 2009). One has to keep following in mind when getting prepared to tenders:
• Expand the supplier markets
– Open specifications
Those responsible for developing specification shall use functional or performance
specifications instead of detailed ones or, even worse, supplier specifications.
– Language
One shall open possibilities for bids to be submitted in English language. This has to be
specified particularly in RFQs, which ideally should also be formulated in English.
• Control information flow
– Before invitations to tenders are sent out
One should keep in secret agreed upon budget prices and other details for internal use within
the company. No informal contacts with current suppliers should be taken prior the tender.
– Under the procurement process
Such information as current prices for products and services, any information about other
bidders’ prices and specification (etc.) should be kept aside communication with relevant
suppliers.
– Give the suppliers an impression that new suppliers are welcomed for
participation in the tender.
Bringing insecurity about who participates in the tender makes cartels unstable, if such
should exist within a certain tender.
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OECD Checklist
The Organisation for Economic co-operation and development (OECD) developed a
Checklist for Enhancing Integrity in Public Procurement. 29 The purpose of the Checklist is
to guide policy makers at the central government level in instilling a culture of integrity in
the entire procurement cycle, from needs assessment to contract management and payment.
The first part of it provides guidance for policy makers – in the form of ten key
recommendations – on developing an adequate policy framework for enhancing integrity in
public procurement. The second part provides guidance on how to implement this
framework at each stage, from needs assessment to contract management (ibid).
NCA recommendations
The Check list for Public Procurements by Konkurransetilsynet in the meanwhile lists
following moments for evaluation when organizing tendering processes:
 Be updated on prices and price development on essential factors in the bids.
 Take contact with purchasers that have recently carried out similar purchases.
 Make sure that external consultants that are being involved in the procurement
process sign oath of secrecy and statement that all deviations and irregularities shall
be reported at once.
 Avoid making invitations to tender so ‘exclusive’ that other potential bidders are shut
out.
 Avoid unnecessary terms that could exclude foreign interest. Foreign bids can
provide a useful scale of measure!
 Be unpredictable with regard to who is particularly invited to deliver a bid.
Unpredictability creates anxiety and insecurity in a cartel!
29 The Checklist is fully available in English and French at:
http://www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3343,en_2649_34135_41072238_1_1_1_37447,00.html
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 If it is possible, it can be advantageous to split up a tender. This can awaken interest
from a bigger number of suppliers that don’t have capacity to submit bids on a big
complex project.
 Make difficult the communication between relevant suppliers in the process of a
tender. It should be evaluates to carry out individual location inspections for a single
bidder, although it can be time consuming. It can be evaluated whether suppliers
shall specify all verbal and written communication they have had with competitors
during the tendering process.
 Take contact with suppliers you have expected a bid from and hear with them why
this has not happened.
 Develop experience and competence in own organization with regard to disclosure of
hallmarks of collusive tendering.
 Take contact with Konkurransetilsynet if you have questions or suspicions that
”something is going on”. Don’t discuss your suspicions with anyone of the involved
suppliers. Keep all written materials and communication with the involved bidders.
Obviously, many of the depicted moments are related to the behavioural aspect of the
relationship to the supplier markets in public procurement, which is the focus of this thesis.
Further, behavioural theories that will make a basis for the conceptual model will be
presented.
2.5 Behavioural theories
Two behavioural theories will be used as a basis for development of the conceptual model.
The Theory of Planned Behaviour will be reviewed firstly, and then followed by Robert B.
Cialdini’s fundamental social and psychological principles underlying the tactics of
successful persuaders. The conceptual model will integrate both theories in relation to the
industrial buying behaviour and purchasing process in the el-industry.
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2.5.1 Theory of Planned Behaviour
The Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) assumes that people are rational actors that
systematically adapt and process available information before making decisions. Whether a
certain behaviour will be performed or not depends on whether the person intends to perform
it. Intention is presented a function of attitude toward the behaviour, subjective norms, and
perceived behavioural control (see Figure 9).
Figure 9. Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1985, p.14)
Intention acts as an indication of an individual's readiness to perform a given behaviour and
it is assumed to be immediate antecedent of behaviour. Subjective norm is an individual’s
perception about particular behaviour, which is influenced by social norms. Attitude is an
individual’s positive or negative evaluation of self-performance of a particular behaviour.
Perceived behavioural control refers to individual's perceived ease or difficulty of
performing the particular behaviour. It is meant to account for individuals’ uncontrollable
factors (Lu et al. 2010, p. 802).
As an example, a consumer might have a very favourable attitude toward having a drink
before dinner at a restaurant. However, the intention to actually order the drink may be
influenced by the consumer’s beliefs about the appropriateness (i.e. the perceived social
norm) of ordering a drink in the current situation (with friends for a fun meal or on a job
interview) and her/his motivation to comply with those beliefs (Hawkins et al. 2001). Also
consumers may be confronted with situations in which the target behaviour is not completely
under the consumer’s control. For example, a consumer may be prevented from purchasing a
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considered service if the consumer perceives the purchase process as too complex or if
he/she does not possess the resources necessary to perform the considered behaviour
(Hansen and Jensen 2007, p. 86).
As such, TPB predicts intention to perform a behaviour by consumer’s attitude towards that
behaviour rather than by consumer’s attitude towards a product or service. Ajzen (1985)
proposes TPB to explain and predict various human behaviour patterns.
2.5.2 Influence by Cialdini
Robert Cialdini’s social and psychological principles underlying the tactics of persuaders
(which all sellers are by definition) are based on automatic, shortcut responding of people to
a set of trigger features. The triggers are specific pieces for information used by persuaders
for compliance with requests, and are proved to affect behaviour in various situations.
Ph. D. Cialdini in his book Influence, which has already become a classic, argues that
behaviour often occurs in rigid and mechanical patterns (revised in 2009, p.16). He
introduces six principles that compliance practitioners use every day to get us to say yes:
reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social proof, liking, authority and scarcity.
Reciprocation
This rule requires that one person try to repay, in kind, what another person has provided. By
obligating the recipient of an act to repayment in the future, the rule for reciprocation allows
one individual to give something to another with confidence that it is not being lost. This
sense of future obligation within the rule makes possible the development of various kinds of
continuing relationships, transactions, and exchanges (Cialdini 2009). The rule is extremely
powerful, often overwhelming the influence of other factors; among other things, it applies
to uninvited first favours and can spur unequal exchanges as a result of uncomfortable
feeling of indebtedness.
Commitment and Consistency
This principle is based on the fact that people have a desire to look consistent within their
words, beliefs, attitudes and deeds. Once they have made a choice or taken a stand, they are
under both internal and external pressure to behave consistently with that commitment.
Many compliance professionals try to induce people to take an initial position that is
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consistent with a behaviour they will later request from these people. Commitments are most
effective when they are active, public, effortful, and viewed as internally motivated
(uncoerced). Once a stand is taken, there is a natural tendency to behave in ways that are
stubbornly consistent with the stand (ibid).
Social Proof
This principle says that people decide what is correct by noticing what other people think is
correct. It applies especially to the way people determine what constitutes correct behaviour.
If everyone else is behaving a certain way, most assume that is the right thing to do.
Product endorsements are the most obvious application of the Social Proof. If you want
someone to do something for you, be sure to let them see that many other people are already
doing it or are willing to do it. Social proof is most influential under two conditions:
 uncertainty – when unsure, people are more likely to attend to the actions of others
and to accept those actions as correct;
 similarity – people are more inclined to follow the lead of similar others (ibid).
Liking
Cialdini continues that ‘people love to say 'yes' to requests from people they know and like.
And people tend to like others who appear to have similar opinions, personality traits,
background, or lifestyle. They also tend to like and trust anything familiar. The best way to
build this familiarity is to have frequent, pleasant contacts. One positive circumstance that
works especially well is mutual and successful cooperation’. Another factor linked to Liking
is association, which, if desired, provides a halo effect when associated with something
positive.
Authority
The professor states that some people are more strongly influenced by authority than others,
and then compliance can vary according to the situation. This principle is generally used by
citing authoritative sources to support own ideas. It is also frequently used in situations when
an individual looks and act like an authority himself/herself and let others know that his/her
education and experience support the expressed ideas.
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When reacting to authority in an automatic fashion, there is a tendency to do so in response
to the mere symbols of authority rather than to its substance (Cialdini 2009).
Scarcity
According to this last principle, people assign more value to opportunities when they are less
available. The availability of an item serves as a shortcut cue to its quality. Also according to
psychological reactance theory, we respond to the loss of freedoms by wanting to have them
more than before. The possibility of losing something acts as a more powerful motivator
than of gaining something. For example, the scarcity principle applies to the way
information is evaluated. The act of limiting access to a message causes individuals to want
to receive it more and to become more favourable to it. This makes limited information more
persuasive (ibid).
Cialdini (2009) summarizes that people are forced to resort to a shortcut decision-making
approach in which the decision to comply (or agree or believe or buy) is made on the basis of
a single, usually reliable piece of information. Most popular such single triggers for
compliance are the six principles described.
2.5.3 The Conceptual Model (TPB Modified)
As both behavioural theories are well known in academic environment and are supported by
empirical evidence from various studies on human behaviour, they provide a good base for
development of the conceptual model.
In the conceptual model, firstly TPB will be adapted according to the theoretical perspective
on industrial purchasers’ behaviour. Then Cialdini’s principals will be used as a foundation
behind the industry buyers’ attitude towards the supplier market. The conceptual model is
depicted in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: The Conceptual Model, based on the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen 1985)
According to the model, the industrial buyers systematically process available information
before making decisions. A central factor in the model is the individual’s intention to
perform a given behaviour. Intention captures the motivational factors that influence a
behaviour; it is indication of how hard people are willing to try, of how much of an effort
they are planning to exert, in order to perform the behaviour (Ajzen 1991). So, intention
refers to purchasers’ evaluative affect about performing a certain behaviour, and it is based
on such constructs as attitudes toward the behaviour, normative pressures, and perceived
behavioural control.
In the context of this study, normative pressures (NP) refer to “norms developed through
external and interpersonal influence” (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975). In order to make
relationships more distinct, the construct will concern the pressure of legislative norms under
which industry has to operate (therefore the replacement of subjective norms from the
original model). In this research NP is measured as a degree of knowledge of laws and
regulations relating to Public Procurement.
Perceived behavioural control (PBC) is defined as “the perceived ease or difficulty of
performing the behaviour of interest” (Azjen 1991, p. 183). In the context of the
procurement in the supply sector, the behaviour of interest is competition-promoting
practices that would undermine collusive behaviour of suppliers in tendering process. The
PBC construct is related to the consumer’s confidence in his/her ability to perform the
behaviour, and therefore, can be interpreted as a confidence construct (Hoffman and Novak
Attitude
Toward
Behaviour
Normative
pressure
Perceived
Behavioural
Control
Intention Behaviour
64
1996). It means that those who have more confidence in their ability to make a difference are
more likely to change their behaviour. Measuring this construct will follow Klobas’s (1995)
proposition of researching underlying potential barriers and costs of employing such
behaviour.
A special attention in the conceptual model is given to attitudes. Triandis (1971) argues that
attitudes have three components: cognitive component (thoughts and beliefs people hold),
affective component (emotional feelings), behavioural component (predispositions to act in
certain ways). As most contemporary social psychologists, we take a cognitive or
information-processing approach to attitude formation. This approach is exemplified by
Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) expectancy-value model of attitudes. According to this model,
attitudes develop reasonably from the beliefs people hold about the object of the attitude
(Ajzen 1991). In our context, attitude toward the behaviour (ATB) refers to the degree to
which a person has a favourable or unfavourable evaluation or appraisal of the behaviour in
question (Ajzen 1991).
The model points the attention to the mental barriers that obstruct the change in behaviour.
These barriers don’t need to do anything with the real obstacles. Here the Cialdini’s
principals are employed as an explanation to how the buyer’s “rational” behaviour is
affected by influence factors. Following definitions were agreed upon in a focus group
consisting of three specialists representing a commercial dimension in the procurement
process in the el-industry:
Reciprocation construct applies to beliefs about product qualities and the relationship
between high price and other dimensions of the purchase, like, for example, quality, brand
and supplier names, etc. The reasoning behind this choice of measure was decision to
employ a fixed-action behavioural pattern, which indicates unconscious response to various
stimuli persuaders use in order to justify high price. In the meanwhile, however, the price
concept should have been correlated with willingness to pay. It was decided not to employ
the “give-and-take” constituent in this construct due to the very sensitivity of the issue.
Commitment and consistency construct applies to exchange of information, both internally
(colleague-to-colleague) and externally (company-to-company) in the industry. Examples
include recommendations to colleagues, willingness to give positive statements about
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suppliers at request, or any other statements and activities that evoke feelings of ownership
to before the choice of supplier is fulfilled.
Social Proof construct applies to the processes and routines usually employed in the
industry.
Liking construct applies to beliefs about necessity of local presence of suppliers, networking
in the industry, common experience, mutual acquaintances, attitudes towards culture, and
language beliefs shared by purchasers.
Authority construct applies to the importance of references and recommendations in the
industry.
Scarcity construct applies to beliefs about uniqueness and exclusivity of products and
suppliers.
In sum, attitude beliefs about products, suppliers, routines, and related positive or negative
changes on the market will explain in which degree purchasers want personally to employ a
certain behaviour.
The TPB theory says that all the three factors (ATB, NP and PBC) can have an indirect
effect on behaviour through affecting each other. For example, normative pressures affect
perceived behavioural control in such a way that it can cause purchasers to behave in a
manner that is inconsistent with their attitudes and their preformed intentions. On the other
hand, the most effective way to strengthen the intention to behave in a certain way is through
perception that it will be possible. Thus, negative experiences, especially in an earlier
attempt, will affect beliefs through reducing expectations.
As the conceptual framework makes it possible to understand and predict better the industry
purchaser’s decisions related to the supplier market by thoroughly examining underlying
attitudes and perceptions, the actual behaviour is still to be researched and described.
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3. Method
3.1 Survey Administration
A population is the entire collection of all observations of interest to the researcher (Burns
and Burns 2008). In this case the population is the executives who carry out procurement
projects with value above the EEA threshold in the Norwegian electric utility companies.
These are executives involved into the very procurement process, and they are represented
by the commercial and technical dimensions in the procurement, which are distinctive in big
and medium-sized companies, or those executives who carry out both functions – as a rule,
in smaller companies.
Commercial executives are contracting managers, responsible for the supply market research,
development of requests for quotations (RFQs), evaluating the incoming bids, and carrying
out supplier negotiations. They control that the supplier selection is made based on the
lawful selection criteria, and enter into contracts with the winning bidder according to the
voiced pre-specified criteria. Their specific function is to provide to a sufficient competition
and make sure that each stage of the procurement process is carried out in accordance with
the requirements in the Public Procurement Act and the pertaining Regulations.
Technical executives are various specialists representing internal customers within a
company (it can be, for example, departments or daughter companies). These specialists as a
rule represented by engineers, but there are many siviløkonomer (MBAs) in this group as
well, so it would be incorrect to shorten the definition to, for example, ‘technicians’. They
define needs of goods and services that are to be purchased, determine specifications, audit
quality organization, perform value analysis, and quality control. In smaller companies
technical specialists undertake both, technical and commercial functions in the purchasing
process.
As sample is a representative portion of the population which is selected for study (Burns
and Burns 2008), Sellihca register of Norwegian utility companies is chosen as sampling
frame (list of the target population) for this research. Sellihca is representative of the entire
population, because its purpose is to ease the procedure for procurements above the EEA
threshold value for the industry. Therefore, companies that are not registered in Sellihca
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have no need in direct purchases above the EEA threshold value and are initially not relevant
respondents for this research.
Two Sellihca-users, Hydro and Statoil (represented by Norsk Hydro ASA, Norsk Hydro
Produksjon AS, Hydro Aluminium AS), were excluded from the respondent list, as these
large international companies have much more professional procurement function compared
to the Norwegian utility industry. Besides, oil and gas companies produce energy for mostly
own consumption, while this study is concerned about the costs that affect the end consumer
and therefore have greater impact on general welfare of the Norwegian society.
The initial list of registered companies in Sellihca pr January 2010 contained 180 companies
represented by 83 original contact persons (or “company e-mail address” for smaller
companies) and 9 additional contact persons. In the provided list, all the companies were
categorized into 27 purchasing units called Subscribers.
Since Sellihca provided a list of only contact people from each utility company, a snowball
sampling (when initial contacts provide further contacts) was used. Respondents were
recruited by an invitation e-mail in which contact persons registered in Sellihca were asked
to produce a list of relevant commercial and technical executives participating in the
procurement process in the company. Thus, elements of judgment sampling (experts’
judgment that they are representative of the population of interest) were used. The contacted
people were given 2 weeks to produce the respondent list for their company.
A total of 252 respondents were assigned. In order to make a representative selection from
the industry, quota sampling (selecting units from each of the segments) was used on parts
of the contacts by sending research reminders to samples from each group of company
representatives based on the company size. Bigger companies have more resources and more
frequent needs in purchasing goods and services above the EEA threshold value, so it was
very important that these companies would be equally represented in the response.
The survey was administered via Questback. Two reminders were sent with a week in
between. The reminders were followed by phone in order to clarify the research purposes
and answer to possible questions. 118 responded produced 46,8% response.
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3.2 Questionnaire Design
With help of the data obtained in the interview, it was decided to focus on following
elements in the structural approach of the research when looking at Behaviour vs Perceived
control vs Attitude:
Suppliers
 products (quality, price, etc.)
 proximity (in meaning of local presence)
o from Norway
o from the EU/EEA
o outside of the EU/EEA
Routines
 industry vs company
o Supplier search
- Sellihca and Doffin/TED
o Requests for quotation
- templates
- standard terms of contract
- specification
- language
- bid-submitting deadlines
Besides these elements, awareness of cartels in the supply market will also be measured.
One pilot-test of the questionnaire was carried out on one commercial executive. The author
will not describe the pilot-testing of the questionnaire and all the revisions made, only the
final result will be presented.
In this subsection, questions will be presented according to the structural approach, so the
order of appearance will be different from the questionnaire, in which the question structure
has a more “natural” flow. For space-saving reasons, the original question formulations are
to be found in Appendices 1- 2 (exception Q50 and Q55, for which the original statements
will be presented). Here, the purpose of each question will be introduced and argumentation
for answering alternatives will be provided.
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Introduction part. Here the author and the objective of the research are introduced to the
prospective respondents. The definition of procurement projects with value above the EEA
threshold is provided, and a short explanation on why the research is relevant for both, the
commercial and technical executives, is given. An approximate estimation of time needed
for filling out the questionnaire, and contacts in case of additional questions are supported.
Classification questions
Q1 – company size
Less than 100 employees – small companies.
100-500 – medium-sized companies.
More than 500 – large companies.
Large and medium-sized companies have purchasing departments in which commercial and
technical sides in procurement are two distinctive dimensions.
Q2 – company type
Energy production, Distribution, District heating – main types of electric utility companies
Q3 – working experience in this industry
Less than 3 years – relatively little experience, no expected awareness of cartels
3-10 – long enough experience, the executives should be aware of cartels existence in the
industry
More than 10 years – long experience in the industry
Q4 – area of the executive’s responsibility in procurement process
Commercial, technical or both fields of responsibility.
Normative pressure
Q5 – degree of proficiency in the Public Procurement Act and the relating Regulations.
Those who believe they know the laws and regulations Well don’t see needs for changes and
might have stronger resistance for changes. Those who agree they Have need for training,
are those who might have wrong attitudes and beliefs due to lack of knowledge, which can
be fixed with more training. They constitute the “margin” for positive development in the
industry. It is expected that those who are Proficient in laws, have the best understanding of
the market situation and take the initiative to develop preventive measures against the
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supplier cartels. If they don’t develop a structural approach and systems in their routines, one
has to see why. This group of executives is the most difficult to change their attitudes.
This question can be seen in relation with Q3 (experience), Q4 (area of responsibility), Q6
(awareness of cartels in the past) and Q16 (awareness of cartels in the present) in addition to
checking established company routines – Q18.
Other tools of normative pressure are systems Sellihca, Doffin/TED which are in use in the
industry due to the Regulations relating to public procurement in the supply sector. Despite
of the results on Q5, all the questions regarding the use of these systems will be control
questions for the construct of the Normative pressure. Based on the results, there might be
discussion regarding the following:
- knowledge about these systems
For example, if over 20-30% respondents answer Don’t know on questions related to these
systems, it will mean that they have no knowledge about it. All responds less than 20% will
indicate a neutral position in the answers.
- behaviour
Those who provide answers will show the effect the normative pressures have in the
industry.
Awareness of cartels in the supply market
Q6 – awareness of the cartels existence in the past in the industry
Q7 – awareness of the field(s) in which cartels had existed
Q8 – awareness of the supplier names that were involved in this practice
Q9 – awareness of how cartels were disclosed (can provide tips for the industry)
Q10 – sources of information
Q12 – awareness of how many suppliers are present in Norway within the cartel exposed
field
Q13 – awareness of how many suppliers are present in the EU within the cartel exposed field
Q14 – awareness of how many suppliers are present outside the EU within the cartel
exposed field(s)
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Q16 - awareness of the cartels existence in the present in the industry
The aim of these questions is to check the awareness level about supplier cartels in the
industry, knowledge of what has happened in the industry and what is going on in the supply
market at present time.
Behaviour
Q11 – whether those who are aware of cartels are conscious about the fact that they continue
purchasing from the cartel participants
Shall analyse Q11 against data from Q6 (awareness of cartels)
[Routines]
Q15 – how many suppliers the executive invites when purchasing within the cartel exposed
field
3 or less – minimum requirement/ sometimes under the minimum requirement
4-6 – trying to break the collusive practice and promote competition
This question is related with Q12-Q14 (market knowledge).
Q17 – how procurement is organized with regard to communication with the supplier.
Answering alternatives Only technical executive is involved or Only commercial executive is
involved will both indicate unfortunate practices.
Q18 – at which stage commercial executive becomes involved in the procurement process
Early in the planning process of the procurement – the ideal procedure for procurement
process
After specification is developed – power of the commercial executive is limited
After contact with possible suppliers is made – power of suppliers over buyers is on its
maximum
The aim of Q17-18 is to check points of contacts in relation to communication with the
suppliers.
Search for suppliers routines Q19-21:
Q19 – how many suppliers usually are on the bidders list. This is also a control question to
Q15.
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1 or 2 – competition-limiting activities
3-5 – varying from minimum requirements (3) to an OK level
More than 5 – competition-promoting activities
This question can be seen in relation with Q12-Q14 (about how many suppliers are available
at different parts of the market in the cartels exposed field).
Q20-21 – how often different methods of selecting suppliers to bidder list are selected
Sellihca, Internet, Industry magazines, Visit to exhibitions, Other
While Sellihca is an official database with suppliers, the more methods used, the better. We
have to look at the frequency of their use in the entirety of answers. For example, prevalence
of Visit to exhibitions will point into direction of importance of personal relationships.
It will also be interesting to see which other methods are used, if any.
System routines Q23-26:
Q23 – whether the executives encourage new suppliers to register in Sellihca.
This question has to be seen in relation with Q22 (regarding satisfaction with Sellihca).
Q24 – how often the executives publish requests for information in Doffin/TED.
The industry is not obliged to do so because of having Sellihca. Still, it is an extra measure
of competition-promoting activities. Answers can be controlled by checking Doffin/TED for
data registered the last year or two.
Q25 – how often the executives announce contract awards in Doffin/TED.
Unlike Q24, this procedure is obligatory, therefore answer alternatives are more concrete
than in Q24.
1-3 times pr year – depending on size of the company can be a bad routine (for a large
company) or good one (for a small company).
More than 3 times pr year – relatively often.
Announce all assignments (over 3,2 mil NOK) – a perfect routine for all companies in the
industry.
Answers can be controlled by opening Doffin/TED web pages and checking the register for
announcements of awarded contracts the last year or two.
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Q26 – whether the company has an internal procedure that ensures that contract awards
become announced in Doffin/TED.
This is an explanatory question to Q25.
Relationships with suppliers
from Norway:
Q32a – how often the company invites to tenders suppliers from Norway.
from the EU:
Q32b – how often the company invites to tenders suppliers from the EU.
international suppliers from outside of the EU/EEA:
Q32c – how often the company invites to tenders international suppliers from outside of the
EU (meaning outside of the EEA). This question can be seen in relation with Q28 and Q29
(earlier experience).
Behaviour in the past and experience with suppliers from outside of the EU/EEA
Q28 – whether the company has ever purchased from international suppliers from outside of
the EEA.
Q29a-Q29e – experience with these deliveries. This is a supplementary question to Q28.
Behaviour in the present
Q30 – whether the company still invites to tenders same suppliers from other countries than
the EEA that they earlier had as bidders. This question has to be seen in relation with Q28
and Q29.
Q31 – whether the company invites to tenders new suppliers from other countries than the
EEA. This question has to be seen in relation with Q28 and Q29.
[Local presence]
Q45 – routine of entering into a contract with a foreign supplier, which is not established in
Norway
Directly – an open approach towards foreign suppliers
Through a Norwegian representative – risk aversive approach towards foreign suppliers
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Q46 – how many of the existing suppliers don’t have a Norwegian registration number
The answers vary from Less than 1% to More than 20%.
Q47 – what part of purchases in total foreign contracts have in volume
The answers also vary from Less than 1% to More than 20%. This is a somewhat
explanatory question to Q46.
Request for quotation (RFQ)
Q34 – whether the company use templates when preparing requests for quotation. If a
company does use templates, it means that this company has a system with internally
developed standards when approaching suppliers. Each company should have a system and
procedures, routines that all executives involved into procurement processes have to be
familiar with.
Q35a – whether there have been made changes in templates for RFQs the last two years.
This question has to be seen in relation with Q34. Cross-tabs with Q3, Q4 will help to
interpret the answers.
The industry has to make sure that the systems and routines become updated with time.
Outdated technical descriptions lead to use of old technologies. New technical solutions
could have helped to solve old problems in new ways. On the other hand, not revised
technical descriptions provide security, because they make sure that something that has
functioned many times before will be used again. Old templates for RFQs and old
specifications both cement old technology – from each side in the procurement process,
technical and commercial.
Specification
Q35b – whether there have been made changes in technical descriptions the last two years.
This question has to be seen in relation with Q38. Cross-tabs with Q3, Q4 will help to
interpret the answers.
Q36 – how often different standard terms of contract are used in the industry.
In this research the following range of standard terms is used:
a) NL01 – a supplier developed standard.
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b) AKB1988 – an industry-agreed on standard for electro-mechanical equipment. This one is
more balanced than NL01, but still seller- friendly.
c) AKS89 – general governmental terms of contract for procurement. It is suited for product
and made-to-order procurements. Outdated.
d) AIS89 – general governmental terms of contract. Plain delivery terms (guarantees,
delivery).
e) Fidic, Orgalime, ICC – international standards.
Fidic – an advisory engineers contract. Balanced.
Orgalime – a supplier-based standard (international variant of NL01).
ICC – International Chamber of Commerce standard.
f) NS – Norwegian standards. Technical and contract standards developed by Standard
Norge. An industry-agreed upon standard. The proprietor is Standard Norge. It is mainly
applied to building and construction, but also to some advisory services. Balanced.
g) Kolemo – a standard under development. ‘Contract, delivery and montage’. A modern
contract that is meant as a replacement of 20 year old AKB1988.
h) SSA, IKT – a governmental standard agreement for IT.
Several contracts that regard purchase, service and development of both hard- and software.
Balanced.
i) In-house terms of contract – own standards developed by the purchasing enterprises. Are
mainly used by big buyers. If the research will show that small and medium-sized companies
in el-industry also use such terms, it will indicate an unfortunate practice. Such standards
pressure all the risks to the supplier, which will result in a higher price. This is a
competition-limiting practice.
j) Other – to be specified in Q37.
In sum, the standard terms of contract can be distinguished as supplier-based terms of
contracts, governmental contracts that are balanced, and in-house terms of contract that let
buyers exercise their power over suppliers. The first and the last groups are competition-
limiting practices. It will also be interesting to see how many of the commercial executives
and those who carry out both functions are familiar with all of these standards.
Q38 – how often the companies use following types of specification.
a) Detail specification
b) Function- or performance based specification
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c) Industry-standard specification
d) Suppliers’ specification
The larger the degree of detail specification, the less the possibility for competition is
provided. This makes use of supplier specification least desirable and performance-based
specification most desirable type. The types are mixed in order not to let the respondents
intuitively understand which answers are more preferable.
This question may be seen in relation with Q16 (awareness of cartels) in order to interpret
the results.
Language
Q39 – how often the executives allow for following:
a) That RFQ is prepared in English
b) That a bid can be submitted in English
Q40 – share of Norwegian language RFQs in the respondent’s company.
This is a control question for Q39.
Under 10% - this is an expected real estimation in the industry
10-50% - would indicate a good open attitude towards foreign suppliers
51-70%, 71-80%, Over 80% - are the alternatives indicating an open-minded attitude
towards international competition. The shares over 50% are divided into several options in
order to capture a more precise estimation.
Q41 – whether the company has in-house terms of contract in English.
Q44 – what share of the company’s contracts above the EEA threshold value is in English.
Answer alternatives are Under 10%, 10-50%, Over 50%. The share above 50 % is not
divided into smaller segments because it is already a very high value in itself.
This is a control questions to Q40. It can also be compared to answers given on Q39.
Bid-submitting deadlines
Q42 – how often the company uses different deadlines in competitions with negotiation:
a) Less than 24 days - the absolute minimum is 10 days, which is used in extraordinary
circumstances or where this is agreed upon with the bidders.
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b) 24 days - is a minimum deadline in competitions with negotiations for purchases above
the EEA threshold value (Regulations relating to procurement rules in supply sector, Chapter
9, § 9-2).
c) More than 24 days
As the usual deadline is 24 days, all shorter deadlines are exceptions. We want to see how
often the energy companies have to carry out urgent deliveries.
Q43 – how often the company uses an extended deadline in order to attract new market
players.
This question checks whether the industry consciously uses extended deadlines in order to
promote supplier competition.
Perceived behavioural control
Here the respondents’ beliefs and perceptions about whether they can control conditions in
which they operate will be measured.
Company routines
Q48 – who has a greater impact on the outcome of the procurement process in the
respondent’s company.
With either of the alternatives, the technical executive or the commercial executive, there
will be a distorted picture of the industry. Both technical and commercial executives have
equal impact should be the ideal perception of the situation.
This question has to be seen in relation with Q4 (company size) and Q5 (field of
responsibility).
Q49 – who should have greater impact on the outcome (who becomes awarded the contract)
in the company
This is the check-question on the prevailing beliefs about own roles in the procurement
process. Besides Q48, results should also be seen in relation with Q4 and Q5.
Respondents will be presented a number of statements on which they are asked to indicate,
the degree of agreement/disagreement on a 6-point Likert scale, varying from Strongly Agree
to Strongly Disagree.
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Suppliers
Q50a – In my opinion there is a real competition in the market
Q50b – I don’t let myself be manipulated by suppliers
Q50f – References provided in the bid give valuable information regarding the procurement
Q55tt – It is okay to pay more if this leads to reduced delivery times
Routines
Q50c – I regularly have to carry out urgent deliveries
Q50d – I regularly have too little time to carry out procurement projects correctly
Q50e – I don’t have time to check references in the bid
Q50g – It is resource-demanding to administrate many bidders
Q50h – It is time-consuming to evaluate many bids
Q50i – The submitting deadlines are too short to attract new market players
Q50j – The outcome is in too large degree determined by procurement regulations
Q50k – I am comfortable with using English as business language in preparation of RFQ
and in negotiations
Q55ss – It is necessary to have several bids to evaluate
Q55uu – An extended submitting deadline attracts new suppliers
Q55vv – It is important to check stated references
Q55ww – Use of English in the preparation of RFQ leads to more competition
Attitudes affected by perceived behavioural control
Attitude towards Sellihca
Q22 – satisfaction with the supplier choice in Sellihca
Q27c – beliefs about whether Sellihca can provide a sufficient choice of suppliers
Q51 – beliefs about whether announcement of tenders in Sellihca leads to better changes in:
a) market situation, b) products, c) quality, d) reliability, e) delivery times, f) risk, g) prices.
Attitude towards Doffin/TED
Q27a – beliefs about whether it is possible to get more competition by publishing more RFIs
in Doffin/TED
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Q27b – beliefs about whether it is possible to get more competition by announcing more
contract awards in Doffin/TED
Q52 – beliefs about whether announcement of tenders in Doffin/TED leads to better changes
in: a) market situation, b) products, c) quality, d) reliability, e) delivery times, f) risk, g)
prices.
Q53 – beliefs about whether announcement of awarded contracts in Doffin/TED leads to
better changes in: a) market situation, b) products, c) quality, d) reliability, e) delivery times,
f) risk, g) prices.
Answers to Q51, Q52, Q53 can be compared in order to see which beliefs about advantages
and disadvantages prevail in the buyers’ minds with use of each of the systems.
Attitude towards suppliers
Q33 – satisfaction with suppliers from Norway, the EU, and international suppliers from
outside of the EU/ EEA. Difference in attitude. This question has to be seen in relation to
Q32.
Q54 – beliefs about whether sending RFQs to suppliers outside the EEA leads to better
changes in: a) market situation, b) products, c) quality, d) reliability, e) delivery times, f)
risk, g) prices. This is explanatory question to Q52-Q53.
Attitudes towards behaviour – constructs from the Cialdini’s theory of persuasion and
compliance
Reciprocation
Questions measuring this construct ideally shall sound as follows:
- Do you receive small gifts/ accept invitation to dinners, family tours etc. or
- Do you feel you owe a return favour …?
Even such a simple question as Do you accept invitations to presentations organized by
suppliers? could evoke negative attitude towards the whole research, so it was decided to
extract direct measuring of the reciprocation construct. Still, as it is one of the most
frequently used techniques in the field of persuasion, compliance, and negotiation, it would
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be incorrect to avoid measuring it completely. That is why it will be measured indirectly via
questions relating to the exchange of information and relationships building in the questions
relating to the later constructs. Instead, it was used general “click, whir”-responses to
information on price, brands and suppliers (can be relevant to Liking).
Q55a – A high price indicates higher quality
Q55b – Well-known brands indicate high quality
Q55c – Well-known suppliers indicate security
Commitment and consistency
Q55d – I give references and make positive statements about products that I buy
Q55e – I give recommendations to colleagues if suppliers ask about it
Q55f – I participate with suppliers in product development [ownership]
Q55g – I participate in external user forums [ownership]
Social Proof
[Suppliers]
Q55h – New and unknown suppliers lead to increased risk
Q55i – New and unknown suppliers lead to greater need for training
[Products]
Q55j – Unfamiliar brands indicate increased risk
Q55k – Unfamiliar brands indicate greater need for training
[Routines]
Q55l – It is important that the industry has a common approach to the supplier market
[Specification]
Q55m – Established technical standards hamper technology development
Q55n – Established templates for RFQ and general contract terms hamper more
competition
[Standard terms of contract]
Q55o – Use of internationally known standard terms of contract encourages competition
Q55p – Use of internationally known standard terms of contract increases our risk
exposure
[Language]
Q55q – Use of English in RFQ increases our risk exposure
[Systems: Doffin/TED]
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Q55r – It is okay not to announce competitions in Doffin/TED, because this is common
procedure
Q55s – It is okay not to announce awarded contracts in Doffin/TED, because this is
common procedure
Q55t – It is okay not to announce awarded contracts in Doffin/TED, because it has no
consequences
Liking
Attitude to suppliers – degree of comfort
Q55u – It is important that the supplier is known in our industry
Q55v – It is important that the supplier knows our company
Q55w – It is important that the supplier has a local presence
Q55x – It is important that the supplier knows Norwegian conditions
Q55y – Networks established by known suppliers are important for the industry
Q55z – Replacing a product is unreasonably costly
Q55aa – Replacing a supplier is unreasonably costly
Q55bb – I will rather relate to suppliers I already have a positive experience with
(companies)
Q55cc – I will rather relate to suppliers I know (persons)
Q55dd – I will rather relate to suppliers my colleagues are familiar with
Q55ee – I will rather relate to suppliers who have the same business culture as I
Q55ff – I will rather relate to suppliers who speak the same language as I
Authority
Q55gg – Network from college is important to the industry
Q55hh – Network from professional life is important to the industry
Q55ii – I rely on informal references about a product from my colleagues
Q55jj – I rely on informal references about suppliers from my colleagues
Q55kk – I rely on formal references about a product from my colleagues
Q55ll – I rely on formal references about suppliers from my colleagues
Q55mm – It is better to choose same products as other energy companies use
Q55nn – It is better to choose same suppliers as other energy companies use
Q55oo – We should not be a pilot-buyer for new products and suppliers
Scarcity
Q55pp – It is better to buy from a niche-supplier to the energy industry than from
suppliers to other industries
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Q55qq – It is okay to pay more for deliveries from a niche-supplier
Q55rr – I would rather buy from a supplier who only has the EU as market
The questionnaire sums up with 2 open questions:
Q56 – offers the opportunity to think and tell about the affect cartels have had on the
respondents company. This is a control question that will explain the attitude towards the
problem of cartels.
Q57 – opens for comments.
In sum, open-ended text questions were used to generate more detailed answers on
awareness of supplier cartels in the beginning of the questionnaire and to gather information
that respondents feel has not been covered in the closed-ended questions – in the end of the
questionnaire. Multiple choice question was used on Q29a-Q29e about earlier experience
with international suppliers. There the repondents could select among a set of response
choices all issues that apply. Ordinal scale questions are applied when measuring degrees of
agreement with propositions or satisfaction with measured issues (routines or experience).
Ratio scale questions were used when measuring certain volumes (i.e., purchases or shares
of foreign suppliers in the total supplier database).
The questionnaire is enclosed in both, Norwegian (original) and English version in
Appendices 1 and 2.
3.3 Validity and reliability
Data analysis will never provide good results unless the data are of good quality. Therefore,
it is important to use operational definitions that are valid and reliable measures of concepts.
A measure is valid if it actually measures the concept we are attempting to measure. It is
reliable if it consistently produces the same result (Aasland 2008).
3.3.1 Validity
Internal validity is concerned with the degree to which the conditions of the research are
controlled. Following types of internal validity are relevant for discussion of measuring
instrument:
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Content validity reflects the extent to which the content of a measurement reflects the
intended content to be investigated. In other words, it regards whether the survey is fairly
representing the actual content. Consulting with the industry specialist, Head of Purchasing
Department of one of the biggest power companies in the pre-survey interview helped to
gain understanding on the variety of issues before developing the survey questionnaire.
Face validity is a validity of appearances that disguises the real intent of the assessment
(what a test purports to measure). It regards the questionnaire design and how professional it
looks. Questback program used for professional surveys was used. NHH logo indicated that
the purpose of the survey is scientific. A lot of industry terms were employed in the measure.
Name of the industry authority was included in the invitation e-mail encouraging the
respondents to participate in the research. What was stated in the invitation letter was the real
purpose of the research. High face validity assumingly motivated the subjects to tackle the
survey in a serious way.
Construct validity involves relating a theoretical concept to a specific measuring device or
procedure.
Its concern is whether the measuring instrument taps the concept as theorized. Ciladini’s
construct Reciprocation was not measured in order to take attention from personality and on
industry routines. Other measures are considered reliable, as all the statements for Q55 were
discussed in a focus group with professional buyers, which provides generally high construct
validity.
3.3.2 Reliability
Reliability refers to the consistency and stability of findings that enables findings to be
replicated. When talking about errors of measurement in a measuring instrument, following
concerns were paid attention to:
Positively and negatively worded items are randomly distributed in the questionnaire to
make respondents read and understand the item before responding.
An increased length of an assessment is used in order to make a respondent think before
providing a reply, intended to increase its reliability.
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Answer alternatives are alike on some questions that measure same concept or are control
questions. This way it will be possible to compare the results and see whether they support
each other or whether there is a mismatch.
Questions that start with “How often…?”, “How satisfied…?”, and “How do you agree…?”
offer the respondents to indicate their answer on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from Never to
Always / Very Dissatisfied to Very Satisfied / Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree. The
alternative “Don’t know” is set into the middle of the scale in order to force the respondents
to choose either positive or negative position on the scale.
Many questions measure new information that cannot be achieved from any other sources.
Though, some answers can be checked (e.g., use of Doffin/TED), which increases the
reliability.
There is a need for accurate and stable measures within research. Reliability of measurement
allows to access future behaviour in the industry.
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4. Analysis and discussion
4.1.1 Questionnaire
Answers on obligatory questions were provided by all respondents (N=118), which generally
gives no missing values.
For purposes of this paper, following will be the main toolkit of data analysis for this
research:
- Frequency tables – describing the number of times an observation occurs
- Descriptive statistic – with Mean (average of the data values), Median (the mid point),
Mode (the data value that occurs most often),
- Crosstabs (contingency tables), that allow to study relationships between different
variables,
- Some functions of Questback program (e.g., filters and comparing)
Due to space restrictions of the paper, most of the data will be described as text with some of
the tables and graphical presentations placed where relevant.
Classification questions
Company size
An approximately even representation of respondents within each company size group
indicates a representative selection from the population. Small companies are represented by
32,2% of the respondents, medium-sized companies – by 27,1%. Large companies (40,7%)
is the biggest group of the respondents. This is a positive result, as it is expected that large
companies have more resources to carry out bigger procurement projects, which also means
that they are more actively involved into purchasing products and services with value about
the EEA threshold. Besides, attitudes and established routines in the large companies set
example to the whole industry. So the received distribution in respondents is fortunate for
the analysis.
Company type
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More than a half of the respondents come from distribution companies (54,2%). Energy
production provides 22,9%, and Other 19,5%, which are assumingly parent companies, as
commercial executives usually work there. District heating is represented by 3,4% of the
respondents. This is as expected and is in correspondence with the sampling population.
Industry experience
65,3% of the respondents have worked in this industry for more than 10 years. The other two
groups are represented evenly, Less than 3 years - 16,9%, 3-10 years - 17,8%.
Field of responsibility in the procurement process
All the three groups are represented evenly. Commercial side – 28,8%, Technical – 37,3%,
Both – 33,9%. The longest work experience (30,5% of the total) represent technical
executives with experience longer than 10 years. The second biggest group, 22% of the total,
are those who carry out both, commercial and technical functions for longer than 10 years.
The third biggest group, 12,7% of total are commercial executives with experience of longer
than 10 years. The rest is evenly distributed among groups of respondents with shorter work
experience.
Figure 11. Experience vs. responsibility
Normative pressure
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Knowledge of laws and regulations
Ca half of the respondents (50,8%) says that they know the regulations relating to public
procurement ‘well’. The second biggest group (28%) agree that they ‘need more training’.
19,5% claim to be ‘proficient’ in the laws and regulations, and 1,7 % say that this question is
not relevant to the area of their professional responsibility.
Of those who are ‘proficient’ 15,3% work on the commercial side and 3,4% carry out both
technical and commercial functions in the company. Only 0,8% (1 person) on the technical
side. This is a good sign, because laws and regulations are so complex that it is not expected
that technical executives have a full understanding of the regulations, since it is the field of
responsibility of commercial executives in which they get a continuous training.
Knowledge of laws vs. area of responsibility
The most ‘proficient’ in laws, as expected, are commercial executives (15,3% of 19,5%).
Of those who know the regulations ‘well’ 11% are commercial executives, 22,9% carry out
both functions, and 16,9% are technical executives.
Of those who ‘need more training’ 2,5% are commercial executives, 18,6% are technical,
and 6,8% carry out both functions. The result for commercial side and those who carry out
both functions can be explained with earlier crosstab with years of experience, in which of
the total 9,3% of commercial and 6,8% (the absolute match) of the executives carrying out
both functions have experience less than 3 years. Moreover, technical executives are
naturally not expected to know the regulation fully.
‘Not relevant’ the regulations are to 0,8% of technical executives and to 0,8% of those who
carry out both functions. While the former can be justified by the specifics of work on the
technical side (those who take care of projecting don’t participate in procurements directly,
and are therefore not relevant respondents for this research at all), those who carry out both
functions, on the other side, must know the laws.
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Figure 12. Knowledge of laws vs. field of responsibility
Knowledge of laws vs experience
Of those who have the longest experience in the industry (more than 10 years) 34,7% know
laws and regulations ‘well’, 22% need more training. Relatively even division of proficient
and well familiar executives is among those with experience of less than 10 years.
Figure 13. Knowledge of laws vs. industry experience
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Awareness of cartels in the supply market
Awareness that the company has been exposed to cartels
The total of 75,4% of the respondents are either not aware of the cartels (more than half of
the respondents - 50,8% - gave a clear ‘No’ as answer) or Don’t know (24,6%) about it. Less
than one forth of the respondents, 24,6%, are aware of supplier cartels cases in the industry.
This indicates that the degree of awareness of supplier cartels in the industry generally is
very low.
Awareness that the company has been exposed to cartels vs field of responsibility
The biggest groups of executives who have not been aware of supplier cartels in the industry
are technical executives (20,3%) and those who carry out both functions (20,3%). If this
result for technical executives can be argued for, those who carry out both functions should
have had more information the ongoing processes in the market.
Figure 14. Awareness of cartels vs. field of responsibility
Awareness of cartels in the past vs experience
Despite the long industry experience, 28,8% of those who are not aware of cartels have more
than 10 years experience in the industry. 17,8% answered Don’t know, which may indicate
that they wanted to avoid expressing their opinion on the issue.
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Figure 15. Awareness of cartels in the past vs. industry experience
Awareness of cartels in the past vs knowledge of laws relating to Public Procurement
In total 39,8% of ‘well’ familiar with laws and regulations executives are either not aware
that their company has been exposed to cartels (frightening large 30,5%) or don’t know
about it (9,3%).
In total 10,2% of ‘proficient’ in law executives are either not aware of cartels (5,1%) or
don’t know about it (5,1%).
Most of those who need more training in the laws are not aware of cartels (13,6%) or don’t
know about it (10,2%). As expected, those for whom the knowledge of laws and regulations
is not relevant, are not aware of cartels (1,7%).
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Figure 16. Awareness of cartels in the past vs. knowledge of laws
Awareness of the product fields in which cartels have existed
Of total 118 research participants 29 (24,6%) responded on this open question. These also
constitute 100% of those who are aware of cartels in the industry.
Open answers have been grouped into following categories:
Switchgear and steering system – 13 respondents (44,8% of the answered and 11% of total)
Electric equipment – some answers were unclear, so this group can contain both, electric
wholesalers and switch gear and steering system – 8 respondents (27,6% of the responded).
Cabling – 4 respondents (13,8%)
Electric transformer stations (also will be called transformers) – 4 answered (13,8%).
District heating – 2 respondents (6,9%).
Surface treatment – 2 respondents (6,9%).
2 answers (6,9%) were not specified (e.g., responses like ‘several areas’).
The total of these subgroups will give more than 100%, as some of the respondents listed
several categories.
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Awareness of suppliers that were involved in this practice
Of total 118 respondents 28 (23,7%) responded on this open question. These make 96,6% of
those who are aware of cartels in the industry.
17 respondents (60,7% of the answered and 14,4% of the total) mentioned ABB and
Siemens (of these once Siemens was mentioned without ABB).
Based on the provided answers following grouping of the awareness can be made:
EU-cases:
- cabling: STK (Nexans), KWO, Pirelli, Siemens – 3 respondents
- district heating: ABB++
Norway-cases:
- switch gear and steering system: ABB and Siemens
- electric wholesalers: ABB Distribution, Eilag, Solar, Elektroskandia, Berggård Amundsen
- surface treatment: without names (can indicate the names are not in the recall-list)
- other: Uniprotect and Proccorr, Horten Aluminium Conductors, REIME Jarlsberg, Alfr.
Andersen
In the meanwhile, it is important to note that the fact that it was Norwegian cartels that were
disclosed doesn’t mean that same cartels didn’t exist internationally. With market sharing,
international cartels are indicative of local cartels, because then buyers search for suppliers
internationally and don’t get reply from any other geographical areas than Norway.
2 respondents (7,1% of the answered) indicated that they didn’t want to specify the names.
Together with the other one aware of cartels respondent who didn’t answer the question at
all this amounts to 10,3% of aware of cartels respondents who consciously refused to specify
names. There will be no speculation on why, but one would assume that such information is
important to provide in order to increase the general awareness in the industry, so that
profitable procurement projects are possible to be carried out.
Awareness of how cartels were disclosed
Of total 118 respondents 26 (22%) responded on this question. These make 89,7% of those
who are aware of cartels in the industry.
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The methods of cartel disclosure are grouped in following categories:
1) Konkurransetilsynet and EU-commision – 8 (30,8% of the answered and 6,8% of the
total) respondents
2) The buyer’s alertness – 3 (11,5% of the answered and 2,5% of the total).
3) Media investigation – 2 (7,7% of the answered) respondents
Don’t know 9 (34,6% of the answered and 7,6% of the total) respondents, so this was the
most popular answer.
The high percent of responses about the Norwegian Competitive Authority and competitive
authorities on the EU-level can indicate following:
1) they could have been tipped off by:
- competitors
- buyers
- “whistleblowers” (own employees in cartel participating companies)
2) they could have taken own initiative after having realised that the market doesn’t
function.
The results show that buyers themselves have rather a little focus on the warning signals of
cartels.
Sources of information
Of the total 118 respondents 27 (22,9%) responded. This is 93,1% of those who are aware of
cartels.
Resources of information can be grouped into 3 categories:
1) Internal sources – 55,6% of the answered (12,7% of the total)
Information flow within the industry, colleagues, heads of departments, internal audit.
2) Media – 33,3% of the answered (7,6% of the total).
TV, radio, newspapers, Internet sources.
3) Konkurransetilsynet – 14,8% of the answered (3,4% of the total).
Awareness of how many suppliers are present in Norway within the cartel exposed field
Of the total 118 respondents less than a half (45,8%) responded.
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Figure 17. Suppliers in Norway within the cartel exposed field
Of these:
33,3% know that there are 4-6 suppliers within the cartel exposed field in Norway (15,3% of
the total).
14,8% know that there are 3 or less suppliers (6,8% of the total).
11,1% know that there are more than 6 (5,1% of the total).
40,7% don’t know about that (18,6% of the total).
Awareness of how many suppliers are present in the EU within the cartel exposed field
Of the total 118 respondents 52 (44,1%) responded.
Figure 18. Suppliers in the EU within the cartel exposed field
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Of these:
30,8% know that there are more than 6 suppliers within the cartel exposed field are present
in the EU (13,6% of the total).
19,2% know that there are 4-6 suppliers (8,5% of the total).
48% don’t know about that (21,2% of the total).
Awareness of how many suppliers are present outside the EU within the cartel exposed
field
Of the total 118 respondents 43,2% responded.
Figure 19. Suppliers outside of the EU/EEU within the cartel exposed field
Of these:
17,6% know there are more than 6 suppliers within the cartel exposed field are present
outside the EU (7,6% of the total).
9,8% know that there are 4-6 suppliers (4,2% of the total).
72,5% don’t know about that (31,4% of the total).
Comparison of knowledge about the markets:
Within the cartel exposed field, how many suppliers are present:
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Figure 20. Suppliers in Norway / in the EU / outside the EU/EEA within the cartel exposed field
In Norway In the EU/EEA Outside the
EU/EEA
1 - 3 or less 14,8 % 1,9 % 0,0 %
2 - 4-6 33,3 % 19,2 % 9,8 %
3 - More than 6 11,1 % 30,8 % 17,6 %
4 - Don’t know 40,7 % 48,1 % 72,5 %
Total respondents (N)
in average 44,4%
54 52 51
The research shows that the biggest amount of the respondents don’t know how many
suppliers are present within the cartel exposed field in different geographical markets
worldwide. The provided response indicate that few suppliers are present in Norway,
compared to the EU/EEA. Another result is that the further from Norway, the less is known
about the supplier market by the industry.
Awareness of cartels existence in the present in the industry
Almost one half of the total respondents, 49,2% don’t know whether cartels might still exist.
11% provided a clear ‘No’. 39,8% believe there might be cartels in the supplier market.
In spite of missing answers on the questions regarding cartel awareness, this result indicates
that a lot of people in the industry are aware that cartels may still exist in the supplier
market. This awareness should make the industry purchasers not only more conscious about
warning signal from the market, but also of own choices.
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Awareness of cartels existence in the present vs field of responsibility
Among those who don’t believe that cartels still exist in the supplier market are technical executives
– 7,6% of the total amount of the respondents and those who carry out both functions 3,4%.
Commercial executives are not represented in this group.
Among those who don’t know about it 21,2% are technical executives; 16,9% of those who carry out
both functions, and only 11% of commercial executives.
In the ‘Yes’ group, the smallest part is represented by technical executives (8,5%), who share the
company with those who carry out both functions (13,6%). The commercial executives represent the
largest part (17,8%) in this category.
The results show that commercial executives in the procurement process
Behaviour
Whether the company continue purchasing from cartel participants
Of the total 118 survey participants 58 (49,2%) responded.
Of these 51,7% still buy from the cartel participants (25,4% of the total).
39,7% don’t know about it (19,5% of the total) and 8,6 % (4,2% of the total) don’t buy from
those companies.
The biggest group among those who still buy (11,9%) are commercial executives (vs 7,6%
technical and 5,9% those who carry out both functions). The non-buyers are 3,4%
technicians and 0,8% of those who carry out both functions.
Routines
How many suppliers the executives invite when purchasing within the cartel exposed
field
Of the total 118 respondents 63 (53,4%) answered.
98
Figure 21. Comparison of in fact invited suppliers when purchasing within cartel exposed fields and beliefs on
how many suppliers are available in these fields in different markets:
In fact invited
suppliers
Available in
Norway
Available in
the EU/EEA
Available
outside the
EU/EEA
1 - 3 or less 20,6% 14,8 % 1,9 % 0,0 %
2 - 4-6 46,0% 33,3 % 19,2 % 9,8 %
3 - More than 6 7,9% 11,1 % 30,8 % 17,6 %
4 - Don’t know 25,4% 40,7 % 48,1 % 72,5 %
Total respondents (N) 63 54 52 51
The results show that buyers tend to narrow own choice to 3 or less suppliers (20,6%) or
preferably 4-6 suppliers (46%). Only 7,9% ask more than 6 suppliers when purchasing
within the cartel exposed field (this is almost one forth of those who know that more
suppliers exist in the EU, and less than half of those who know about more suppliers outside
of the EU).
It was later received a comment (Q57) that for large procurement projects there are not so
many suppliers available even internationally within the cartels exposed fields. Even doing
so (i.e., going and inviting more international suppliers), the buyers cannot secure
competition, because it may happen, that those newly asked may neglect submitting their
bid. Whereas beliefs about vainness of inviting more suppliers may, attempts to do so can
destabilise cartels and decrease entry barriers to sellers.
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Organization of procurement process with regard to communication with the supplier
Figure 22. Organization of procurement process with regard to communication with the supplier
73,7% of the industry involve both, technical and commercial executives.
In 15,3% of the organizations only commercial executives are involved.
In 11% of the organizations only technical executives are involved.
This is a rather good result. Though, the fact that in some organisations only technical
executives decide the outcome of the procurement indicates that their preferences will be the
only determinant factor in the choice of the suppliers.
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Figure 23. Points of contact vs. company size
While generally in the industry both commercial and technical dimensions are equally
involved into communication with the supplier (73,7%), there are different tendencies for the
rest of the industry. While the practice of involving only commercial dimension into contact
with supplier is prevalent in large companies (11% of total 15%), only technical executives
are involved into communication tasks with suppliers in small ones (10,2% of the total
11%).
At which stage commercial executive becomes involved in the procurement process
Figure 24. Involvement of commercial dimension into the procurement process
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Almost one forth (22%) of the organisations involve commercial executives after
specification is developed. 3,4% involve commercial executives after contact with possible
suppliers is made.
Figure 25. Degree of involvement of the commercial dimension vs. company size
The biggest part of those who involve commercial dimension early in the planning process
are large companies (35,6% of the total 74,6%). They also have the lowest percent (5,1%) of
those who develop specification before contacting commercial executive. Smaller companies
let technical executives make contact with suppliers before the procurement becomes a part
of planning on a higher level (3,3%).
The results show that ca in one forth of the organisations commercial dimensions are
involved after specifications are developed. This indicates that technical executives might
have more impact on the total outcome of the procurement process in those companies.
Supplier search routines
How many suppliers usually are on the bidder list
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Figure 26. Amount of suppliers on the bidder list
Majority of the industry (61,9%) has 3-5 suppliers on their bidders list. One third (33,9%)
attempts to broaden the market by inviting more than 5 suppliers to tenders.
How often different methods of selecting suppliers to bidder list are selected
Sellihca Internet Industry
magazines
Visit to
exhibitions
Other
1 Never 11,9% 16,1% 22,9% 22,0% 28,0%
2 Very Rarely 5,9% 13,6% 14,4% 22,0% 5,9%
3 Rarely 7,6% 30,5% 31,4% 35,6% 12,7%
4 Don’t know 3,4% 4,2% 7,6% 7,6% 20,3%
5 Frequently 19,5% 24,6% 19,5% 10,2% 16,1%
6 Very Frequently 24,6% 7,6% 2,5% 2,5% 10,2%
7 Always 27,1% 3,4% 1,7% 0,0% 6,8%
20) How often do you select suppliers to your bidder list with:
Statistics
a) Sellihca b) Internet
c) Industry
magazines
d) Visit to
exhibitions e) Other
Valid 118 118 118 118 94N
Missing 0 0 0 0 24
Mean 4.95 3.44 3.01 2.69 3.35
Median 6.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Mode 7 3 3 3 1
Std. Deviation 2.033 1.692 1.561 1.317 2.174
Range 6 6 6 5 6
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1
Maximum 7 7 7 6 7
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Sellihca is one of the most frequently employed sources in the industry for supplier selection
when purchasing above the EEA threshold value (71,2% of the industry uses it from
Frequently to Always, Meadian=6, ‘Very Frequently’; Mean=4,95 ‘Frequently’), while
25,1% of the industry uses Sellihca from Never (11,9%) to Rarely.
Sellihca is also the only legal source of supplier selection among the provided in this
question (as the other one, as we know, is Doffin). Other alternatives can still be used in
order to search for suppliers in case they are not registered in the industry database.
Remaining sources as sources of supplier search are placed in decreasing order: Internet
(used by 35,6% from Frequently to Always, Mean=3,44, between ‘Rarely’ and neutral
position, Mode=3 ‘Rarely’), Industry magazines (used by 23,7% from Frequently to Always,
Mean=3,01 ‘ Rarely’, Mode=3), Visit to exhibitions (used by 12,7% from Frequently to
Always, Mean=2,69, between ‘Very Rarely’ to ‘Rarely’). Large std. deviations indicate that
there is much variation from the mean values on all of the listed sources.
All the listed sources can be used for supplier search as long as the found suppliers become
encouraged to register in Sellihca for a later phase of supplier selection for tendering. Thus,
as all sources are valid in a long term perspective.
When it comes to use of “Other” 33,1% of the industry uses these sources from Frequently
to Always, which make them third most popular alternative to supplier search. As only 46
respondents (39%) further specified the content of this variable, those who did not respond
were treated as missing. Again, for the procurement projects above the EEA threshold
value, the received answers can be classified as legal and illegal, if they were provided as
sources of supplier selection.
Legal sources for supplier selection:
- Use of the company’s purchasing department/ commercial executives – 10,9% of the
responded
As this alternative could be provided only by technical executives, the fact that technical
executives rely on their colleagues from the commercial department when searching for
suppliers is a good sign, given that the commercial executives use right means of
supplier selection.
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- Use of general agreements/ purchasing agreements; also of those entered in
cooperation with other energy companies – 6,5%
This alternative could be provided either by technical executives or by representatives of
smaller companies that carry out procurement projects collectively with bigger
companies. This routine secures that some of illegal activities doesn’t happen (for
example, direct procurement from sympathised suppliers even though a contract that
covers same demand already exists).
- Use of prequalification system – 10,9%
This alternative is assumingly provided by those technical executives, who are not
regularly involved into the purchasing process, because the only legal prequalification
system in the industry is Sellihca.
- Use of Doffin, TED – 6,5%
The last two alternatives indicate that at least part of the respondents understood the
question correctly and use legal sources for supplier selection. In the meanwhile, use of
Doffin can be checked by scrutinizing Doffin’s database, which due to time limitations
will not be focused on in this paper.
Illegal sources for supplier selection:
- Recommendations and references – 32,6%
o from colleagues
o from other companies in the industry
o from companies in other industries
o from other contacts in the industry
o from hired consultancy companies
- Use of familiar suppliers/ through a long-time cooperation with different suppliers –
21,7%
- Use of local suppliers – 4,3%
- Use of other supplier databases – 4,3%
- Through direct contacts with suppliers – 4,3%
One response stated direct contact if there is only one supplier. This is a legal procedure of
supplier selection given there is only one supplier on the market. In cases there are more
suppliers available on the market, a detailed explanation of the choice must be provided to
the competition authorities.
Networking, preference of local suppliers, and other forms for search for suppliers are
extensively used in the industry. While some specialists try to use internal networks in the
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industry, others rely on own experience and direct contacts with suppliers, which brings
negative consequences for the whole industry.
System routines
Whether the executives encourage new suppliers to register in Sellihca
Figure 27. Encouragement of new suppliers to register in Sellihca
Ca 6% don’t encourage perspective suppliers to register in Sellihca, while majority of the industry
take an active position in this matter and broaden supplier database (78,8%).
Figure 28. Encouragement of new suppliers to register in Sellihca vs. satisfaction with Sellihca
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Those who do encourage suppliers to register in Sellihca have different levels of satisfaction
with the database. The biggest group of the encouragers, 60,2%, are those whose satisfaction
with Sellihca vary from somewhat satisfied to very satisfied. On the other hand, 9,3% of the
total of the respondents are those whose satisfaction vary from somewhat dissatisfied to very
dissatisfied, and they also encourage suppliers to registration. 9,3% of the total of the
respondents have no opinion about Sellihca and still encourage the suppliers to register.
Relatively even inconsiderably small groups of those who don’t encourage are to be found in
the groups of very dissatisfied, satisfied and having no opinion about Sellihca.
It lets us make conclusion that generally, the industry takes an active position in expanding
the Sellihca database.
How often the executives publish requests for information (RFIs) in Doffin/TED
Because 17% of the respondents chose “Don’t know” as the answer alternative on this
question, it was decided to treat these responses as missing values in order to see any trends
(N=98).
Figure 29. Announcement of tenders in Doffin/TED
The biggest share of the industry, 85,7%, don’t take an initiative to publish RFIs in
Doffin/TED and do it from never to rarely.
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14,3% mean that they visit Doffin/TED in order to publish RFIs from frequently to often.
This is a surprising result, because it is not a requirement in the industry to do that.
Since earlier results show that 25,4% of the respondents never or rarely use Sellihca, it
would be logical to assume that those, who don’t use Sellica, use Doffin for supplier
selection. When we crosstab the data (N=118 on both), only 4% of those who use Sellihca
from never to rarely use Doffin/TED from frequently to always. Another result is that 18,4%
use either of the methods of announcements of competition from never (7,6%) to rarely. This
is a very interesting result for purchases over the EEA threshold value for all executives
involved into the procurement process.
Performing the same crosstab analysis on commercial executives and those who carry out
both functions (N=74) shall provide more sound results, as these executives deal with
announcements on a daily basis. In this case this 2,8% of those who use Sellihca from never
to rarely use Doffin/TED from frequently to always, and 9,6% use either of the methods of
announcements of competition from never (2,7%) to rarely.
7,5% of all executives inform that they use both systems in order to announce tenders and
search for suppliers from frequently to always. This is also a rather interesting result.
How often the executives announce contract awards in Doffin/TED
40% respondents answered “Don’t know” on this question. Since 37,3% of them are
technical executives, and this routine is not directly connected to search for suppliers, it is
expected that commercial executives and those who carry out both functions are relevant
respondents on this type of information (N=74). When done that, the structure of answers
remained the same.
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Figure 30. Announcement of contract awards in Doffin/TED
33,8% of commercial executives and those who carry out both functions Don’t know
whether contract awards become announced in Doffin/TED. 31,1% of these executives never
does so.
The crosstab with field of responsibility shows that commercial executives (27,1%) take
more action in announcing contact awards in Doffin that those who carry out both functions
(8,2%).
Figure 31. Announcement of contract awards vs. responsibility (N=74 – commercial executives and those who
carry out both functions)
The crosstab with field of responsibility in procurement on all the respondents (N=118)
shows that answers provided by those who carry out both functions in the purchasing
process are very much alike to those provided by the technical executives.
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Figure 32. Announcement of contract awards vs. responsibility (N=118 – all three groups of executives)
It is expected that small companies (less than 100 employees) announce contracts relatively
seldom, 1-3 times pr year, the medium-sized companies (100-500 employees) should
announce contracts relatively often, more than 3 times pr year, and big companies are
expected to always announce awarded contracts.
Figure 33. Announcement of contract awards vs. company size (N=118)
When we look at the results (N=74), we see that this is not exactly the case. Large
companies are represented in all groups. Whereas they yield to small companies in the group
where the routine is not followed, they announce contract awards more frequently than
others. Surprisingly, they have more executives who don’t know about that than companies
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of other sizes. This result may be interpreted ambiguously. First, it may indicate that not all
of those who indicated that they represent commercial dimension in procurement actually do
so. As a rule, these people are representatives of internal company customers and should
have indicated themselves as technical executives in procurement process. Second, it may
indicate that routines regarding announcement in Doffin/TED are not at place. The second
proposition is to be checked further.
Whether the company has an internal procedure that ensures that contract awards
become announced in Doffin/TED
In order to check whether those who carry out both functions will have same structure of
answers as technical executives, this outcome will be analyzed on all the three groups of
respondents (N=118).
Figure 34. Procedure for announcement of contract awards in Doffin/TED
42,7% of the respondents don’t know about such procedures. It is expected that only
technical executives and those who carry out both functions in the company make this
category. When checking on the field of responsibility, we see that this is the case (see
Figure below).
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Figure 35. Knowledge of announcement procedures vs. field of responsibility
Negative reply is still prevailing one among those who provided any answer on this question.
Of these 26,3% commercial executives constitute 16,1% and those who carry out both
functions – 10,2%. If technical executives (and those who carry out both functions) are to be
excluded from the analysis, the picture is somewhat more optimistic. The result indicates
that generally not many companies have internal procedures that would ensure that contract
awards with value above the EEA threshold become announced in Doffin/TED database.
Relationships with suppliers
Descriptive statistics sum up the data on Q32a-Q32c. More data will be analyzed from
frequency tables not presented here.
How often do you invite suppliers from:
Statistics
32a) Norway? 32b) EU? 32c) outside the EU?
Valid 118 118 118N
Missing 0 0 0
Mean 6.00 4.00 2.26
Median 6.00 5.00 2.00
Mode 7 5 1
Std. Deviation .987 1.739 1.368
Range 4 6 5
Minimum 3 1 1
Maximum 7 7 6
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Suppliers from Norway
How often the company invites to tenders suppliers from Norway
96,6% of the respondents’ answers vary from Frequently to Always (Mean=6 lies on
alternative Frequently). Of these 40% always invite suppliers from Norway (Mode=7
indicates that this is the most popular answer). St. deviation 0,987 indicates that the data are
clustered closely around the mean.
0,8% answered Don’t know (Minimum) and only 2,5% rarely use Norwegian suppliers.
Suppliers from the EU
How often the company invites to tenders suppliers from the EU
50,9% answers vary from Frequently to Always, and 41,5% - from Never to Rarely. Almost
equal shares of respondents (Mean=4). 7,6% of the respondents don’t know about it. This
value is small enough to treat it together with the rest of the data.
The most popular answer, 29,7% is Frequently (Mode=5). This, on the other hand, is almost
counterbalanced by 20,3% of those who answered Rarely.
A large st. deviation 1,739 and range 6 indicate that the data points are relatively equally
dispersed far from the mean.
International suppliers from outside of the EU/EEA
How often the company invites to tenders international suppliers from outside of the
EU
82,2% - from Never to Rarely. 7,6% from Frequently to Very Frequently (Maximum=6).
The data are considerably skewed into negative position (Mean=2,26) with Never as the
most popular answer, 42,4% (Mode=1). 10,2% Don’t know. This value is small enough to be
treated with the rest of the data.
St. deviation 1,368 indicates that the data points are dispersed far from the mean (the effect
of relatively considerable amount of those who answered Don’t know).
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Behaviour in the past and experience with suppliers from outside of the EU/EEA
Descriptive statistics sum up the data on Q28, Q30 and Q31.
Statistics
28) Have you ever
purchased from other
countries than the EEA?
30) Do you still invite
these suppliers to
tenders?
31) Do you invite
suppliers from outside the
EEA?
Valid 118 118 118N
Missing 0 0 0
Mean 1.77 .68 .82
Median 2.00 .00 .00
Mode 2 0 0
Std. Deviation .576 .977 1.075
Range 2 3 3
Minimum 1 0 0
Maximum 3 3 3
Whether the company has ever purchased from international suppliers from outside of
the EEA
61,9% of the respondents answered ‘No’; 30,5% - answered ‘Yes’, and 7,6% - don’t know
about it.
These data indicate that more than a half of the respondents has never purchased from
suppliers outside of the EEA.
In order to analyze consistency of the data, only those who had experience with suppliers
from the EEA in the past will be analyzed in the following three categories (30,5% of the
total respondents), while other replies will be treated as missing. The reason for data
inconsistency is that these questions were non-obligatory and the respondents who answered
‘No’ or ‘Don’t know’ could fill them out by inertia from previous obligatory questions. In
the meanwhile, it was meant to see how previous experience affects the buyer behaviour in
the present. Therefore, only those who said ‘Yes’ are relevant for the analysis.
How did the deliveries work
Following data were gathered:
[Product]
11,1% experienced that the product was poor (3,4% of the total).
36,1% experienced that the product was according to the agreement (11% of the total).
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[Delivery]
13,9% experienced a delay in delivery (4,2% of the total).
58,3% experienced that the delivery was according to the agreement (17,8% of the total).
[Other]
22,2% provided following comments (6,8% of the total):
Negative:
- at times missing quality
- mistake with fastening and stability
- insecure documentation on quality
Neutral:
- the delivery required a tight follow-up
- sometimes good and sometimes bad
- these are sub-suppliers to Norwegian suppliers
- it is needed a thorough control of quality
For some respondents the experience was new and they haven’t experienced any
consequences of their choice yet. Following comment was provided by the respondent who
hasn’t had any experience:
- let the intermediaries take care of these
Almost 60% are satisfied with delivery terms, and ca half of those who have bought from
outside of the EEA found the product according to the agreement. Among the provided
comments, the main reasoning towards scepticism was quality concern and the suppliers’
ability to document it. The buyers prefer to have international suppliers as sub-suppliers to
Norwegian suppliers and let others take risks and solve problems leading to insecurity of
deliveries.
Behaviour in the present
Whether the company still invites to tenders same suppliers from other countries than
the EEA that they earlier had as bidders
72,2% still invite same suppliers to tenders, 13,9% don’t invite the suppliers, 13,9% Don’t
know.
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The amount of those who invite same suppliers is higher than the share of those who was
clearly satisfied with the delivery. It means that even those who didn’t have positive
experience are willing to give the suppliers a chance in next tenders. The results show that
positive experience still plays an important role in attitude formation.
Whether the company invites to tenders new suppliers from other countries than the
EEA
66,7% invite other suppliers from outside the EEA,19,4% don’t invite new suppliers, and
13,9% Don’t know.
The amount of those who dare to take the risk and invite totally new suppliers from outside
the EEA is a little smaller in this case. Still, the difference (5,5%) is so inconsiderable that it
let us draw conclusion that a once the executive had experience with such a routine, it is a
bigger chance he or she will continue with this routine in the future.
[Local presence]
Routine of entering into a contract with a foreign supplier, which is not established in
Norway
45,8% answered Don’t know (Max=3; Mode=3). Of these 51,9% are technical executives
and 37% carry out both functions. Those who provided such an answer were excluded from
the analysis.
4) Do you work on commercial or technical side in procurement? * 45) When you enter into a
contract with a supplier that doesn’t have a Norwegian registration number, how do you do it?
Crosstabulation
% of Total
45) When you enter into a contract with a
supplier that doesn’t have a Norwegian
registration number, how do you do it?
Directly
Through a Norwegian
representative Total
Commercial 29.7% 14.1% 43.8%
Technical 4.7% 20.3% 25.0%
4) Do you work on
commercial or technical side
in procurement? Both 7.8% 23.4% 31.3%
Total 42.2% 57.8% 100.0%
57,8% of the industry enter into a contract through a Norwegian representative (Min=1) and
42,2% enter into contracts directly. The biggest part in the latter group constitute commercial
executives, while technical executives and those who respondents carry out both functions
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prefer to enter into contracts through a Norwegian representative (20,3% and 23,4%
correspondingly).
1) How many employees are in your company? * 45) When you enter into a contract with a supplier
that doesn’t have a Norwegian registration number, how do you do it? Crosstabulation
% of Total
45) When you enter into a contract with a
supplier that doesn’t have a Norwegian
registration number, how do you do it?
Directly
Through a Norwegian
representative Total
Less than 100 4.7% 18.8% 23.4%
100-500 9.4% 20.3% 29.7%
1) How many employees
are in your company?
More than 500 28.1% 18.8% 46.9%
Total 42.2% 57.8% 100.0%
28,1% of those who enter into contracts with foreign suppliers directly are big companies.
39,1% of those who enter into contracts with foreign suppliers through a Norwegian
representative are small and medium-sized companies.
The results show that the industry prefers to enter into contracts through a Norwegian
representative.
The most conservative part of these are technical executives and those who carry out both
functions. Even though commercial executives in big companies are more open to the
international market, an equally big amount of technical representatives in those companies
are sceptical and drug the rates down even there.
Part of the existing suppliers which don’t have a Norwegian registration number and
Part of foreign contracts in total purchases in volume
Because it is assumed that technical executives are not supposed to have accurate data on
these clearly commercial questions, answers given by them were excluded from the analysis
of Q46 and Q47. Further, all respondents that answered Don’t know were excluded (29,7% -
Q46 and 32,4% - Q47) in order to see pattern of data from those who know the answers on
these questions.
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Statistics
46) How many of your suppliers don’t have a
Norwegian registration number, ca?
47) What part in total purchases in
volume have foreign contracts, ca?
Valid 52 50N
Missing 22 24
Mean 2.10 2.80
Median 2.00 2.50
Mode 1 1
Std. Deviation 1.332 1.552
Range 4 4
Minimum 1 1
Maximum 5 5
Part of the existing suppliers which don’t have a Norwegian registration number
For 73% of the industry, suppliers that don’t have a Norwegian registration number
constitute up to 5% of their supplier database. 44,2% of these make up Less than 1% of their
suppliers in total (Min=1, Mode=1). Only for 11,5% of the industry suppliers without
Norwegian registration number constitute More than 20% of the supplier database
(Maximum=5).
When we crosstab with the size of the company, we see that small and medium-sized
companies are those who buy the least from the foreign suppliers directly – they make 43,9%
of the whole industry whose database of foreign suppliers without a Norwegian registration
number is up to 5%. Big companies, on the other hand, are those who buy from foreign
suppliers directly. For 13,6% such suppliers constitute 6-20% of the database and for 9,6%
these suppliers make more than 20% of the whole supplier database.
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Figure 36. Company size vs. share of suppliers without a Norwegian registration number
Part of foreign contracts in total purchases in volume
For 50% of the industry, foreign contracts constitute up to 5% of the purchase volume. The
other half relatively even dispersed around other shares of volume, making in total 26% of
the industry in which foreign contracts constitute up to 20% of the purchase volume. For
one forth of the industry, 24%, these contracts constitute More than 20% of the whole
volume purchase.
When we crosstab with the size of the company, we see that for largest part (16%) of small
companies (less than 100 employees) volume of foreign contracts is less than 1%, while for
largest part (18%) of big companies (more than 500 employees) volume of contracts is more
than 20%.
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Figure 37. Company size vs. volume of foreign contracts
These results indicate that according to Pareto principle (also known as the 80-20 rule),
which states that roughly 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes (Bunkley 2008),
foreign suppliers constitute a little share in the supplier database, but make a bigger volume
in purchases.
Request for quotation (RFQ)
Whether the company use templates when preparing requests for quotation.
83,9% of the industry use templates for RFQs. 11% a clear ‘No’ and 5,1% don’t know about
it. Because this and the following questions are the questions, to which commercial
executives and those who carry out both functions have a better knowledge, technical
executives were excluded from the analysis (N=74, 62,7% of the total). Though, this didn’t
have a much expected great effect. 89,2% of the industry use templates for RFQs. 8,1% a
clear ‘No’ and 2,7% don’t know about it.
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1) How many employees are in your company? * 34) Do you use templates when preparing RFQs?
Crosstabulation
% of Total
34) Do you use templates when preparing RFQs?
Yes No Don’t know Total
Less than 100 24.3% 5.4% 1.4% 31.1%
100-500 21.6% 2.7% 24.3%
1) How many employees
are in your company?
More than 500 43.2% 1.4% 44.6%
Total 89.2% 8.1% 2.7% 100.0%
Big companies have the biggest share of those who use templates (43,2%) and the least share
of those who don’t (0,8%). 10,2% of small and medium-sized companies don’t use
templates.
1) How many employees are in your company? * 34) Do you use templates when preparing RFQs?
* 4) Do you work on commercial or technical side in procurement? Crosstabulation
% of Total
34) Do you use templates when
preparing RFQs?
4) Do you work on commercial or technical side in
procurement?
Yes No Don’t know Total
Less than 100 20.6% 20.6%
100-500 20.6% 5.9% 26.5%
1) How many
employees are in
your company?
More than 500 52.9% 52.9%
Commercial
Total 94.1% 5.9% 100.0%
Less than 100 27.5% 10.0% 2.5% 40.0%
100-500 22.5% 22.5%
1) How many
employees are in
your company?
More than 500 35.0% 2.5% 37.5%
Both
Total 85.0% 10.0% 5.0% 100.0%
Commercial executives and those who carry out both functions are responsible for preparing
RFQs that is why we look at the tendencies closer from this point. The results show that in
big companies those who use templates most often are 52,9% commercial executives and
35% of those who carry out both functions. Only 5,9% of commercial executives in medium-
sized companies don’t use templates. 10% of those who carry out both functions in small
companies don’t use templates when preparing RFQs.
So, generally companies have a system with internally developed standards for RFQs.
Though, when it comes to questionable results in small companies, they can be explained
with relatively seldom need in large procurements (which could still be relevant to all types
of the procurements). Around 6% of medium-sized companies have a space for
improvement.
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Whether there have been made changes in templates for RFQs the last two years
34) Do you use templates when preparing RFQs? * 35) Have you the last 2 years made changes to the
following?: - in templates for RFQs Crosstabulation
% of Total
35) Have you the last 2 years made changes to the
following?: - in templates for RFQs
Yes No Don’t know Total
Yes 78.4% 5.4% 5.4% 89.2%
No 1.4% 5.4% 1.4% 8.1%
34) Do you use templates
when preparing RFQs?
Don’t know 1.4% 1.4% 2.7%
Total 81.1% 10.8% 8.1% 100.0%
Of those who use templates 78,4% have updated them the last two years, 5,4% didn’t update.
1) How many employees are in your company? * 35) Have you the last 2 years made changes to
the following?: - in templates for RFQs * 4) Do you work on commercial or technical side in
procurement? Crosstabulation
% of Total
35) Have you the last 2 years made
changes to the following?: - in
templates for RFQs
4) Do you work on commercial or technical side in
procurement?
Yes No Don’t know Total
Less than 100 17.6% 2.9% 20.6%
100-500 20.6% 2.9% 2.9% 26.5%
1) How many
employees are in
your company?
More than 500 52.9% 52.9%
Commercial
Total 91.2% 5.9% 2.9% 100.0%
Less than 100 22.5% 12.5% 5.0% 40.0%
100-500 17.5% 2.5% 2.5% 22.5%
1) How many
employees are in
your company? More than 500 32.5% 5.0% 37.5%
Both
Total 72.5% 15.0% 12.5% 100.0%
Of those who updated the templates, the absolute majority are big companies, with 52,9% on
the commercial executives’ side and 32,5& on the side of those who carry out both
functions. Of those who did not update the templates are small and medium-sized companies
(12,5% of those who carry out both functions in small companies is the biggest
representative part of them).
Standards and Specification
Both commercial and technical executives have power on deciding which technical
description will be finally presented in the RFQ. If technical executives are responsible for
developing of the specifications, commercial executives are the ones who check that the
specifications do(n’t) repeat the existing contracts and are not supplier specific (which is
against the law). Therefore, all responds will be analyzed (N=118, 100%).
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Whether there have been made changes in technical descriptions the last two years
4) Do you work on commercial or technical side in procurement? * 35) Have you the last 2 years made
changes to the following?: - in technical descriptions Crosstabulation
% of Total
35) Have you the last 2 years made changes to the
following?: - in technical descriptions
Yes No Don’t know Total
Commercial 21.2% 1.7% 5.9% 28.8%
Technical 26.3% 6.8% 4.2% 37.3%
4) Do you work on
commercial or technical side
in procurement? Both 26.3% 4.2% 3.4% 33.9%
Total 73.7% 12.7% 13.6% 100.0%
73,7% of the industry have made changes in technical descriptions the last 2 years. These are
relatively equally dispersed among all the three groups of the executives.
1) How many employees are in your company? * 35a) Have you the last 2 years made changes to the
following?: - in technical descriptions Crosstabulation
% of Total
35) Have you the last 2 years made changes to the
following?: - in technical descriptions
Yes No Don’t know Total
Less than 100 19.5% 8.5% 4.2% 32.2%
100-500 18.6% 3.4% 5.1% 27.1%
1) How many employees
are in your company?
More than 500 35.6% .8% 4.2% 40.7%
Total 73.7% 12.7% 13.6% 100.0%
The biggest share of those who have made changes in technical descriptions is on the big
companies (more than 500 employees), 35,6%. The rest is evenly divided between medium-
sized and small companies. Big companies are also in the minority among those who
provided negative answer.
1) How many employees are in your company? * 35b) Have you the last 2 years made changes to
the following?: - in technical descriptions * 4) Do you work on commercial or technical side in
procurement? Crosstabulation
% of Total
35) Have you the last 2 years made
changes to the following?:
- in technical descriptions
4) Do you work on commercial or technical side in
procurement?
Yes No Don’t know Total
Less than 100 11.8% 2.9% 5.9% 20.6%
100-500 17.6% 2.9% 5.9% 26.5%
1) How many
employees are in
your company? More than 500 44.1% 8.8% 52.9%
Commercial
Total 73.5% 5.9% 20.6% 100.0%
Less than 100 20.5% 11.4% 2.3% 34.1%
100-500 22.7% 4.5% 4.5% 31.8%
1) How many
employees are in
your company? More than 500 27.3% 2.3% 4.5% 34.1%
Technical
Total 70.5% 18.2% 11.4% 100.0%
Less than 100 25.0% 10.0% 5.0% 40.0%
100-500 15.0% 2.5% 5.0% 22.5%
1) How many
employees are in
your company? More than 500 37.5% 37.5%
Both
Total 77.5% 12.5% 10.0% 100.0%
In big companies, the biggest share of those who strive for update in technical descriptions
two groups are represented the most, the commercial executives, 44,1%, and those who carry
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out both functions, 37,5%. In small and medium sized companies the majority of those who
provided negative answers, are technical executives, 15,9%, and those who carry out both
functions, 12,5% (small companies stand out in this case). The technical executives that
provided positive answer are evenly represented in companies of all sizes, which means that
their attitude are stable despite of the company size.
How often different standard terms of contract are used
Because this questions are the question only commercial executives and those who carry out
both functions can answer, we exclude technical executives from the analysis (N=74, 62,7%
of the total). Further, all answers Don’t know were treated as missing – in order to see a
pattern.
36) How often do you use following standard terms of contract?:
Descriptive Statistics
a)
NL01
b)
AKB1988
c)
AKS89
d)
AIS89
e) Fidic,
Orgalime,
ICC
f)
NS
g)
Kolemo
h)
SSA, IKT
i) In-house
terms of
contract
j)
Other
Valid 45 48 42 42 42 61 41 46 62 37N
Missing 29 26 32 32 32 13 33 28 12 37
Mean 2.04 2.85 2.64 1.57 1.60 4.69 1.54 3.11 4.98 2.19
Median 1.00 2.00 2.50 1.00 1.00 5.00 1.00 3.00 6.00 1.00
Mode 1 1 1 1 1 6 1 1 6 1
Std. Deviation 1.476 2.032 1.859 .941 1.037 1.867 1.325 2.100 1.769 1.808
Skewness 1.251 .556 .840 1.721 2.004 -1.006 2.427 .332 -.855 1.431
Std. Error of
Skewness
.354 .343 .365 .365 .365 .306 .369 .350 .304 .388
Range 5 6 6 4 4 6 5 6 6 6
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maximum 6 7 7 5 5 7 6 7 7 7
Of the remaining respondents, ca 37,8% answered ‘Don’t know’, thus in average N=46
responds were provided on these questions.
Of all the standards the most frequently used are in-house developed terms. There 72,6% of
the respondents use it from Frequently to Always, from which 33,9% use it Very Frequently
(Mode=6, ‘Very Frequently’, Max=7, ‘Always’). Data lessening towards negative answer
alternatives (Skewness= -.855). Large st. deviation indicates that data are dispersed around
the Mean=4,98.
Use of in-house developed standards – own standards, developed by the buyer enterprises –
may in fact be a competition hampering practice. First, it is possible that these terms of
contracts may be made specifically to match a certain supplier. Second, if these terms
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pressure risks to the supplier, the price of the solution is also being pushed up. Big
companies are naturally those who use this practice the most (38,8%) in attempt to exploit
their market power. As they also are those who have more resources to pay extra for less
risk, it is possible that current suppliers have nothing against this practice.
Figure 38. Use of in-house terms of contract vs company size
The second most frequently used standard is NS (Norwegian standard). There 60,8% of the
respondents use it from Frequently to Always, from which 39,3% use it Very Frequently
(Mode=6, ‘Very Frequently’, Max=7, ‘Always’). The lower mid point (Median=5.00,
‘Frequently’) and Skewness -1.006 indicate that more data are to be found on the negative
answer alternatives side than with the in-house developed terms.
A frequent use of an industry agreed on standard, developed by Standard Norge, is a positive
sign, as the standard is well balanced on both, the supplier and the buyer side.
Other standards received low scores, indicating that they are relatively rarely used.
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Standards AKB1988, AKS89, SSA, IKT with Mean=ca 3,00, Median=2; 2,50; 3,00. ‘Very
Rarely’ to ‘Rarely’. Large st. deviations point out that the data are far dispersed from the
mean.
Standards NL01, AIS89, Fidic, Orgalime, ICC , Kolemo and Other are used least frequently
in the industry. They have lowest means (from 1,54 to 2,19) and Median=1, ‘Never’.
Among Other following answers were given:
- offshore industry standard (for oil industry) – NF, NTK
- industry standard developed jointly with others in the industry
- supplier standards
- IKT Norge – supplier-developed standard
While the fact that supplier-developed standards (NL01) and outdated governmental
standards (AKB1988, AKS89) are rarely used is positive for the industry, there is a rare use
of international standards (Fidic, Orgalime, ICC) and some governmental standard
agreements (SSA, IKT). The fact that a big part of the commercial executives didn’t know
about new standards, means that in-house developed standard terms are being used in such a
large extent, that all other standards are left without intended attention.
How often the company uses following types of specification
38) How often do you use following specification?:
Descriptive Statistics
a)
Detail
specification
b)
Function- or
performance based
specification
c)
Industry-
standard
specification
d) Suppliers'
specification
Valid 118 118 118 118N
Missing 0 0 0 0
Mean 4.49 4.87 4.28 2.92
Median 5.00 5.00 5.00 3.00
Mode 5 5 5 3
Std. Deviation 1.506 1.251 1.507 1.528
Skewness -.594 -.821 -.306 .481
Std. Error of Skewness .223 .223 .223 .223
Minimum 1 1 1 1
Maximum 7 7 7 7
Minimum= ’Never’, Maximum=’Always’.
The most frequently used specification is Function- or performance based specification.
77,1% of the industry uses it from Frequently to Always, where Frequently constitutes
48,3% (Mean=4,87, Mode=5, ‘Frequently’). This is the most desirable type of technical
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specification, as it doesn’t favour any suppliers above others and let evaluate on performance
criteria.
Then follows Detail specification which 64,4% use from Frequently to Always with
Frequently 39,8% (Mean=4,49, Mode=5, ‘Frequently’). Though, large st. deviation
indicates that data are dispersed around other more negative answer alternatives. Frequent
use of detail specification provides less possibility for competition among suppliers, as it
allows the executives be more supplier-specific when developing RFQs.
Industry-standard specification is used by 51,7% of the industry from Frequently to Always
with Frequently 32,2% (Mean=4,28 was affected by relatively considerable 16,1% of those
who answered Don’t know). Skewness =-0.306 and large st. deviation indicate that data are
more dispersed from the mean and are to be found in a falling order on the negative scale of
answer alternatives. Somewhat less popular, but still in use is a good sign.
Suppliers’ specification is used from Never to Rarely (Mean=2,92, Mode=3, ‘Rarely’) by
69,5% of the industry. Surprisingly, 21,2% of the industry use it from Frequently to Always.
This is a very worrying sign. When we cross the results with question researching level of
awareness of cartels in the industry, we see that supplier specification is used by those who
are not aware of supplier cartels (14,5% - see Figure X).
Figure 39. Awareness of cartels vs. use of supplier specification
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Language
Commercial executives and those who carry out both functions are relevant for the next
group of questions (N=74).
39) How often do you allow for the following?:
Statistics
a) That RFQ is prepared in English That a bid can be submitted in English
Valid 74 74N
Missing 0 0
Mean 3.04 3.27
Median 3.00 3.00
Mode 3 3
Std. Deviation 1.716 1.770
Skewness .588 .460
Std. Error of Skewness .279 .279
Minimum 1 1
Maximum 7 7
The industry is not open to use English as working language. The results show that 71,7% of
the industry Never to Rarely prepare RFQs in English (Mean=3,04, Mode=3, ‘Rarely). On
the other side, 23% of commercial executives use English in development of RFQs from
Frequently to Always.
The situation is not much better with submitting of bids. 64,9% of the industry Never to
Rarely allow bids to be submitted in English, and 28,8% do it from Frequently to Always.
(Skewness in both cases indicate popularity of negative answers over the positive).
While the results are slightly better with bid-submitting procedures, it is important to
remember that these two routines are connected. If a company does not prepare RFQs in
Enlgish, it is very unlikely they will receive any bids submitted in English.
Share of Norwegian language RFQs in the company
For 82,4% of the industry the Norwegian language is used in more than 70% of RFQs. For
14,9% Norwegian language RFQs constitute less than 50% RFQs. The latter commercial
executives belong to big energy production and distribution companies (with above 500
employees).
Whether the company has in-house terms of contract in English
44,6% of the respondents answered ‘No’ and 35,1% answered ‘Yes’. 20,3% of commercial
executives and those who carry out both functions don’t know about that.
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The fact that for almost half of companies in the industry in-house terms of contract don’t
even exist in English shows how little thought is given to relationships with international
suppliers. That 20% of those who prepare RFQs are not aware if terms of contracts are to be
found in English means little structured internal systems used.
What part of the company’s contracts above the EEA threshold value is in English
For 45,9% of the industry such contracts constitute less than 10%. For 20,3% the contracts
make above 50% of all contracts. 24,3% of the executives answered ‘Don’t know’.
A rather big part of the industry claim that above 50% of their contracts are written in
English. When we crosstab with company size, that the majority of these answers come from
the group of big companies. The result is rather surprising, but consistent with those
previously provided. In sum they indicate that there is a group of companies (it is possible
that the response comes from the employees of only one of the major power companies)
actively engaged into relationships with international suppliers. Since smaller companies
may sometimes enter into contracts together with bigger companies, one would believe that
English language does play an important role for them as well.
Figure 40. Share of contracts in English vs. company size
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Bid-submitting deadlines
How often the company uses different deadlines in competitions with negotiation
42) How often do you use the following deadlines in competitions with negotiation?:
Descriptive Statistics
a) Less than 24 days b) 24 days c) More than 24 days
Valid 74 55 74N
Missing 0 19 0
Mean 3.15 3.76 4.72
Median 3.00 3.00 5.00
Mode 3 3 5
Std. Deviation 1.585 1.763 1.494
Skewness .322 .038 -.863
Std. Error of Skewness .279 .322 .279
Minimum 1 1 1
Maximum 7 7 7
Minimum=’Never’, Maximum=’Always’.
a) Less than 24 days
63,5% of the industry use less than 24 days as a bid-submitting deadline from Never to
Rarely, where Rarely is the most common answer (Mean=3,15, Mode=3, ‘Rarely’). Even
though the data are skewed to the side with negative answer alternatives, 27% use short
deadlines from Frequently (23%) to Always.
When we crosstab with company size, we see that 13,5% of those who use it Frequently are
big companies, 9,5% are medium-sized (Frequently to Very Frequently) and 2,7% are small
ones (Always).
b) 24 days
25,7% commercial executives and those who carry out both functions answered ‘Don’t
know’. In order to get a more accurate indication of how often the deadline is used, they
were treated as missing. Once we do it, we see that the results are mixed. Mean=3,76 and
Skewness=.038 indicate that there is a rather symmetric distribution of data. Large std.
deviation indicates that the data are dispersed far from the mean. While 40,6% use this
deadline from Never to Rarely (Mode=3, ‘Rarely’), 33,8% use it from Frequently to Always,
which pushed the mean more to the right.
When we crosstab the data with company size, we see that 14,5% of those who use it
Frequently and 9,1% of those who is it Very Frequently are big companies.
c) More than 24 days
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The data are skewed to the right, indicating that the most, 70,3%, use these deadlines from
Frequently (Mean=4,72, Mode=5, ‘Frequently’) to Always. 20,3% use it from Never to
Rarely.
When we crosstab the data with company size, we see that 33,8% of the active users of long
deadlines come from big companies.
In general, the industry avoids using short deadlines and gives preference to longer deadlines
or a minimum deadline for procurements above the EEA threshold value, which is 24 days.
Apparently, almost one third of the industry, mostly represented by big and medium-sized
companies use shorter deadlines. The lawful reasons for use of shorter deadlines than 24
days may be the urgent necessity of such procurements, use of electronic systems of bid
submitting or agreement with all the bidders on the shorter deadlines. Either the case, this is
a competition-limiting practice, which may also be an indicator of problems with internal
planning procedures for the company’s total procurement.
How often the company uses an extended deadline in order to attract new market
players
17,6% of commercial executives and those who carry out both functions answered ‘Don’t
know’. Those variables were treated as missing in order to see a pattern among those who do
know.
66,2% of the remaining respondents use extended deadlines from Never to Rarely
(Mean=2,74, Mode=3, ‘Rarely’). Although 16,2% employ such practice Frequently, the data
indicate that extended deadline is not a popular market extending routine in the industry.
Perceived behavioural control
Company routines
Perception on who has a greater impact on the outcome of the procurement process in
the company
49,2% of the industry perceive that both dimensions have equal impact on the outcome of
the procurement process. Another half, 42,4% feels that technical executives have greater
impact on which supplier is awarded the contract.
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Figure 41. Perception of power to decide in the procurement process
When we crosstab with field of responsibility, we see how these perceptions are dispersed
among all the three groups of executives. 10,2% of commercial executives vs. 18,6% of
technical executives vs. 13,6% of those who carry out both functions in procurement – is the
group believing that technical executives have greater impact on who becomes awarded the
contract. 15,3% of commercial executives vs. 15,3% of technical executives vs. 18,6% of
those who perform both functions – is the group believing that both dimensions have equal
impact on the outcome. The smallest group, 3,4% vs. 3,4% vs. 1,7 correspondingly – is the
group believing that commercial executives have greater impact in the process of the final
supplier choice.
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Figure 42. Power perception vs. field of responsibility
On the other hand, the perception on who should have greater impact on the outcome of the
process differs from the real practice. The importance of both dimensions gets more weight
in the beliefs of the respondents, and impact of the technical dimension is somewhat
reduced.
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Figure 43. Power beliefs in the procurement process
The beliefs differ in the three groups of executives:
Figure 44. Power beliefs in the procurement process vs. filed of responsibility
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The data indicate that in ca half of the industry technical executives have a sole impact on
the final choice of supplier, though some insignificant part of the technical executives (3,4%)
perceive that commercial executives have too much power in the purchasing process and
want their impact reduced. Commercial executives (7,7%), on the other side, feel that
technical executives have larger impact than they should, and could wish more of equal
impact from both dimensions. All in all, more than half of the technical executives want to
decide which supplier should get the contract. This opinion is supported by a pig part of
those who carry out both functions in the purchasing process.
Crosstabs help to delve deeper into differences in perceptions and beliefs between the three
groups of the executives by showing how opinions are divided within each of the groups.
Perceptions about the role power in the purchasing process:
4) Do you work on commercial or technical side in procurement? * 48) Whom do you believe has greater
impact on who is awarded the contract? Crosstabulation
48) Whom do you believe has greater impact
on who is awarded the contract?
The
technical
executive
The
commercial
executive
Both technical
and commercial
executives have
equal impact Total
% within 4) Do you work on
commercial or technical
side in procurement?
35.3% 11.8% 52.9% 100.0%Commercial
% of Total 10.2% 3.4% 15.3% 28.8%
% within 4) Do you work on
commercial or technical
side in procurement?
50.0% 9.1% 40.9% 100.0%Technical
% of Total 18.6% 3.4% 15.3% 37.3%
% within 4) Do you work on
commercial or technical
side in procurement?
40.0% 5.0% 55.0% 100.0%
4) Do you work
on commercial
or technical
side in
procurement?
Both
% of Total 13.6% 1.7% 18.6% 33.9%
% within 4) Do you work on
commercial or technical
side in procurement?
42.4% 8.5% 49.2% 100.0%Total
% of Total 42.4% 8.5% 49.2% 100.0%
Technical executives have greater impact
35,3% of commercial executives perceive that technical executives have greater impact in
the final evaluation of the incoming bids. The same is valid for 50% of technical executives
and 40% for those who carry out both functions.
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Commercial executives have greater impact
9,1% of technical executives and 5% of those who carry out both functions perceive that
commercial dimension play a bigger role in bid evaluation. 11,8% of commercial executives
agree on that.
Both technical and commercial executives have equal impact
The group is represented by 52,9% of commercial executives, 40,9% of technical executives,
and 55% of those who carry out both functions.
Beliefs about the role power in the purchasing process:
4) Do you work on commercial or technical side in procurement? * 49) Whom do you think should have
greater impact on who is awarded the contract? Crosstabulation
49) Whom do you think should have greater
impact on who is awarded the contract?
The
technical
executive
The
commercial
executive
Both technical
and commercial
executives
should have
equal impact Total
% within 4) Do you work on
commercial or technical side
in procurement?
8.8% 8.8% 82.4% 100.0
%
Commercial
% of Total 2.5% 2.5% 23.7% 28.8%
% within 4) Do you work on
commercial or technical side
in procurement?
52.3% 47.7% 100.0
%
Technical
% of Total 19.5% 17.8% 37.3%
% within 4) Do you work on
commercial or technical side
in procurement?
40.0% 2.5% 57.5% 100.0
%
4) Do you work
on commercial
or technical
side in
procurement?
Both
% of Total 13.6% .8% 19.5% 33.9%
% within 4) Do you work on
commercial or technical side
in procurement?
35.6% 3.4% 61.0% 100.0
%
Total
% of Total 35.6% 3.4% 61.0% 100.0
%
Technical executives should have greater impact
52,3% of technical executives believe that they should have greater impact in the final
process of the supplier choice. The same is valid for 40% of those who carry out both
functions.
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Commercial executives should have greater impact
Somewhat reduced amount of commercial executives (8,8%) think that guidelines set by the
commercial dimension should be determining in the procurement process. Only 2,5% of
those who carry out both functions agree on that.
Both technical and commercial executives should have equal impact
82,4% of commercial executives, 47,7% of technical executives and 57,5% of those who
carry out both functions represent this group.
The results show that ca one third of commercial executives experience that technical
dimension is more prioritized in the process of final supplier choice and could wish a more
equal impact on the outcome of the process. Those who carry out both functions, to a big
degree reflect the view of the technical dimension, which supports the expectation that they
represent more technical dimension than commercial.
As knowledge of the Public Procurement Act and relating Regulations determines how the
procurement process is set and followed, crosstab with the level of proficiency in laws and
relating regulations will provide a further insight into the obtained results.
5) How well do you know the regulations relating to public procurement? * 49) Whom do you think should
have greater impact on who is awarded the contract? Crosstabulation
49) Whom do you think should have greater
impact on who is awarded the contract?
The
technical
executive
The
commercial
executive
Both technical
and commercial
executives
should have
equal impact Total
% within 5) How well do you
know the regulations
relating to public
procurement?
4.3% 13.0% 82.6% 100.0
%
Proficient
% of Total .8% 2.5% 16.1% 19.5%
% within 5) How well do you
know the regulations
relating to public
procurement?
38.3% 1.7% 60.0% 100.0
%
Well
% of Total 19.5% .8% 30.5% 50.8%
% within 5) How well do you
know the regulations
relating to public
procurement?
54.5% 45.5% 100.0
%
Need more
training
% of Total 15.3% 12.7% 28.0%
5) How well do
you know the
regulations
relating to
public
procurement?
Not relevant % within 5) How well do you
know the regulations
relating to public
procurement?
100.0% 100.0
%
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% of Total 1.7% 1.7%
% within 5) How well do you
know the regulations
relating to public
procurement?
35.6% 3.4% 61.0% 100.0
%
Total
% of Total 35.6% 3.4% 61.0% 100.0
%
The majority of those who are proficient in laws (82,6%) and who say that they know them
Well (60%) have no doubt that both dimensions should have an equal impact on who
becomes awarded the contract in the end. Those who believe technical executives should
have greater impact on the outcome are represented by 38,3% of those who say they know
the laws Well and by 54,5% of those who Need more training.
These results show that while commercial executives have a correct understanding of
importance of both roles in the purchasing process in the industry, since as the rule, they are
those who make sure that the laws are followed, more than one half of technical executives
and ca same amount of those who carry out both functions value technical component above
the joint effort of these two dimensions in the procurement process. It means that attitudes
and beliefs about suppliers, routines, products and prices prevailing among technical
executives are those that prevail in the industry at the moment. Moderate understanding of
laws is one of the factors that provide to this situation. Industry behaviour in total can be
seen as the outcome of these attitudes and beliefs.
Perceived behavioural control towards Suppliers
Descriptive Statistics
N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Skewness
Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Std. Error
50a) In my opinion there is a real competition in
the market
118 1 6 2.25 .944 1.697 .223
50b) I don’t let myself be manipulated by
suppliers
118 1 7 2.04 1.112 1.696 .223
50f) References provided in the bid give
valuable information regarding the procurement
118 1 6 2.50 1.107 1.248 .223
55tt) It is okay to pay more if this leads to
reduced delivery times
118 1 7 3.50 1.273 .810 .223
Valid N (listwise) 118
Minimum=1, ’Strongly Agree’, Maximum=7, ‘Strongly Disagree’
In general, the industry agrees that there is a real competition in the supplier market
(Mean=2,25 ‘Agree’, Mode=2, small std. deviation indicates consistency of the replies). The
respondents believe that they do what it takes in order not to be manipulated by the seller
market (Mean=2,04, ‘Agree’, Mode=2), though opinions are more dispersed here (std.
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deviation is large), which indicates that some part of the industry doesn’t perceive that they
can control all the ongoing processes.
Majority of the respondents (86,5%) agree that references provided in the bid may give
valuable information regarding the procurement (Mode=2, ‘Agree’). Willingness to pay
more if this leads to reduced delivery times is not that certain (Mean=3,50, Mode=3,
‘Somewhat Agree’).
Perceived behavioural control towards Routines
Q55uu produced 27,1% of the respondents who answered ‘Don’t know’ and Q55ww –
31,4%. These values are too high to be treated as neutral attitude, and were therefore
extracted as missing for the analysis.
Descriptive Statistics
N Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Skewness
Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Std. Error
50c) I regularly have to carry out urgent
deliveries
118 1 7 4.42 1.717 -.198 .223
50d) I regularly have too little time to carry out
procurement projects correctly
118 1 7 4.53 1.657 -.324 .223
50e) I don’t have time to check references in the
bid
118 1 7 5.09 1.377 -.809 .223
50g) It is resource-demanding to administrate
many bidders
118 1 7 2.67 1.427 1.214 .223
50h) It is time-consuming to evaluate many bids 118 1 7 2.56 1.393 1.236 .223
50i) The submitting deadlines are too short to
attract new market players
118 1 7 4.79 1.395 -.727 .223
50j) The outcome is in too large degree
determined by procurement regulations
118 1 7 4.17 1.576 -.059 .223
50k) I am comfortable with using English as
business language in preparation of RFQ and in
negotiations
118 1 7 3.98 1.974 -.078 .223
55ss) It is necessary to have several bids to
evaluate
118 1 6 1.79 .941 1.751 .223
55uu) An extended submitting deadline attracts
new suppliers
86 1 7 3.84 1.600 .343 .260
55vv) It is important to check stated references 118 1 7 2.33 .979 1.461 .223
55ww) Use of English in the preparation of RFQ
leads to more competition
81 1 7 3.17 1.829 .869 .267
Minimum=1, ’Strongly Agree’, Maximum=7, ‘Strongly Disagree’
In order to reflect nuances in opinions the collected data represent, it was decided to divide
responses in groups as follows:
Somewhat Disagree - statements in this group have Mean close to 5,0 ‘Somewhat Disagree’
and Mode=6 ‘Disagree‘.
I regularly have to carry out urgent deliveries (Mean=4,42, closer to 4 ‘Disagree’).
I regularly have too little time to carry out procurement projects correctly
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I don’t have time to check references in the bid
The submitting deadlines are too short to attract new market players
Mixed – this group has mixed results, but Mean close to 4 which indicates neutral position.
I am comfortable with using English as business language in preparation of RFQ and in
negotiations (Mode=6 ‘Disagree‘).
An extended submitting deadline attracts new suppliers (Mode=3 ‘Somewhat Agree‘).
Somewhat Agree – in this group, Mean and Mode have the same loading of 3 ‘Somewhat
Agree‘.
The outcome is in too large degree determined by procurement regulations
Agree – statements in this group have Mean varying from 2, ‘Agree’ to 3, ‘Somewhat
Agree’, and Mode=2 ‘Agree‘.
It is resource-demanding to administrate many bidders
It is time-consuming to evaluate many bids
It is necessary to have several bids to evaluate (Mean=1,79 from ‘Strongly Agree’ to
‘Agree’)
It is important to check stated references (Mean=2,33 closer to ‘Agree’).
Use of English in the preparation of RFQ leads to more competition (Mean=3,17, bigger
than 3).
In sum, the industry perceives that they plan purchasing processes in the way that there is
sufficient time to carry out procurement projects. This results in correct approach to the
process – setting sufficient deadlines, checking references provided in the bids. The
executives involved into the purchasing process see the importance of having many bids to
evaluate, despite the fact that it is time-consuming. Although the respondents agree that use
of English in preparation of RFQs leads to more competition, they feel to a larger degree
uncomfortable using it themselves. Extending of bid-submitting deadline is not much
focused on.
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Attitudes
Attitude towards Sellihca
Satisfaction with Sellihca (Q22)
22,9% of commercial executives and those who carry out both functions answered ‘Don’t
know’. As this is a large value, these responses were treated as missing values (N=67).
Descriptive statistics (Min=1 ‘Very Dissatisfied’, Max=7 ‘Very Satisfied’) and frequency
tables provide Mean=5,06 (‘Somewhat Satisfied’). Negative skewness -1.676 indicates that
the data are skewed left. Large std. deviation 1.1486 indicates that the data points are far
from the mean. Still, in total only 15% answers vary from ‘Very Dissatisfied’ to ‘Somewhat
Dissatisfied’, and 85,1% of the respondents feel from ‘Somewhat Satisfied’ to ‘Very
satisfied’ (Mode=6, ‘Satisfied’). Thus, majority of the industry is satisfied with Sellihca
database.
After completing the analysis of attitudes to Sellihca, beliefs about other systems used for
invitation of suppliers to tenders will be compared. As only commercial executives and those
who carry out both functions have competence about these systems, only their answers will
be analysed (N=74).
Descriptive Statistics
N Min. Max. Mean Std. Deviation Skewness
Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Statistic Stat. Std. Error
27a) I can get more competition by
publishing more RFIs in Doffin/TED
74 1 7 3.78 1.519 .161 .279
27b) I can get more competition by
announcing more contract awards in
Doffin/TED
74 1 7 4.23 1.467 -.036 .279
27c) Sellihca provides a sufficient choice of
suppliers
74 1 7 3.45 1.597 .578 .279
Valid N (listwise) 74
Minimum=1, ’Strongly Agree’, Maximum=7, ‘Strongly Disagree’
Beliefs about whether Sellihca provides a sufficient choice of suppliers (Q27c)
Satisfaction results (Q22) are somewhat supported. Mean=3,45 (between ‘Somewhat Agree’
and neutral position) Mode=2, ‘Agree’. Data points are far dispersed around the mean.
60,9% answers vary from ‘Strongly Agree’ to ‘Somewhat Agree’.
31,1% answers vary from ‘Strongly Disagree’ to ‘Somewhat Disagree’ (18,9%).
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The results show that although a smaller number of respondents thinks that Sellihca provides
a sufficient choice of suppliers, the industry is satisfied with this database. This is according
with earlier results that indicate that many executives encourage new suppliers to register in
Sellihca.
Beliefs about which improvements announcement of tenders in Sellihca can lead to: (see
table below).
From 18% to 33,8% respondents answered Don’t know, they were treated as missing values.
51) Announcement of tenders in Sellihca leads to:
Statistics
a) Better
market
situation
b) Better
products
c) Higher
quality
d) Better
reliability
e) Reduced
delivery times
f) Lower
risk
g) Lower
prices
Valid 60 53 51 54 54 62 49N
Missing 14 21 23 20 20 12 25
Mean 2.83 3.89 3.84 3.69 4.04 3.65 4.06
Median 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 5.00 3.00 3.00
Mode 2 2 3 3 2a 3 3a
Std. Deviation 1.392 1.783 1.793 1.680 1.759 1.631 1.830
Skewness 1.049 .283 .223 .446 -.058 .318 .076
Std. Error of
Skewness
.309 .327 .333 .325 .325 .304 .340
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maximum 6 7 7 7 7 7 7
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown
Minimum=1, ’Strongly Agree’, Maximum=7, ‘Strongly Disagree’
The data show that among the prevailing beliefs about Sellihca are: 1) it makes the supplier
market more predictable (lower risk), and 2) somewhat reliable. Though, there are
ambiguous data regarding beliefs about its effects on product quality, and especially mixed
beliefs about the effects it may have on delivery times and prices.
Attitude towards Doffin/TED
Beliefs about which improvements announcement of competitions in Doffin/TED can lead to
(see table below).
From 40% to 56,8% of commercial executives and those who carry out both functions
answered Don’t know. These were treated as missing variables.
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52) Announcement of competitions in Doffin/TED leads to:
Statistics
a) Better
market
situation
b) Better
products
c) Higher
quality
d) Better
reliability
e) Reduced
delivery times
f) Lower
risk
g) Lower
prices
Valid 43 32 34 33 38 40 36N
Missing 31 42 40 41 36 34 38
Mean 2.77 3.75 4.21 4.06 4.68 4.53 3.44
Median 2.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 3.00
Mode 2 2 3 5 5 3 3
Std. Deviation 1.342 1.741 1.572 1.638 1.454 1.467 1.681
Skewness 1.439 .489 .086 .033 -.582 -.129 .732
Std. Error of
Skewness
.361 .414 .403 .409 .383 .374 .393
Minimum 1 2 2 2 2 2 1
Maximum 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Minimum=1, ’Strongly Agree’, Maximum=7, ‘Strongly Disagree’
The results show that the prevailing belief about the announcement of competitions in
Doffin/TED is that it leads to a better market situation, which naturally results in somewhat
better products. There are mixed opinion on whether this routine would result in lower
prices. On the negative side, the routine entails higher risks due to reduced reliability with
deliveries, connected, for example, with longer delivery times.
Beliefs about which improvements announcement of awarded contracts in Doffin/TED can
lead to (see table below).
From 51,4% to 58,1% of commercial executives and those who carry out both functions
answered Don’t know. These were treated as missing values.
53) Announcement of awarded contracts in Doffin/TED leads to:
Statistics
a) Better
market
situation
b) Better
products
c) Higher
quality
d) Better
reliability
e) Reduced
delivery times
f) Lower
risk
g) Lower
prices
Valid 36 32 33 33 32 35 31N
Missing 38 42 41 41 42 39 43
Mean 3.58 4.91 4.79 4.79 5.13 4.80 4.65
Median 3.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 5.00 5.00
Mode 2a 6 6 6 6 6 6
Std. Deviation 1.857 1.653 1.746 1.799 1.581 1.729 1.780
Skewness .626 -.755 -.592 -.691 -1.002 -.651 -.293
Std. Error of
Skewness
.393 .414 .409 .409 .414 .398 .421
Minimum 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
Maximum 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown
Minimum=1, ’Strongly Agree’, Maximum=7, ‘Strongly Disagree’
The data are more mixed when it comes to beliefs the industry has about the effects of
announcement of awarded contracts in Doffin. The general tendency is that it leads to a
better market situation (first Mode=2, ‘Agree’ and second Mode=3, ’Somewhat agree’ with
143
66,8% of those who tend to agree and 33,3% of those who tend to disagree). Although a
summary evaluation of other alternatives was rathernegative in general (Mean around 5
‘Somewhat Disagree’, Mode=6 ‘Disagree’), large std. deviations and small skewness
indicate that data are rather evenly dispersed far from the mean.
Attitude towards suppliers
Satisfaction with suppliers
On satisfaction with Norwegian suppliers only 1,7% answered Don’t know. All respondents
are therefore relevant (N=118).
On satisfaction with suppliers from the EU/EEA 33,1% answered Don’t know. This is a
large value and cannot be considered as neutral evaluation when performing descriptive
statistics, thus the data is reduced to N=79.
On satisfaction with suppliers from outside of the EU/EEA, 61,9% of the respondents
answered Don’t know. This indicates that that have no experience with the suppliers in
question and are therefore not relevant for the analysis. This reduced N to 45 of valid
respondents.
33) How often are you satisfied with the deliveries from:
Descriptive Statistics
N Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Skewness
Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Stat. Std. Error
a) Norway? 118 3 7 5.42 .633 -.017 .223
b) the EU? 79 1 7 4.78 1.288 -1.766 .271
c) outside the EU? 45 1 6 3.38 1.969 -.202 .354
Minimum=1, ’Never’, Maximum=7, ‘Always’
Suppliers from Norway
97,5% of the respondents are from Frequently (55,1%, Mode=5) to Always satisfied with
suppliers from Norway. Mean=5,42 is between ‘Frequently’ to ‘Very Frequently’. Of the
negative alternatives only 0,8% are satisfied Rarely. Small std. deviation and almost zero
skewness indicate that the values are relatively evenly distributed not far from the mean.
Suppliers from the EU/EEA
More variable results are achieved on satisfaction with suppliers from the EU. 84,9% of the
respondents are from Frequently (63,3%, Mode=5) to Always satisfied with them.
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Mean=4,78 is near ‘Frequently’. 15,2% are Never to Rarely satisfied with the deliveries.
Large deviation and large negative skewness indicate that data are unevenly distributed with
a longer tail on the negative side from the mean.
International suppliers from outside the EU/EEA
Ambiguous data are collected on the rest of the respondents. Mean=3,38 is closer to 3
‘Rarely’. A large std. deviation indicates that data are very unevenly distributed around the
mean. Whereas 51,1% of the industry is satisfied with international suppliers from
Frequently (42,2%) to Very Frequently, 48,9% of it is satisfied from Never (35,6%) to
Rarely.
Interestingly enough, virtually all respondents who answered Never have never purchased
anything from countries other than EU/EEA (see crosstab X). This is a truly amazing
research result, because instead of avoiding to respond, they indicate negative pre-attitude
towards those suppliers.
Figure 45. Experience with suppliers from outside of the EU vs. satisfaction
The results suggest that the industry is definitely satisfied with Norwegian suppliers. The
further the supplier is placed from Norway, the less satisfaction the buyers show. Though,
not all these attitudes are based on the experience.
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We further analyze same beliefs alternatives about these suppliers, as we did when analyzing
attitude towards Doffin/TED. This is because announcement in that database is the main tool
for reaching international suppliers worldwide.
Beliefs about which improvements sending RFQs to suppliers outside the EEA leads to: (see
table below)
From 42,4% to 62,7% of the responded answered Don’t know. For the purpose of analysis,
these are treated as missing values, even though it reduces N significantly.
54) Sending of RFQ to suppliers outside the EEA leads to:
Statistics
a) Better
market
situation
b) Better
products
c) Higher
quality
d) Better
reliability
e) Reduced
delivery times
f) Lower
risk
g) Lower
prices
Valid 68 44 44 48 56 61 65N
Missing 50 74 74 70 62 57 54
Mean 2.75 4.27 4.68 4.88 4.71 5.39 3.06
Median 2.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 5.00 6.00 3.00
Mode 2 6 5 5 6 6 2a
Std. Deviation 1.386 1.796 1.653 1.619 1.546 1.201 1.572
Skewness 1.574 -.178 -.627 -.448 -.480 -1.530 1.007
Std. Error of
Skewness
.291 .357 .357 .343 .319 .306 .299
Minimum 1 1 1 2 2 2 1
Maximum 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown
Minimum=1, ’Strongly Agree’, Maximum=7, ‘Strongly Disagree’
Majority of respondents who provided answers on the series of these questions actually
believe that inviting suppliers from outside of the EEA leads a better market situation
(Mean=2,75 close to 3, ‘Somewhat Agree’, Mode=2, ‘Agree’). 85,3% have positive
approach to international suppliers vs 14,7% with negative approach. Relatively small std.
deviation and large positive skewness indicate that data are distributed not far from the
mean, and the distribution is right-skewed.
78,2% of the responded tend to agree that such international competition would result in
reduced prices (first Mode=2, ‘Agree’, second Mode= 3, ‘Somewhat Agree’) are not in
contradiction with the general tendency.
Ambiguous data collected regarding the issue of better products (while Mean=4,27 is near 4
‘Somewhat Agree’, 43,2% tend to agree, and over a half, 56,8%, tend to disagree with that.
Mode=5, ‘Disagree’). Large std. deviation indicate that data are distributed far from the
mean, but very little skewed.
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Respondents tend to disagree (ca 70%) regarding alternatives as quality, reliability, and
delivery times. High risk involved is the major issue of their concern (90,2% of the
responded, Mean=5,39 nearly coincides with the Mode=6, ‘Disagree’).
In sum, invitation of suppliers from outside the EEA to participate in tenders can lead to a
better market situation and lower prices. On the other side of the scales lie fear of the risks
invloved and negative beliefs about quality, long delivery times, and reliability of the
deliveries. There are mixed beliefs about whether the product such suppliers have to offer is
any better than Norwegian suppliers have to offer.
Attitude based on beliefs classified according to six Cialdini’s constructs of persuasion
and compliance
The beliefs were measured in Q55. We start by performing descriptive statistics on it.
On most of the statements the level of those who answered ‘Don’t know’ was under 20-30%,
which we want to assume reflects neutral attitude of respondents towards the statements.
Four questions on which Don’t know responses are above 30%:
55p) Use of internationally known standard terms of contract increases our risk exposure
55r) It is okay not to announce competitions in Doffin/TED, because this is common procedure
55s) It is okay not to announce awarded contracts in Doffin/TED, because this is common procedure
55t) It is okay not to announce awarded contracts in Doffin/TED, because it has no consequences
As definition of this category as missing would reduce amount of respondents to N=33 (28%
of the total), it was decided to analyse these questions separately, because the very purpose
of this research is performing analysis of attitudes of the entire set of the respondents.
Agree
Q55c – Well-known suppliers indicate security - R
Q55d – I give references and make positive statements about products that I buy – C&C
Q55e – I give recommendations to colleagues if suppliers ask about it – C&C
Q55h – New and unknown suppliers lead to increased risk - SP
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Q55i – New and unknown suppliers lead to greater need for training - SP
Q55j – Unfamiliar brands indicate increased risk - SP
Q55k – Unfamiliar brands indicate greater need for training - SP
Q55l – It is important that the industry has a common approach to the supplier market - SP
Q55u – It is important that the supplier is known in our industry - L
Q55x – It is important that the supplier knows Norwegian conditions - L
Q55kk – I rely on formal references about a product from my colleagues - Auth
Q55ll – I rely on formal references about suppliers from my colleagues - Auth
Somewhat agree
Q55b – Well-known brands indicate high quality - R
Q55g – I participate in external user forums [ownership] – C&C
Q55o – Use of internationally known standard terms of contract encourages competition - SP
Q55v – It is important that the supplier knows our company - L
Q55y – Networks established by known suppliers are important for the industry - L
Q55ff – I will rather relate to suppliers who speak the same language as I - L
Q55hh – Network from professional life is important to the industry - Auth
Q55jj – I rely on informal references about suppliers from my colleagues - Auth
Mixed
Q55a – A high price indicates higher quality - R
Q55f – I participate with suppliers in product development [ownership] - C&C
Q55m – Established technical standards hamper technology development - SP
Q55q – Use of English in RFQ increases our risk exposure - SP
Q55pp – It is better to buy from a niche-supplier to the energy industry than from suppliers to
other industries - Scar
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Q55w – It is important that the supplier has a local presence - L
Q55ee – I will rather relate to suppliers who have the same business culture as I - L
Q55ii – I rely on informal references about a product from my colleagues - Auth
Q55oo – We should not be a pilot-buyer for new products and suppliers A - Auth
Somewhat disagree
Q55n – Established templates for RFQ and general contract terms hamper more competition - SP
Q55p – Use of internationally known standard terms of contract increases our risk exposure - SP
Q55bb – I will rather relate to suppliers I already have a positive experience with (companies) - L
Disagree
Q55r – It is okay not to announce competitions in Doffin/TED, because this is common procedure
- SP
Q55s – It is okay not to announce awarded contracts in Doffin/TED, because this is common
procedure - SP
Q55t – It is okay not to announce awarded contracts in Doffin/TED, because it has no
consequences - SP
Q55z – Replacing a product is unreasonably costly - L
Q55aa – Replacing a supplier is unreasonably costly - L
Q55cc – I will rather relate to suppliers I know (persons) - L
Q55dd – I will rather relate to suppliers my colleagues are familiar with - L
Q55gg – Network from college is important to the industry - Auth
Q55mm – It is better to choose same products as other energy companies use - Auth
Q55nn – It is better to choose same suppliers as other energy companies use - Auth
Q55qq – It is okay to pay more for deliveries from a niche-supplier - Scar
Q55rr – I would rather buy from a supplier who only has the EU as market - Scar
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Initially, it was intended to perform factor analysis on this question in order to explore the
relationships among the set of variables, find major factors and see which items load
heaviest, since some of them may seem repeating the information. Due to time limitations, it
was decided not to proceed with factor analysis further. Though, it was made a good start
when it was found out that 13 factors are extractable from the analysis along with their
eigenvalues. The first factor accounted for 23% of the variance, the second for 7%, third for
6% ect., a total of 72% of the total variance. All the remaining factors each controled only
small amount of variance and accounted for the remaining 28%. The scree plot indicated that
the curve began to flatten after factor 6. This makes me believe that the assumption
regarding the six constructs is true. Even though factor analysis will not be presented in this
paper, it will be performed outside of the scope of this paper.
One can generally conclude that all the six constructs of compliance, Reciprocation, Social
Proof, Commitment and Consistency, Liking, Authority, and Scarcity relate to decision-
making in the industry. Some beliefs play greater role than others, and in some areas there
are different practices employed both within companies and within the industry.
Effect of cartels (Q56)
38,1% of the total respondents answered this open question.
This is a control question to the understanding of the threat of cartels in the industry. The
provided responses are grouped into two categories as follows.
Positive signals of understanding the scale of the issue from the industry:
- higher prices for bought products and services have lead to unnecessary higher costs
of investment and operation of power plants;
- worse products and product development;
- hinder entrance of new suppliers;
- purchasing process have become more systemized and professionalized both
internally and in form of cooperation in the industry;
- have become more critical to the role of competition and information exchange
between the industry and suppliers.
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Negative signals from the industry:
- don’t know (11% of responded)
- no or minimal effect (20% of responded)
The results suggest that only a part of the industry might have understood the effects cartels
have had on their company, the industry in total, and the whole society generally. The other
part might either deny any effects due to satisfaction by the present state of things, or simply
state the zero effect as a fact.
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5. Conclusion
5.1 Discoveries and Implications
The el-industry is mostly represented by the executives with working experience over 10
years. The biggest group representing the ‘experience’ are technical executives and those
who carry out both technical and commercial functions within their company. Relatively
‘young’ group are commercial executives, which may indicate that the industry takes steps
towards greater distinguishing of these two dimensions in the procurement process.
The focus of this research was on following question:
Does buyers’ behaviour facilitate collusion on the marketplace?
Following findings were obtained:
Awareness of cartels in the supply market – past vs. present
A half of the industry is certain that they have not been exposed to supplier cartels, and only
one-forth part of it is aware about cartel disclosures among suppliers to the industry.
Whereas commercial executives constitute the biggest part of those aware, the other two
groups of executives are surprisingly little informed about the processes in the supplier
markets despite their long experience in the industry.
Among the most well-known cartel disclosures in the industry is ABB and Siemens case
which became known due coverage by the media, with further transfer of the information via
systems of internal information exchange (e.g., from Head of Department to employees)
within a single company.
Due to the low alertness of collusive behaviour among suppliers, the Norwegian
Competitive Authority remains major tool of cartel disclosures in the industry.
Those executives, who have been aware of cartel disclosures, shown very little knowledge of
the worldwide supplier market within the cartel exposed fields (from 40% to ca 70% don’t
know how many suppliers are available in Norway, the EU or outside the EEA). Among the
indicated levels only several (up to 6) suppliers of those known are present in Norway
compared to a more varied supplier choice in the EU/EEA countries.
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Regarding present situation on the supplier market, a half of the industry has no opinion on
whether cartels may still exist. A rather considerable part of the industry (11%) is certain that
there are no functioning cartels present in the supplier market. This part is represented
mostly by technical executives and those who carry out both functions in the purchasing
process. Commercial executives are those who are least optimistic regarding cartels.
Behaviour vs awareness
Whereas only somewhat insignificant part of the industry can avoid buying from cartel
participants, the absolute majority still purchase goods and services from earlier disclosed
cartel participants. However, this result is not unexpected due to the market specifics
(described in a more detail in the theoretical part of this thesis).
Routines
When it comes to organization of tenders in cartel-exposed fields of procurement, the
majority of the industry invites four to six bidders to tenders. One fifth of the responded tend
to invite three or less bidders, when three is the minimum amount of suppliers one is allowed
to invite to a tender, in case there are more suppliers are available on the market. The results
indicate that one third of the respondents think that there are more than six suppliers
available within the cartel-exposed fields in the EU/EEA. Hence, the revealed routine at
parts of the industry is one that limits competition.
Behaviour
Points of contact with supplier
Though the majority of the industry (ca 70%) makes sure that both technical and commercial
executives are involved in the procurement process with regard to communication with
suppliers, almost one forth of the organisations involve commercial dimension after
specification is developed (in even a worse case after contact with possible suppliers is
made). Among otherwise employed routines in the industry, are the involvement of only one
of the executives into the purchasing process (the most common practice when only one
executive does in fact carry out both functions). In smaller companies only technical
dimension is sometimes involved. On the contrary, in some part of large companies (11%)
only commercial dimension is sometimes responsible for contact with suppliers.
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Amount of suppliers on the bidder list
The majority of the industry (ca 60%) fulfils minimum requirement of the law inviting three
to five suppliers when purchasing goods and services above the EEA threshold value. Only
one third of the executives are striving for more competition and attempt to find more
suppliers into the bidder list.
Sources of supplier search and selection
Sellihca is the most popular source of supplier selection (71,2%). Other sources of supplier
search are Internet 35,6%, and Other sources 33,1%. Industry magazines 23,7%, and visit to
exhibitions 12,7% are also popular. The category Other provided somewhat ambiguous
results. Recommendations and references are one of the most frequent categories of supplier
search, which indicates that information exchange does work within the industry. However,
use of familiar suppliers was the next most popular answer in this category.
System routines and satisfaction
Ca 80% of the industry takes an initiative in expanding the Sellihca prequalification
database. Only ca 60% of these is satisfied with Sellihca.
Doffin/TED
Ca 85% don’t publish RFIs in Doffin/TED vs. ca 15% of those who do so.
Ca 10 % don’t use either Sellihca or Doffin for supplier selection.
Another new finding is that ca 30% of commercial executives and those who carry out both
functions don’t have information on whether or not RFIs are published in Doffin in their
companies. Since they are those who make this routine, this result may indicate two possible
things:
- Those who think they perform commercial function in procurement are in fact
technical executives representing internal customers. Thus, a great deal of roles
confusion is at place;
or
- there is no routine about announcement of contract awards in Doffin/TED, and these
respondents wanted to avoid to respond on this question.
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One third of the industry never announces contract awards in Doffin/TED. All three size
groups of companies are represented in this group.
Ca 40% of the industry are clear about that their companies don’t have internal procedures
that would ensure that contract awards with value above the EEA threshold become
announced in Doffin/TED database. 40% avoided responding this question.
Relationships with suppliers
The majority of the industry (97%) invites Norwegian suppliers. Only half of them actively
invite suppliers from the EU. Ca 80% rarely invites international suppliers from outside of
the EU/EEA.
Earlier experience with suppliers vs. behaviour
Ca 60% of the industry has never purchased from suppliers outside of the EEA. Only one
third of the industry has carried out international purchases. Those who have purchased have
somewhat mixed type of experience with deliveries, though even those who didn’t have
positive experience invite same suppliers to tenders. The majority of those who had such
experience now invite new suppliers from outside the EEA (ca 65%). This result indicates
that positive experience plays an important but not determinant role in attitude formation.
Among the reasons for scepticism the leading ones were quality concerns and the suppliers’
ability to document it. The buyers prefer to have international suppliers as sub-suppliers to
Norwegian suppliers and let others take risks and solve problems leading to insecurity of
deliveries.
Routine of entering into a contract with a foreign supplier
Half of the industry, represented by technical executives and those who carry out both
functions are not aware of these routines. Ca 60% prefers to enter into a contract through a
Norwegian representative and ca 40% dares to do it directly. The latter group is mostly
represented by large companies.
Part of the existing suppliers which don’t have a Norwegian registration number
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For ca 10% of the industry suppliers without Norwegian registration number constitute more
than 20% of the supplier database. For ca 70% of the companies such suppliers constitute up
to 5% of the database.
Part of foreign contracts in total purchases in volume
For in total 26% of the industry foreign contracts constitute up to 20% of the purchase
volume. For one forth of the industry, such contracts constitute more than 20% of the whole
volume purchase. Hence, foreign suppliers constitute a little share in the supplier database,
but make a bigger volume in purchases.
Requests for quotations (RFQs)
Generally companies have systems with internally developed standards for RFQs. Ca 85% of
the industry uses templates, which ca 80% updates regularly. Ca 70% of the industry updates
technical descriptions regularly. Leading positions in these routines take larger companies.
Contract standards
Ca 70% of the industry uses in-house standard contract terms on a regular basis. This is a
competition hampering practice, as 1) it is possible that these terms of contracts are made
specifically to match a certain supplier, 2) if these terms pressure risks to the supplier, the
price of the solution can be higher than with use of other standard terms. Large companies
are naturally those who use this practice the most (ca 40%) in their attempt to exploit their
market power over suppliers.
For ca 60% of the industry, NS (Norwegian standard) is a regularly used standard as well.
Since it was developed by Standard Norge, it is well-balanced on both, the supplier and the
buyer side. Other standards are relatively rarely used; among them are international
standards (Fidic, Orgalime, ICC) and some governmental standard agreements (SSA, IKT),
which some part of the industry was not aware about.
Specification
Ca 80% of the industry uses function- or performance based specification on a regular basis.
It doesn’t favour any suppliers above others and let evaluate on objective criteria. Ca 65% of
the industry regularly uses detail specification, which allows being more supplier-specific
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when developing RFQs. Industry-standard specification is regularly used by ca 50% of the
industry. Ca 20% of the industry favours supplier specification. The latter practice is one of
the most popular among competition-limiting practices available for those who carry out
procurements.
Language
Ca 70% of the industry from never to rarely prepares RFQs in English. Ca 50% of the
industry doesn’t have in-house terms of contract in English. For ca 50% contracts in English
constitute less than 10%.
Bid-submitting deadlines
The industry avoids using short deadlines and gives preference to longer deadlines or a
minimum deadline for procurements above the EEA threshold value, which is 24 days.
Almost one third of the industry, mostly represented by big and medium-sized companies
uses shorter deadlines (and they may have lawful reasons for that). Still, this is a
competition-limiting practice, which may also be an indicator of problems with internal
planning procedures for the company’s total procurement.
Ca 70% of the industry rarely uses extended deadlines in order to attract new bidders.
This paper has examined levels of cartels awareness, methodology and underlying
perceptions and attitudes regarding the supplier market and the conditions in which the
industry operates. All in all, this study reveals that ca 10-20% of the industry always does
what it takes in order to promote competition in the supplier market. Ca 10-30% of the
Norwegian utility companies do not promote competition as a part of a conscious approach
to the supplier market. The rest of the industry doesn’t have a common approach, and
‘quality’ of their procurements can vary. Out primary hypothesis that Buyers’ behaviour
facilitates collusion on the marketplace is therefore confirmed for a part of the el-industry.
Underlying reasons to such behaviour for the executives involved into the procurement
process are embedded into the constructs of the perceived behavioural control and attitudes,
which constitute an inner force that motivates the buyers to mobilize for action. The
constructs are reviewed in detail in the Analysis part in this thesis.
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The results derived in this paper suggest that the buyers should take into consideration
following:
1) Increase levels of cartels awareness within the industry.
A low level of awareness of supplier cartels is related to the fact that the focus on cartels is
low. The market player who is aware of the situation can take an active position on the issue
and change market processes dramatically.
2) Focus on competition.
Expand the supplier markets by opening specifications, using English language in
preparation of RFQs, allowing bids to be submitted in English language, using international
contract terms etc.
The system that regulates the procurement process in the industry is formed in such a way
that many options are available to the buyer, but it is his/ her decision to take an action.
3) Increase the role of the purchasing department in the purchasing process.
Commercial dimension used for managing relationships with suppliers and contractual
conditions should be involved into the procurement process early in the planning process.
This is the way to ensure an equal treatment of suppliers and secure that selection of
suppliers happens on the basis of objective and non-discriminating criteria according to the
fundamental requirements (§5) in the Public Procurement Act. The industry has to be more
aware that violation of these rules of the Act and the pertaining Regulations can have serious
economical consequences for the industry.
4) Finally, control the information flows on all levels of the procurement process.
The industry specialists may unwillingly provide suppliers with information that can be used
in mechanisms of coordination and regulation of cartel behaviour. It is therefore important to
be attentive to warning signals of collusive tendering and where possible limit the conditions
for learning over time.
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5.2 Limitations and suggestions to future research
The scientific approach to any research is to maximize its reliability and validity. Reliability
refers to the consistency and stability of findings that enables findings to be replicated.
External validity refers to the extent to which the results of a sample are transferable to a
population.
The results of this survey are in sum generalizable to the population in the context of
procurement process in el-industry in Norway. Though, some limitations must be
considered.
Non-response bias. Not all companies provided with proportionate number of respondents
from both sides of the procurement process. This is especially the case with large companies.
While one of the biggest company was insufficiently represented by only one respondent,
another one (Hafslund) refused to participate in the survey.
Response bias. t is possible that not all technical executives who participated in the survey
are involved into the procurement process. For example, their area of responsibility may be
project engineering, and they may have nothing to do with supplier evaluation. Sampling
error (difference between the unknown population parameter and the sample statistic used to
estimate the parameter) cannot be calculated.
Another undertaken limitation in the thesis is focusing on the buyer side. Other sources of
information could include different points of view on the issue.
Reliability of measures is considered to be high as they were developed on the basis of
clarifying interview, and the questionnaire was pretested. Though, some instrumentation bias
(bias from question wording, etc.) have occurred. For example, including Don’t know in the
middle of the measuring scale produced somewhat unreliable results.
Some sensitive questions question reliability of gathered data. Of this reason bribery was not
a focus of this survey due to sensitivity of the topic, and Reciprocation construct was not
measured directly. Still, repeated surveying of the same respondents can possibly produce
slightly different results. If that would be the case, results provided by this survey are more
reliable.
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Other methods of analysis could be used on different groups of questions. Then more
hypotheses on dependencies between different variables could be developed. This was
chosen not to do mainly due to time constraints (but also when there are many categories
within each variable, larger samples would be needed). Variables and methodologies are
adequately described for future replications.
The research has been carried out in Norwegian and later translated to English. Some terms
might be affected.
Despite of all the limitations, to the author’s knowledge this is the first attempt to date to
research data in this field. Besides, this is the first time Cialdini’s principles of persuasion
and compliance are employed to explain industrial buying behaviour.
One possible suggestion to future research in this area can be analysing whether laws and
regulations pertaining to Public Procurement may be conducive to collusion on the
marketplace. Alternatively, it could be interesting to make a EU-research or one on the
worldwide basis and see whether the collected data apply to the whole industry.
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7. Appendices
7.1 Appendix 1 – Survey questionnaire (in English)
1. How many employees are in your company?
Less than 100 100-500 More than 500
Check
(X)
2. What type of company do you work in?
Energy production Distribution District heating Other
Check
(X)
3. How long have you worked in this industry sector (years)?
Less than 3 3-10 More than 10
Check
(X)
4. Do you work on commercial or technical side in procurement?
Commercial Technical Both
Check
(X)
5. How well do you know the regulations relating to public procurement?
Proficient Well Need more training Not relevant
Check
(X)
6. Do you know that your company has been exposed to cartels?
NB: Cartel – collusion between suppliers in order to control market price or share the market.
Yes No Don’t know
Check
(X)
If ”Yes”:
7. In which field?
Specify
8. Which suppliers you know were involved in this practice?
Specify
9. How was the cartel disclosed?
Specify
10. How did you get to know about the cartel?
Specify
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11. Do you continue to purchase from the cartel participants?
Yes No Don’t know
Check
(X)
12. Within the cartel exposed field, how many suppliers are present in Norway?
3 or less 4-6 More than 6 Don’t know
Check
(X)
13. Within the cartel exposed field, how many suppliers are present in the EU?
3 or less 4-6 More than 6 Don’t know
Check
(X)
14. Within the cartel exposed field, how many suppliers are present outside the
EU?
1
4.
Within
the
cartel
expose
d field,
how
many
supplie
rs are
present
outside
the EU?
3 or less 4-6 More than 6 Don’t know
Check
(X)
15. How many suppliers do you invite when you buy within this field?
3 or less 4-6 More than 6 Don’t know
Check
(X)
16. Do you believe cartels still exist in the supplier market to the energy industry?
Yes No Don’t know
Check
(X)
17. How do you organize procurement with regard to communication with the supplier?
Only technical executive is
involved
Only commercial
executive is involved
Both technical and
commercial executives are
involved
Check
(X)
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18. At which stage does the commercial executive become involved in the procurement
process?
Early in the planning
process of the procurement
After specification is
developed
After contact with possible
suppliers is made
Check
(X)
19. How many suppliers are usually on your bidders list?
1 or 2 3-5 More than 5
Check
(X)
20. How often do you use following methods of selecting suppliers to your bidder list?
(Check X)
Never Very
rarely
Rarely Don’t
know
Fre-
quently
Very fre-
quently
Always
Sellihca
Internet
Industry
magazines
Visit to exhibitions
Other
21. If ”Other”:
Specify
22. Are you satisfied with the supplier choice in Sellihca?
Very dis-
satisfied
Dis-
satisfied
Somewhat
dissatisfied
Don’t
know
Somewha
t satisfied
Satisfied Very
satisfied
Check
(X)
23. Do you encourage suppliers that are not in Sellihca to register there?
Yes No Not relevant
Check
(X)
24. How often do you publish requests for information in Doffin/TED?
Never Very
rarely
Rarely Don’t
know
Fre-
quently
Very fre-
quently
Always
Check
(X)
25. How often do you announce contract awards in Doffin/TED?
Never 1-3 times
pr year
More than
3 times pr year
Announce all
assignments
(over 3,2 mil NOK)
Don’t know
Check
(X)
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26. Do you have an internal procedure that ensures that contract awards become
announced in Doffin/TED?
Yes No Don’t know
Check
(X)
27. How do you agree with following propositions? (Check X)
Strong
ly ag-
ree
Agre
e
Some-
what
agree
Don’t
know
Some-
what
dis-
agree
Dis-
agre
e
Strong
ly dis-
agree
I can get more competition by
publishing more requests for
information in Doffin/TED
I can get more competition by
announcing more contract awards in
Doffin/TED
Sellihca provides a sufficient choice of
suppliers
28. Have you ever purchased from other countries than the EEA?
Yes No Don’t know
Check
(X)
If ”Yes”:
29. How did the deliveries work?
The product was The delivery was Other
poor according to
agreement
delayed according to
agreement
(specify if needed)
Check
(X)
30. Do you still invite these suppliers to tenders?
Yes No Don’t know
Check
(X)
31. Do you invite suppliers from outside the EEA?
Yes No Don’t know
Check
(X)
32. How often do you invite suppliers from: (Check X)
Never Very
rarely
Rarely Don’t
know
Fre-
quently
Very fre-
quently
Always
Norway?
the EU?
outside the EU?
33. How often are you satisfied with the deliveries from: (Check X)
Never Very
rarely
Rarely Don’t
know
Fre-
quently
Very fre-
quently
Always
Norway?
the EU?
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outside the EU?
34. Do you use templates when preparing requests for quotation?
Yes No Don’t know
Check
(X)
35. Have you the last 2 years made changes to the following? (Check X)
Yes No Don’t know
- in templates for request
for quotations
- in technical descriptions
36. How often do you use following standard terms of contract? (Check X)
Never Very
rarely
Rarely Don’t
know
Fre-
quently
Very fre-
quently
Always
NL01
AKB1988
AKS89
AIS89
Fidic, Orgalime, ICC
NS
Kolemo
SSA, IKT
In-house terms of contract
Other
37. If ”Other”:
Specify
38. How often do you use following specification? (Check X)
Never Very
rarely
Rarely Don’t
know
Fre-
quently
Very fre-
quently
Always
Detail specification
Function- or performance
based specification
Industry-standard
specification
Suppliers’ specification
39. How often do you allow for the following?
Never Very
rarely
Rarely Don’t
know
Fre-
quently
Very fre-
quently
Always
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That RFQ is prepared in
English
That a bid can be
submitted in English
40. What is the share of Norwegian language RFQs in your company, ca?
Under 10% 10-50% 51-70% 71-80% Over 80%
Check
(X)
41. Do you have in-house terms of contract in English?
Yes No Don’t know
Check
(X)
42. How often do you use the following deadlines in competitions with negotiation?
Never Very
rarely
Rarely Don’t
know
Fre-
quently
Very fre-
quently
Always
Less than 24 days
24 days
More than 24 days
43. How often do you use an extended deadline in order to attract new market players?
Never Very rarely Rarely Don’t
know
Fre-
quently
Very fre-
quently
Always
Check
(X)
44. What part of your contracts above the EEA threshold value is in English?
Under 10% 10-50% Over 50% Don’t know
Check
(X)
45. When you enter into a contract with a supplier that doesn’t have a Norwegian
registration number, how do you do it?
Directly Through a Norwegian
representative
Don’t know
Check
(X)
46. How many of your suppliers don’t have a Norwegian registration number, ca?
Less than 1% 1-5% 6-10% 11-20% More than
20%
Don’t
know
Check
(X)
47. What part in total purchases in volume have foreign contracts, ca?
Less than 1% 1-5% 6-10% 11-20% More than
20%
Don’t
know
Check
(X)
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48. Whom do you believe has greater impact on who is awarded the contract?
The technical executive The commercial
executive
Both technical and
commercial executives have
equal impact
Check
(X)
49. Whom do you think should have greater impact on who is awarded the contract?
The technical executive The commercial
executive
Both technical and
commercial executives
should have equal impact
Check
(X)
50. How do you agree with the following statements? (Check X)
Strong
ly ag-
ree
Agre
e
Som
ewha
t ag-
ree
Don’t
know
Some-
what
dis-
agree
Dis-
agre
e
Strong
ly dis-
agree
In my opinion there is a real competition
in the market
I don’t let myself be manipulated by
suppliers
I regularly have to carry out urgent
deliveries
I regularly have too little time to carry
out procurement projects correctly
I don’t have time to check references in
the bid
References provided in the bid give
valuable information regarding the
procurement
It is resource-demanding to administrate
many bidders
It is time-consuming to evaluate many
bids
The submitting deadlines are too short
to attract new market players
The outcome is in too large degree
determined by procurement regulations
I am comfortable with using English as
business language in preparation of RFQ
and in negotiations
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How do you agree with the following statements? (Check X)
51. Announcement of tenders in Sellihca leads to:
Strongly
agree
Agree Somewh
at agree
Don’t
know
Some-
what
disagree
Dis-
agree
Strongly
disagree
Better market
situation
Better products
Higher quality
Better reliability
Reduced delivery
times
Lower risk
Lower prices
52. Announcement of competitions in Doffin/TED leads to:
Strongly
agree
Agree Somewh
at agree
Don’t
know
Some-
what
disagree
Dis-
agree
Strongly
disagree
Better market
situation
Better products
Higher quality
Better reliability
Reduced delivery
times
Lower risk
Lower prices
53. Announcement of awarded contracts in Doffin/TED leads to:
Strongly
agree
Agree Somewh
at agree
Don’t
know
Some-
what
disagree
Dis-
agree
Strongly
disagree
Better market
situation
Better products
Higher quality
Better reliability
Reduced delivery
times
Lower risk
Lower prices
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54. Sending of RFQ to suppliers outside the EEA leads to:
Strongly
agree
Agree Somewh
at agree
Don’t
know
Some-
what
disagree
Dis-
agree
Strongly
disagree
Better market
situation
Better products
Higher quality
Better reliability
Reduced delivery
times
Lower risk
Lower prices
55. Finally, how do you agree with the following statements?
Strong
ly ag-
ree
Agre
e
Som
ewha
t ag-
ree
Don’t
know
Some-
what
disag-
ree
Dis-
ag-
ree
Strong
ly dis-
agree
A high price indicates higher quality
Well-known brands indicate high quality
Well-known suppliers indicate security
I give references and make positive
statements about products that I buy
I give recommendations to colleagues if
suppliers ask about it
I participate with suppliers in product
development
I participate in external user forums
New and unknown suppliers lead to
increased risk
New and unknown suppliers lead to
greater need for training
Unfamiliar brands indicate increased risk
Unfamiliar brands indicate greater need
for training
It is important that the industry has a
common approach to the supplier
market
Established technical standards hamper
technology development
Established templates for RFQ and
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Strong
ly ag-
ree
Agre
e
Som
ewha
t ag-
ree
Don’t
know
Some-
what
disag-
ree
Dis-
ag-
ree
Strong
ly dis-
agree
general contract terms hamper more
competition
Use of internationally known standard
terms of contract encourages
competition
Use of internationally known standard
terms of contract increases our risk
exposure
Use of English in RFQ increases our risk
exposure
It is okay not to announce competitions
in Doffin/TED, because this is common
procedure
It is okay not to announce awarded
contracts in Doffin/TED, because this is
common procedure
It is okay not to announce awarded
contracts in Doffin/TED, because it has
no consequences
It is important that the supplier is known
in our industry
It is important that the supplier knows
our company
It is important that the supplier has a
local presence
It is important that the supplier knows
Norwegian conditions
Networks established by known suppliers
are important for the industry
Replacing a product is unreasonably
costly
Replacing a supplier is unreasonably
costly
I will rather relate to suppliers I already
have a positive experience with
(companies)
I will rather relate to suppliers I know
(persons)
I will rather relate to suppliers my
colleagues are familiar with
I will rather relate to suppliers who have
the same business culture as I
I will rather relate to suppliers who
174
Strong
ly ag-
ree
Agre
e
Som
ewha
t ag-
ree
Don’t
know
Some-
what
disag-
ree
Dis-
ag-
ree
Strong
ly dis-
agree
speak the same language as I
Network from college is important to the
industry
Network from professional life is
important to the industry
I rely on informal references about a
product from my colleagues
I rely on informal references about
suppliers from my colleagues
I rely on formal references about a
product from my colleagues
I rely on formal references about
suppliers from my colleagues
It is better to choose same products as
other energy companies use
It is better to choose same suppliers as
other energy companies use
We should not be a pilot-buyer for new
products and suppliers
It is better to buy from a niche-supplier
to the energy industry than from
suppliers to other industries
It is okay to pay more for deliveries from
a niche-supplier
I would rather buy from a supplier who
only has the EU as market
It is necessary to have several bids to
evaluate
It is okay to pay more if this leads to
reduced delivery times
An extended submitting deadline attracts
new suppliers
It is important to check stated
references
Use of English in the preparation of RFQ
leads to more competition
56. What affect have cartels had on your company?
Specify
57. Comments
Specify
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7.2 Appendix 2 – Survey questionnaire (in Norwegian)
Spørreundersøkelse om
konkurranseforhold i leverandørmarkedet til
energibransjen
Hei
Jeg heter Natalia Dalane og jobber til daglig som kontraktskonsulent i BKK. Jeg er i den
avsluttende fasen med min masteroppgave i markedsføring og konkurranseanalyse ved
NHH. Oppgaven omhandler kartellvirksomhet rettet mot energibransjen i Norge, og
hvordan konkurranse blir brukt for å motvirke dette.
Det har de 10-12 siste årene blitt avslørt en rekke karteller i Norge og EU som berører
energibransjen. Deres selskap er ett av mange energiselskaper som er rammet av
dette. I oppgaven ønsker jeg å se på hvordan dette har påvirket markedssituasjonen,
ved å kartlegge oppfatninger og arbeidsmetodikk hos aktører som er involvert i
anskaffelsesprosesser.
Listen med kontaktpersoner for denne undersøkelsen er hentet fra Sellihca, samt navn
oppgitt av de aktuelle selskapene. Det er imidlertid ikke en forutsetning at
respondenten er bruker av Sellihca. Undersøkelsen retter seg til dem som gjør
anskaffelser, enten teknisk eller kommersiell saksbehandling, uavhengig av hvilket
system de benytter i prosessen. Vi er klar over at noen selskaper benytter avtaler som
er inngått av andre, men det er likevel ønskelig å registrere hvordan de forholder seg
til leverandørmarkedet.
Denne undersøkelse fokuserer på anskaffelser med verdi over EØS-terskel (3,2
MNOK).
Vennligst avsett ca 30 minutter for å besvare spørreskjemaet og gjør det snarest mulig
og innen utgangen av uke 11 (senest innen fredag 19. mars).
Respondentens identitet vil bli anonymisert. Alle besvarelser vil kun bli behandlet av
meg.
De som deltar i undersøkelsen vil få tilsendt resultatet etter semesterets avslutning.
Jeg håper på en god oppslutning og på forhånd takker deg for hjelpen. Dersom det er
spørsmål til utfyllingen, ta gjerne kontakt med meg på e-post adresse
natalia.dalane@bkk.no eller mobil 94 88 33 51.
Med vennlig hilsen
Natalia Dalane
Bergen 03.03.2010
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Der det er mulig å krysse av i flere rubrikker, må du velge den som er mest vanlig.
Spørreskjemaet består av 57 spørsmål. Forsøk å svare på alle spørsmål.
Eventuelle kommentarer kan skrives i slutten av skjemaet.
1. Hva er antall ansatte i ditt selskap?
Mindre enn 100 100-500 Over 500
Kryss av
(X)
2. Type selskap du tilhører til
Produksjonsselskap Nettselskap Fjernvarme Annet
Kryss av
(X)
3. Hvor lenge har du jobbet i bransjen (antall år)?
Mindre enn 3 3-10 Over 10
Kryss av
(X)
4. Arbeider du på merkantil side eller teknisk side i anskaffelser?
Merkantil Teknisk Begge
Kryss av
(X)
5. Hvor godt kjenner du regelverket for offentlige anskaffelser?
Inngående God Trenger opplæring Ikke relevant
Kryss av
(X)
6. Har du kjennskap til at ditt selskap har vært utsatt for kartell?
NB: Et kartell – et samarbeid mellom leverandører for å kontrollere markedspris eller dele
markedet.
Ja Nei Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
Hvis ”Ja”:
7. Innen hvilket område?
Spesifiser
8. Hvilke leverandører vet du var innblandet i dette?
Spesifiser
9. Hvordan ble kartellet avslørt?
Spesifiser
10. Hvordan fikk du kjennskap til kartellet?
Spesifiser
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11. Kjøper du fortsatt fra kartellmedlemmene?
Ja Nei Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
12. Innen det kartellutsatte området, hvor mange leverandører finnes det i
Norge?
3 eller mindre 4-6 Flere enn 6 Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
13. Innen det kartellutsatte området, hvor mange leverandører finnes det i EU?
3 eller mindre 4-6 Flere enn 6 Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
14. Innen det kartellutsatte området, hvor mange leverandører finnes utenfor
EU?
3 eller mindre 4-6 Flere enn 6 Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
15. Hvor mange leverandører spør du når du skal kjøpe innen dette område?
3 eller mindre 4-6 Flere enn 6 Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
16. Tror du at det fortsatt er kartellvirksomhet rettet mot energibransjen?
Ja Nei Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
17. Hvordan organiseres anskaffelser mht kommunikasjon med leverandør?
Kun den tekniske
saksbehandleren er
involvert
Kun den merkantile
saksbehandleren er
involvert
Både den tekniske og den
merkantile saksbehandlere
er involvert
Kryss av
(X)
18. På hvilket tidspunkt blir den kommersielle saksbehandleren tatt inn i anskaffelsen?
Tidlig under planlegging av
anskaffelser
Etter spesifikasjon er
utarbeidet
Etter at man har tatt
kontakt med mulige
leverandører
Kryss av
(X)
19. Hvor mange leverandører pleier å være på din tilbyderliste?
1 eller 2 3-5 Over 5
Kryss av
(X)
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20. Hvor ofte benytter du følgende måter til å velge ut leverandører? (Kryss av)
Aldri Svært
sjelden
Sjelden Vet ikke Ofte Svært
ofte
Alltid
Søker i Sellihca
Søker på internett
Bransjeblader
Besøk av messer
Annet
21. Om ”Annet”:
Spesifiser
22. Er du fornøyd med leverandørutvalget i Sellihca?
Ikke
fornøyd
Veldig lite
fornøyd
Lite
fornøyd
Vet ikke Litt
fornøyd
Fornøyd Veldig
fornøyd
Kryss av
(X)
23. Oppfordrer du leverandører som ikke finnes i Sellihca om å registrere seg der?
Ja Nei Ikke relevant
Kryss av
(X)
24. Hvor ofte utlyser du konkurranser i Doffin/TED?
Aldri Svært
sjelden
Sjelden Vet ikke Ofte Svært
ofte
Alltid
Kryss av
(X)
25. Hvor ofte kunngjør dere inngåtte kontrakter i Doffin/TED?
Aldri 1-3 ganger
pr år
Over 3 ganger
pr år
Kunngjør alle
tildelinger
(over 3,3 mil NOK)
Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
26. Har dere en intern rutine som sikrer at inngåtte kontrakter blir kunngjort i
Doffin/TED?
Ja Nei Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
27. Hvor enig er du i følgende påstander? (Kryss av)
Veldig
enig
Enig Noe
enig
Vet
ikke
Noe
uenig
Ikke
enig
Svært
uenig
Jeg tror jeg ville få mer konkurranse ved
å utlyse flere forespørsler i Doffin/TED
Jeg tror jeg ville få mer konkurranse ved
å kunngjøre flere inngåtte kontrakter i
Doffin/TED
Sellihca gir et tilstrekkelig
leverandørutvalg
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28. Har du noen gang kjøpt fra andre land enn EØS?
Ja Nei Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
Hvis ”Ja”:
29. Hvordan fungerte leveransene?
Produktet var Leveransen var Annet
dårlig i henhold til
avtale
forsinket i henhold
til avtale
(spesifiser ved behov)
Kryss av
(X)
30. Forespør dere disse leverandører fortsatt?
Ja Nei Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
31. Forespør dere andre leverandører fra utenfor EØS?
Ja Nei Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
32. Hvor ofte forespør dere leverandører fra: (Kryss as)
Aldri Svært
sjelden
Sjelden Vet ikke Ofte Svært
ofte
Alltid
Norge?
EU?
utenfor EU?
33. Hvor ofte er dere fornøyd med leveransene fra: (Kryss as)
Aldri Svært
sjelden
Sjelden Vet ikke Ofte Svært
ofte
Alltid
Norge?
EU?
utenfor EU?
34. Benytter dere maler for å utarbeide konkurransegrunnlag?
Ja Nei Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
35. Har dere de 2 siste årene gjort endringer i følgende? (Kryss av)
Ja Nei Vet ikke
- i maler for forespørsler
- i tekniske beskrivelser
36. Hvor ofte benytter du følgende standard vilkår? (Kryss av)
Aldri Svært
sjelden
Sjelden Vet ikke Ofte Svært
ofte
Alltid
NL01
AKB1988
AKS89
AIS89
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Fidic, Orgalime, ICC
NS-bygg standarder
Kolemo
SSA, IKT
Egenutviklede standard
vilkår
Andre
37. Om ”Andre”:
Spesifiser
38. Hvor ofte benytter dere følgende spesifikasjon? (Kryss av)
Aldri Svært
sjelden
Sjelden Vet ikke Ofte Svært
ofte
Alltid
Detaljspesifikasjon
Funksjons- eller
ytelsesbasert spesifikasjon
Bransje-standard
spesifikasjon
Leverandørens
spesifikasjon
39. Hvor ofte åpner dere for følgende:
Aldri Svært
sjelden
Sjelden Vet ikke Ofte Svært
ofte
Alltid
At konkurransegrunnlaget
utarbeides på engelsk
At tilbud kan leveres på
engelsk
40. Andel av forespørsler utarbeidet kun på norsk i ditt selskap, ca?
Under 10% 10-50% 51-70% 71-80% Over 80%
Kryss av
(X)
41. Har dere egenutviklede standard vilkår skrevet på engelsk?
Ja Nei Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
42. Hvor ofte bruker dere følgende tilbudsfrister i konkurranser med forhandlinger?
Aldri Svært
sjelden
Sjelden Vet ikke Ofte Svært
ofte
Alltid
Mindre enn 24 dager
24 dager
Mer enn 24 dager
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43. Hvor ofte benytter dere en utvidet tilbudsfrist for å tiltrekke nye markedsaktører?
Aldri Svært
sjelden
Sjelden Vet ikke Ofte Svært ofte Alltid
Kryss av
(X)
44. Hvor stor andel av dine kontrakter over EØS-terskelverdi er utformet på engelsk?
Under 10% 10-50% Over 50% Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
45. Når du inngår en avtale med en leverandør som ikke har et norsk
organisasjonsnummer, hvordan gjør du dette?
Direkte Via en norsk representant Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
46. Hvor mange av dine leverandører har ikke et norsk organisasjonsnummer, ca?
Mindre enn 1% 1-5% 6-10% 11-20% Over 20% Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
47. Hvor stor andel av totalt kjøp i volum utgjør slike utenlandske avtaler, ca?
Mindre enn 1% 1-5% 6-10% 11-20% Over 20% Vet ikke
Kryss av
(X)
48. Hvem tror du har mest innflytelse på hvem som tildeles kontrakten?
Den tekniske
saksbehandleren
Den merkantile
saksbehandleren
Den tekniske og den
merkantile saksbehandlere
har like stor innflytelse
Kryss av
(X)
49. Hvem mener du bør ha mest innflytelse på hvem som tildeles kontrakten?
Den tekniske
saksbehandleren
Den merkantile
saksbehandleren
Den tekniske og den
merkantile saksbehandlere
har like stor innflytelse
Kryss av
(X)
50. Hvor enig er du i følgende påstander? (Kryss av)
Veldig
enig
Enig Noe
enig
Vet
ikke
Noe
uenig
Ikke
enig
Svært
uenig
Jeg opplever at det er en reell
konkurranse i markedet
Jeg lar meg ikke manipulere av
leverandører
Jeg må ofte gjennomføre
hasteleveranser
Jeg har ofte for lite tid til å gjennomføre
anskaffelser på en riktig måte
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Jeg har ikke tid til å sjekke referanser i
tilbudet
Referanser oppgitt i tilbudet gir verdifull
informasjon for anskaffelsen
Det er ressurskrevende å administrere
mange tilbydere
Det er tidskrevende å ha mange tilbud å
evaluere
Tilbudsfristene er for kort til å tiltrekke
nye aktører
Utfallet av prosessen er i for stor grad
styrt av rutiner og regelverk
Jeg er bekvem med å benytte engelsk
som forretningsspråk i forespørsler og
forhandlinger
Hvor enig er du i følgende påstander? (Kryss av)
51. Utlysing av konkurranser i Sellihca fører til:
Veldig
enig
Enig Noe
enig
Vet ikke Noe
uenig
Ikke
enig
Svært
uenig
Bedre
markedssituasjon
Bedre produkt
Høyere kvalitet
Større pålitelighet
Kortere leveringstider
Lavere risiko
Lavere priser
52. Utlysing av konkurranser i Doffin/TED fører til:
Veldig
enig
Enig Noe
enig
Vet ikke Noe
uenig
Ikke
enig
Svært
uenig
Bedre
markedssituasjon
Bedre produkt
Høyere kvalitet
Større pålitelighet
Kortere leveringstider
Lavere risiko
Lavere priser
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53. Kunngjøring av tildelte kontrakter i Doffin/TED fører til:
Veldig
enig
Enig Noe
enig
Vet ikke Noe
uenig
Ikke
enig
Svært
uenig
Bedre
markedssituasjon
Bedre produkt
Høyere kvalitet
Større pålitelighet
Kortere leveringstider
Lavere risiko
Lavere priser
54. Utsending av forespørsler til leverandører utenfor EØS fører til:
Veldig
enig
Enig Noe
enig
Vet ikke Noe
uenig
Ikke
enig
Svært
uenig
Bedre
markedssituasjon
Bedre produkt
Høyere kvalitet
Større pålitelighet
Kortere leveringstider
Lavere risiko
Lavere priser
55. Til avslutning ønsker jeg at du tar stilling til følgende påstander:
Veldig
enig
Enig Noe
enig
Vet
ikke
Noe
uenig
Ikke
enig
Svært
uenig
Høy pris betyr høy kvalitet
Kjente merkenavn betyr høy kvalitet
Kjente leverandører betyr trygghet
Jeg gir referanser og positive uttalelser
om produkter jeg kjøper
Jeg gir anbefalinger til andre
saksbehandlere dersom leverandører ber
om det
Jeg deltar i utvikling av produkter
sammen med leverandører
Jeg deltar i eksterne brukerforum
Nye og ukjente leverandører medfører
økt risiko
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Veldig
enig
Enig Noe
enig
Vet
ikke
Noe
uenig
Ikke
enig
Svært
uenig
Nye og ukjente leverandører medfører
stort behov for opplæring
Ukjente merkenavn medfører økt risiko
Ukjente merkenavn medfører økt behov
for opplæring
Det er viktig at bransjen har en felles
tilnærming til leverandørmarkedet
Etablerte tekniske standarder forhindrer
teknologiutvikling
Etablerte maler for forespørsler og
generelle kontraktsvilkår forhindrer mer
konkurranse
Bruk av internasjonalt kjente standard
kontraktvilkår er konkurransefremmende
Bruk av internasjonalt kjente standard
kontraktvilkår øker vår risikoeksponering
Bruk av engelsk i forespørsler og
kontrakter øker vår risikoeksponering
Det er greit å ikke utlyse i konkurranser
Doffin/TED, fordi dette er vanlig i
bransjen
Det er greit å ikke kunngjøre inngåtte
kontrakter i Doffin/TED, fordi dette er
vanlig i bransjen
Det er greit å ikke kunngjøre inngåtte
kontrakter i Doffin/TED, fordi dette får
ikke noe konsekvens
Det er viktig at leverandør er kjent i vår
bransje
Det er viktig at leverandør kjenner vår
bedrift
Det er viktig at leverandør befinner seg i
nærheten
Det er viktig at leverandør kjenner til
norske forhold
Nettverk bygget av kjente leverandører
er viktig for bransjen
Å skifte et produkt er urimelig
kostnadsdrivende
Å skifte en leverandør er
kostnadsdrivende
Jeg vil helst forholde meg til
leverandører jeg har allerede positiv
erfaring med (selskap)
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Veldig
enig
Enig Noe
enig
Vet
ikke
Noe
uenig
Ikke
enig
Svært
uenig
Jeg vil helst forholde meg til
leverandører jeg kjenner (person)
Jeg vil helst forholde meg til
leverandører mine kolleger kjenner
Jeg vil helst forholde meg til
leverandørene som har felles
forretningskultur med meg
Jeg vil helst forholde meg til
leverandørene som snakker samme
språk som jeg
Nettverk fra studietiden er viktig for
bransjen
Nettverk bygget i arbeidslivet er viktig
for bransjen
Jeg vektlegger i stor grad uformelle
referanser om et produkt fra mine
kolleger
Jeg vektlegger i stor grad uformelle
referanser om en leverandør fra mine
kolleger
Jeg vektlegger i stor grad formelle
referanser om et produkt fra mine
kolleger
Jeg vektlegger i stor grad formelle
referanser om en leverandør fra mine
kolleger
Det er best å velge samme produkter
som andre energiselskaper benytter
Det er best å velge samme leverandører
som andre energiselskaper benytter
Vi skal ikke være pilot-kunde for nye
produkter og leverandører
Det er bedre å kjøpe fra nisjeleverandør
til energibransjen enn fra leverandører til
andre bransjer
Det er greit å betale mer for leveranser
fra en nisjeleverandør
Jeg vil helst kjøpe fra en leverandør som
kun har EU som et marked
Det er nødvendig å ha flere tilbud å
evaluere
Det er greit å betale mer dersom dette
medfører kortere leveringstid
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Veldig
enig
Enig Noe
enig
Vet
ikke
Noe
uenig
Ikke
enig
Svært
uenig
En utvidet tilbudsfrist tiltrekker nye
leverandører
Det er viktig å sjekke oppgitte referanser
Bruk av engelsk i utarbeidelse av
konkurransegrunnlaget fører til mer
konkurranse
56. Hvilken virkning har kartellvirksomhet hatt for deres selskap?
Spesifiser
57. Eventuelle kommentarer
Spesifiser
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7.3 Appendix 3 – Attitude constructs according to Cialdini
‘Reciprocation’
Statistics
55a) 55b) 55c)
Valid 118 118 118N
Missing 0 0 0
Mean 4.43 3.75 2.69
Median 5.00 3.00 3.00
Mode 3 3 3
Std. Deviation 1.550 1.346 .882
Skewness -.109 .674 1.098
Std. Error of Skewness .223 .223 .223
Minimum 1 1 1
Maximum 7 7 6
Min=1, ’Strongly Agree’, Max=7, ’Strongly Disagree’.
Commitment and consistency
Statistics
55d) 55e) 55f) 55g)
Valid 118 118 118 118N
Missing 0 0 0 0
Mean 2.98 3.75 4.14 3.95
Median 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00
Mode 3 2a 3 3
Std. Deviation 1.240 1.731 1.734 1.858
Skewness 1.017 .391 .068 .214
Std. Error of Skewness .223 .223 .223 .223
Minimum 1 1 1 1
Maximum 7 7 7 7
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown
Social Proof
Statistics
55h) 55i) 55j) 55k) 55l) 55m) 55n) 55o) 55p) 55q) 55r) 55s) 55t)
Valid 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118N
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 3.05 2.87 3.11 3.03 2.94 4.03 4.68 2.97 4.45 4.12 4.53 4.48 4.42
Median 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Mode 3 3 3 3 2 3 6 3 4 4 4 4 4
Std.
Deviation
1.131 1.017 1.084 1.151 1.385 1.453 1.501 1.205 1.278 1.492 1.506 1.431 1.398
Skewness .800 .705 .596 .840 .755 .023 -.527 .454 .053 .013 -.020 -.028 .044
Std. Error of
Skewness
.223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maximum 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7
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Liking
Statistics
55u) 55v 55w) 55x) 55y) 55z) 55aa) 55bb) 55cc) 55dd) 55ee) 55ff)
Valid 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118N
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 2.60 3.80 4.02 2.50 3.78 4.25 4.33 3.88 4.61 4.79 3.90 3.48
Median 2.00 3.00 3.00 2.00 3.50 5.00 5.00 3.00 5.00 5.00 3.00 3.00
Mode 2 3 3 2 3 5 5 3 3 5 3 2a
Std.
Deviation
1.087 1.625 1.622 1.175 1.575 1.427 1.480 1.660 1.649 1.478 1.566 1.801
Skewness 1.338 .190 .168 1.351 .278 -.155 -.154 .546 -.180 -.321 .321 .488
Std. Error of
Skewness
.223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maximum 6 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown
Authority
Statistics
55gg) 55hh) 55ii) 55jj) 55kk) 55ll) 55mm) 55nn) 55oo)
Valid 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 118N
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Mean 4.68 3.03 4.19 4.13 3.06 3.07 4.22 4.36 3.93
Median 5.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 4.00
Mode 6 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 5
Std. Deviation 1.643 1.374 1.473 1.453 1.193 1.153 1.457 1.454 1.652
Skewness -.257 .979 .047 .098 .897 .853 .165 -.099 -.040
Std. Error of Skewness .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223 .223
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maximum 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Scarcity
Statistics
55pp) 55qq) 55rr)
Valid 118 118 118N
Missing 0 0 0
Mean 4.22 4.95 5.09
Median 4.00 5.00 5.00
Mode 4 6 6
Std. Deviation 1.397 1.370 1.450
Skewness .210 -.475 -.576
Std. Error of Skewness .223 .223 .223
Minimum 1 1 1
Maximum 7 7 7
’Sensitive’ questions
Statistics
55p) 55r) 55s) 55t)
Valid 73 71 68 58N
Missing 45 47 50 60
Mean 4.73 4.89 4.84 4.84
Median 5.00 6.00 5.50 5.00
Mode 5 6 6 6
Std. Deviation 1.566 1.864 1.809 1.908
Skewness -.489 -.594 -.624 -.664
Std. Error of Skewness .281 .285 .291 .314
Minimum 1 1 1 1
Maximum 7 7 7 7
